JOHN LANE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Lane pleaded nolo contendere to carrying a concealed firearm and being a felon in possession of a firearm, but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The court affirmed the denial, holding that the officer had probable cause to believe a concealed firearm offense was occurring based on the ordinary observation standard, even though only a small portion of the gun's butt was visible.
The court held that the officer had probable cause to believe a concealed firearm offense was occurring. The relevant test is whether an average person, through ordinary observation, would recognize an object as a firearm, not whether a trained police officer would recognize it. Because only a small portion of the gun was exposed, an ordinary person would not by ordinary observation recognize it as a firearm, satisfying the concealment requirement.
[1] A firearm is not concealed within the meaning of the statute when its butt, readily recognizable as such, is visible in open view on the seat of a vehicle.
[2] A firearm is not concealed within the meaning of the statute when its butt is visible between the driver's seat and the center part of a vehicle.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The test is "whether an individual, standing near a person with a firearm or beside a vehicle in which a person with a firearm is seated, may by ordinary observation know the questioned object to be a firearm."”
Establishes the proper legal standard for determining whether a firearm is concealed under Florida law—based on what an ordinary person would observe, not a trained officer.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice encountered Lane in a closed public park and ordered him to leave. As Lane entered his car, an officer observed something shiny protruding from…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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COPE, Judge.
Defendant John Lane pled nolo conten-dere to the charges of carrying a concealed firearm in violation of subsection 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1989), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of section 790.23, Florida Statutes (1989), with a reservation of a right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress the firearm.
The arresting officer encountered the defendant in a public park which was closed. He ordered defendant to leave the park and accompanied him to his ear. When the defendant entered the car, the officer observed something shiny protruding from between two armrests in the front seat. The officer stated, “From looking at the back of it, it looked as though it was an object, a weapon.” The visible portion of the object was the back of the butt of a pistol. Approximately ten percent of the handgun was exposed with the remainder being concealed. The officer ordered the defendant out of the car, secured the weapon, and arrested defendant for carrying a concealed firearm. Defendant moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that it was not concealed and was impermissibly seized.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress.
The question was whether the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that the felony of carrying a concealed firearm was being committed in his presence. En-sor v. State, 403 So. 2d 349, 353 (Fla.1981).
The test is “whether an individual, standing near a person with a firearm or beside a vehicle in which a person with a firearm is seated, may by ordinary observation know the questioned object to be a firearm.” Id. at 355.
It is settled that “the permissible and legal observations of a police observer in making an arrest and the observation of an average person making normal contact with an individual are clearly not the same.” Id. The determination for the officer, in other words, was whether an average individual would by ordinary observation know the questioned object to be a firearm. Here, only a small portion of the gun was exposed to view. While a trained police officer recognized it as being a portion of a handgun, that does not establish that an ordinary person would by ordinary observation so recognize it. On this record there was probable cause to believe that the object was a concealed firearm within the meaning of Ensor. See Cross v. State, 432 So. 2d 780, 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (inquiry is whether officer had “knowledge of facts and circumstances which would warrant an individual of reasonable caution in believing an offense had been committed.”).
The cases relied on by defendant do not compel a contrary conclusion. Several cases have held that where the butt of a gun, readily recognizable as such, is visible in open view on the seat of a vehicle, it is not concealed within the meaning of the statute. See Cope v. State, 523 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 531 So. 2d 1355 (Fla.1988); State v. Quinn, 518 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Mitchell v. State, 494 So. 2d 498, 499-500 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
The same analysis has been applied where the butt of a pistol was visible between the driver’s seat and the center part of the vehicle. See Taylor v. State, 552 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), review denied, 563 So. 2d 634 (Fla.1990).
By contrast, in the present case only a small portion of the weapon was visible. The motion to suppress was correctly denied.
Affirmed.
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Citator
Cited By
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L.G. v. State, 693 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…ontrast, the firearm was underneath the driver’s seat, in which position it was concealed for purposes of the concealed firearm statute. The remaining cases relied on by L.G. are factually distinguishable for the reasons expressed in Lane v. State, 567 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Affirmed. * L.G. was also adjudicated delinquent for violation of subsection 790.22(3), Florida Statutes, which prohibits possession of a firearm by a minor under eighteen years of age, subject to certain exceptions not…
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State v. Dorelus, 720 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…at the handgun was within the arresting officer’s “open view” did not preclude a finding that it was a concealed firearm within the meaning of section 790.001(2). See State v. Strachan, 549 So. 2d 235, 236 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); see also Lane v. State, 567 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Appellee primarily relies on State v. Quinn, 518 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), in which this court affirmed the dismissal of an information where a gun sticking out from under the sheet being used as a seat cover in defe…
Authorities Cited
- Elton E. Ensor v. State, 403 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1981)
- Mizell v. Lawson Lamar, 432 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Railey Cross v. State, 432 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Cope v. State, 523 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)
- Mitchell v. State, 494 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- State v. Quinn, 518 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Taylor v. State, 552 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)