PAUL CLAIR LENTZ, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Paul Lentz appealed a trial court's denial of his motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence for attempted first-degree murder. The appellate court affirmed the denial, but on the merits rather than on the trial court's procedural grounds, holding that the use of a firearm was not an essential element of attempted first-degree murder and therefore reclassification as a life felony under Florida law was proper.
The court held that the use of a firearm is not an essential element of attempted first-degree murder. The essential elements are only (1) intent to commit murder and (2) some act toward commission of the murder. While Lentz happened to commit the act with a firearm, this does not make the firearm's use an essential element of the crime, and therefore reclassification as a life felony was proper.
[1] An error in sentencing that causes a defendant to be incarcerated for a greater length of time than the law permits is fundamental and can be corrected on appeal or by th…
[2] A defendant is not precluded from seeking collateral relief from an allegedly illegal sentence simply because the issue was raised on direct appeal, if in fact no sentenc…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An error in sentencing that causes a defendant to be incarcerated for a greater length of time than the law permits is fundamental, and can be corrected on appeal or by the trial court in collateral proceedings.”
Establishes that sentencing errors affecting the length of incarceration are fundamental errors subject to correction in collateral proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLentz was convicted of attempted first-degree murder, a first-degree felony. He was sentenced as a life felony under Florida Statutes Section 775.087(…
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PER CURIAM.
Paul Clair Lentz has appealed an order of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. We affirm, but not for the reason propounded by the trial court.
The trial court denied Lentz’s motion on the ground that he had raised the legality of his sentence on direct appeal. An error in sentencing that causes a defendant to be incarcerated for a greater length of time than the law permits is fundamental, and can be corrected on appeal or by the trial court in collateral proceedings. Adamo v. State, 496 So. 2d 252, 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). A review of this court’s records in Lentz v. State, 498 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), reversed 521 So. 2d 106 (Fla.1988), shows that Lentz raised no sentencing error on direct appeal. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that Lentz was precluded from seeking collateral relief from his allegedly illegal sentence.
On the merits of Lentz’s motion, Section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that a first-degree felony shall be reclassified to a life felony if “during the commission of such felony the defendant carries, displays, uses, threatens, or attempts to use” a firearm. Reclassification is not permitted for “a felony in which the use of a weapon or firearm is an essential element.” Lentz was convicted of attempted first-degree murder, a first-degree felony, and was sentenced under the foregoing provision as for a life felony. He contended in his motion that, because the charge against him was worded as “attempted first-degree murder with a firearm,” the use of a firearm was an essential element so that the offense could not be reclassified.
This argument is without merit. In Strickland v. State, 437 So. 2d 150 (Fla.1983), the Court held that the use of a firearm was not an essential element of the offense of “attempted first-degree murder with a firearm.” Strickland at 152. Lentz contends that Evans v. State, 528 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), is inconsistent with Strickland. However, the issue in Evans was whether a defendant could be convicted of both first-degree murder with a firearm, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. For this purpose, the court included the use of a firearm as an essential element of “attempted first-degree murder with a firearm,” Evans at 126, but noted that it did so because the use of a firearm had been used to enhance the degree of the appellant’s offense.
The essential elements of attempted first-degree murder are 1) the intent to commit murder and 2) the doing of some act toward commission of the murder. §§ 782.04(1), 777.04(1), Fla.Stat. (1985). Lentz argues that, because his only “act toward commission of the murder” was the firing of a gun, in this sense also the use of a firearm was an essential element of his offense. However, a conviction of attempted first-degree murder does not require that the act be committed with a firearm, or in any other specific way, so long as the accused takes action beyond mere preparation. Therefore, that the accused happens to commit the particular act with a firearm does not render the use of that firearm an essential element of the crime.
Based on the foregoing, the order of the trial court denying Lentz’s motion to correct an illegal sentence is affirmed, not because the issue was addressed on direct appeal, but because the arguments raised in the motion are without merit.
Affirmed.
SHIVERS, C.J., and JOANOS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
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KIO v. State, 624 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…eated the reclassification as a matter of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., State v. Whitehead, 472 So. 2d 730 (Fla.1985); Strickland v. State, 437 So. 2d 150 (Fla.1983); Tripp v. State, 610 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 1st DCA [*747] 1992); Lentz v. State, 567 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Burgess v. State, 524 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Parker v. State, 593 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Williams v. State, 407 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). It appears the only time the reclassification does not apply is wh…
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Danzy v. State, 603 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…e pursuant to a plea bargain); Perkins v. Mayo, 92 So. 2d 641 (Fla.1957) (defendant cannot be indicted on one offense and convicted for another, even though the offenses are closely related or of the same general character). See also Lentz v. State, 567 So. 2d 997, 998 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“An error in sentencing that causes a defendant to be incarcerated for a great [*1323] er length of time than the law permits is fundamental, and can be corrected on appeal or by the trial court in collateral proceedings”).…
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State v. Richards, 639 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…t. (1989). It is not necessary that the act which causes the death be committed with a weapon. The fact that an accused uses a weapon to commit an offense does not render the use of the weapon an essential element of the offense. See Lentz v. State, 567 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Nor does an allegation in an information concerning the use of a weapon transform the use of the weapon into an essential element of the offense. In Lareau v. State, 573 So. 2d 813 (Fla.1991), the supreme court upheld the recla…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Smith v. State, 521 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1988)
- Strickland v. State, 437 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1983)
- Evans v. State, 528 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Lentz v. State, 498 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Adamo v. State, 496 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)