MICHELE J. MEASOM, APPELLANT,
v.
RAINBOW CONNECTION PRESCHOOL, INC., ETC., APPELLEE
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Michele Measom appealed a trial court's reduction of a jury award for future medical expenses by 70% based on collateral source setoff. The court reversed, holding that Section 768.76 of the Florida Statutes does not permit reduction of future medical expense awards for unearned collateral source benefits dependent on future employment.
Section 768.76 does not authorize reduction of future medical expense awards for collateral source benefits that are not yet earned or available, particularly those dependent on future employment. Collateral source benefits are not 'otherwise available' if dependent on future employment, and the statute expressly precludes such setoff by prohibiting reduction for collateral sources where subrogation rights exist.
[1] A trial court may not reduce a future medical expense award by collateral source benefits that are not yet available to the plaintiff.
[2] The collateral source statute does not authorize the deduction of collateral sources to which the insured may be entitled in the future.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Collateral source benefits are not "otherwise available" to the insured at the time the court reduces the award if such benefits are dependent upon future employment.”
Establishes that future contingent benefits cannot be used as a basis for setoff under the statute
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKristina Measom was injured while attending Rainbow Connection Preschool. A jury awarded $2,000 for past medical expenses and $8,000 for future medica…
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HARRIS, Judge.
Michele J. Measom, individually and as guardian of her daughter, Kristina, sued for damages for injuries sustained by Kristina while attending preschool. Only those damages awarded to Measom individually for future medical expenses are the subject of this appeal.
It was agreed prior to trial that any setoff because of the collateral source doctrine would be determined by the court after the jury verdict. The jury returned a verdict of $2,000 for past medical expenses and $8,000 for future medical expenses. The trial court then reduced both awards by 70%. Measom appeals claiming that Section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1989) does not authorize the court to setoff unearned collateral source benefits from future medical expenses. We agree and reverse.
Collateral source benefits are not “otherwise available” to the insured at the time the court reduces the award if such benefits are dependent upon future employment. The statute does not purport to benefit the tortfeasor by deducting collateral sources to which the insured may be entitled in the future.
In addition, the statute expressly precludes such setoff. Section 768.76(1) provides that “there shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a right of subrogation exists.” The Florida Supreme Court in Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. v. Matthews, 498 So. 2d 421 (Fla.1986) held that Florida has long recognized the subrogation rights of an insurer to recover payments made to an insured for injuries which were caused by a tortfeasor. While it is true that Measom’s insurance carrier did not have a contractual right of subrogation, Section 768.76(1) does not require a contractual right. Matthews did not mention contractual subrogation, but referred instead to the “long recognized subrogation rights of an insurer” and relied on an old common law subrogation case as authority.1
For the foregoing reasons this matter is reversed with instructions to reinstate the entire jury award for future medical expenses.
REVERSED.
COWART and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. . Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Campbell, 104 Fla. 274, 139 So. 886 (1932).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Campbell, 104 Fla. 274 (Fla. 1932)
- Blue Cross & Blue Shield OF Fla., Inc. v. Matthews, 498 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1986)
- Robinson v. Ebie Eavey, 104 Fla. 398 (Fla. 1932)