IVAN AGUILA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ivan Aguila was convicted of grand theft based on evidence obtained from a vehicle stop that lacked reasonable suspicion. The Florida appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the officer's stop was illegal because the observed conduct—driving through a parking lot at 4 A.M. with parking lights on—did not rise to the level of well-founded suspicion required under the Fourth Amendment.
The court held that the stop was illegal because the factors known to the officer at the time—a vehicle driving through a parking lot with parking lights at 4 A.M. in an area where early morning fishing activity is not uncommon—did not reach the level of well-founded suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop. Consequently, the evidence obtained from the illegal stop was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been suppressed.
[1] An investigatory stop is illegal when the officer lacks a "well-founded suspicion" of criminal activity based on the totality of the circumstances known at the time of th…
[2] Driving through a parking lot at 4 A.M. …
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the factors known to the officer at the time of the stop did not reach the level of a "well-founded suspicion" justifying further investigation to determine whether the auto's occupants had committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime.”
Establishes the legal standard for investigatory stops and finds it was not met here
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn officer observed Aguila's vehicle driving through the parking lot of Robbie's Boat Rentals and an adjacent seafood establishment at 4 A.M. using on…
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[*1008] PER CURIAM.
Aguila appeals his conviction and sentence for grand theft. We reverse.
An officer observed Ivan Aguila and his passengers driving through the parking lot of Robbie’s Boat Rentals and an adjacent seafood place at 4 A.M., using only the automobile’s parking lights. The car pulled out to the adjoining major roadway directly adjacent to a bridge where bridge fishermen sometimes fished in the early morning hours. The headlights were turned on as the auto reached the road.
Based solely upon this observation, the officer stopped the vehicle. The officer was neither responding to a BOLO nor acting upon an observation indicating the possibility of criminal activity. Only subsequent to this stop did backup police inform the officer that Robbie’s had been burglarized. The officer then searched Aguila’s vehicle and retrieved two large bags full of cigarette packages. Aguila and his passengers were arrested. Subsequently, the trial court denied Aguila’s motion to suppress the physical evidence and Aguila was convicted of grand theft.
At trial, the arresting officer virtually admitted that he had no founded suspicion of criminal activity. When asked: “Why did you want to investigate further, did you have a hunch that there was some crime— [?],” the officer responded: “Not a specific hunch but I wanted to — I wanted to see who they were and, what they were doing there.” In the instant case, the factors known to the officer at the time of the stop did not reach the level of a “well-founded suspicion” justifying further investigation to determine whether the auto’s occupants had committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. The vehicle when spotted was closer to the seafood shack than to Robbie’s. Early morning fishing activity is not unusual. Considering the location of the vehicle and the early morning activity, not uncommon to the area, we conclude the stop in the instant case was illegal. See Ruddack v. State, 537 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (observation of individual in high crime area held insufficient to justify investigatory stop); Gipson v. State, 537 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (bare suspicion of criminal activity is insufficient to justify investigatory stop).
Abraham v. State, 532 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); McCloud v. State, 491 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Further, the cigarette packages found in Aguila’s car, as fruit of the illegal stop, should have been suppressed by the court below. See McCloud, 491 So. 2d at 1167; see also Earman v. State, 265 So. 2d 695 (Fla.1972).
Accordingly, the order denying the motion to suppress is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to vacate appellant’s conviction.
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Estep v. State, 597 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…e simply insufficient to support the stop. The officer said that the reason he stopped the car was to find out why the occupants wanted to go into a closed service station. This does not rise to the level of a founded suspicion. See Aguila v. State, 567 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Ward v. State, 453 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); State v. Stevens, 354 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). As argued by appellant, these circumstances are equally suggestive of travel-weary tourists looking for a restroom or a cup…
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Wilson v. State, 734 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…s routine practice during traffic stops to request occupants to remain in the vehicle. Based on the officer’s own testimony, we can conclude that he did not have the requisite founded suspicion of criminal activity for the stop. See Aguila v. State, 567 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). The state argues that, notwithstanding the absence of a founded suspicion for the passenger’s detention, the deputy was justified in ordering the passenger to return to and remain in the vehicle to facilitate officer safety. In…
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State v. Ramos, 598 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…ress, during which he stated he had a hunch about the woman and decided to speak to her. As the defendant correctly points out, there is ample case law which states that a hunch does not rise to the level of a founded suspicion. See Aguila v. State, 567 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Williams v. State, 564 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Turner v. State, 552 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Sharpless v. State, 549 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). However, in this case, when the officer spoke to the woman, he was…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968)
- Earman v. State, 265 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1972)
- Gipson v. State, 537 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- McCLOUD v. State, 491 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Amin Ruddack v. State, 537 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Abraham v. State, 532 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)