JONATHAN A. BRANCH
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Jonathan A. Branch appeals his conviction for burglary of a dwelling with damage exceeding $1,000, arguing insufficient evidence showed he was a principal to the crime when he remained underneath an elevated home while a codefendant entered the living area above. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, holding that the area underneath the home qualified as a dwelling and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the area underneath the elevated home qualified as a dwelling under Florida law because it functioned as an attached porch and carport, both of which meet the statutory definition of a dwelling. The court found sufficient evidence that Appellant's presence underneath the home constituted entry into the dwelling necessary to establish the burglary charge.
[1] A motion for judgment of acquittal must fully set forth the grounds on which it is based to preserve an argument for appeal.
[2] Entering the area underneath an elevated home can qualify as the necessary entry to satisfy the element of burglary.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a motion for judgment of acquittal 'must fully set forth the grounds on which it is based'”
Establishes the requirement for preserving motions for judgment of acquittal under Florida law, which Appellant's boilerplate motion failed to satisfy.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Branch was convicted of burglary of a dwelling with damage over $1,000. The evidence showed that Branch remained underneath an elevated home…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Definition Of Dwelling cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Following his conviction and 25-year sentence for burglary of a dwelling with damage in excess of $1,000 in violation of section 810.02(2)(c)2., Florida Statutes (2023), Appellant challenges the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. Appellant claims that the evidence at trial showed only that he remained underneath the elevated home while a codefendant went upstairs and entered the living area. Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to show he was a principal to the crime committed by the codefendant.
The boilerplate motion for judgment of acquittal made by Appellant's trial counsel was insufficient to preserve the argument now made by appellate counsel. See Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 895 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.380(b)) (a motion for judgment of acquittal “must fully set forth the grounds on which it is based"). Even if preserved, Appellant's argument here would be meritless. The jury had evidence that Appellant entered the "dwelling” as defined by section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes. Entering the area underneath a home can qualify as the necessary entry to meet that element of a burglary. See Tindall v. State, 997 So. 2d 1260, 1261 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (affirming conviction of burglary when the perpetrator entered the crawl space underneath a house and removed copper pipe because the perpetrator “penetrated the invisible, vertical plane into the airspace of house"). The video and photographs of the area underneath the home, admitted at trial, showed that the area functioned both as an attached porch, part of the statutory definition of a dwelling in section 810.011(2), and as a carport, which has been held to meet the definition of a dwelling. See Medrano v. State, 199 So. 3d 413, 416 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); Ferrara v. State, 19 So. 3d 1033, 1035 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); State v. Burston, 693 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
AFFIRMED.
OSTERHAUS, C.J., and BILBREY and WINOKUR, JJ., concur. Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
Ryan Edward McFarland of Kent & McFarland, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Adam B. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- State v. Burston, 693 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Medrano v. State, 199 So. 3d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)
- Ferrara v. State, 19 So. 3d 1033 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)