UPSIDE FOODS INC

v.

COMMISSIONER, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AN

BRASHER, Circuit Judge:

The question in this appeal is whether the Poultry Products Inspection Act preempts a Florida law that bans the sale of labgrown chicken. Florida's SB 1084 outlaws the manufacture, distribution, and sale of all lab-grown meat in the state. Fla. Stat. § 500.452(1)-(6). Upside Foods, Inc. is a startup based in California that makes lab-grown meat, including chicken, and would like to distribute and sell its chicken product in Florida. Upside has challenged SB 1084 as preempted under the federal Poultry Products Inspection Act and has moved to preliminarily enjoin its enforcement. The district court denied Upside's motion, ruling that Upside was unlikely to succeed on its preemption claims because a ban on lab-grown chicken is not equivalent to a regulation of Upside's ingredients, premises, facilities, or operations. We must wade through a morass of justiciability and other preliminary issues before we can reach the merits. But the bottom line is that we agree with the district court. Because Florida's ban on lab-grown meat

* Honorable Paul C. Huck, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, sitting by designation.

24-13640 Opinion of the Court 3 does not regulate Upside's ingredients, premises, facilities, or operations, federal law does not preempt SB 1084. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

We begin by summarizing the relevant provisions of the Poultry Products Inspection Act before examining the origins of this lawsuit and tracing its procedural history.

A.

Congress enacted the Poultry Products Inspection Act in 1957 to require the Secretary of Agriculture to establish uniform federal standards for poultry products, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451, 455–57, and to inspect poultry products to prevent them from being "adulterated or misbranded.” Id. § 452. To help the Secretary implement these uniform standards, the PPIA contains two express preemption provisions: the Ingredients Provision and the Facilities Provision. The Ingredients Provision preempts state laws that require additional or different "ingredient requirements ... with respect to articles prepared at any official establishment . . . .” Id. § 467e. The Facilities Provision preempts state laws with additional or different requirements "with respect to premises, facilities and operations of any official establishment . . . ." Id. The language of the PPIA resembles that of a companion statute, the Federal Meat Inspection Act, which governs meat products much like the PPIA governs poultry products, see id. § 603(a), and contains near-identical Facilities and Ingredients Provisions. See id. § 678.

To be governed by the PPIA, a facility must be an "official establishment.” Id. § 453(p). Because Upside has received a U.S. Department of Agriculture Grant of Inspection, it is considered an "official establishment" and is thus subject to the PPIA. See Upside Foods, Inc., U.S. Dep't of Agric. (last visited Jan.²², 2026) [https://perma.cc/X4V3-LPF5].

The PPIA defines "poultry" as "any domesticated bird, whether live or dead,” and defines "poultry product" as "any poultry carcass, or part thereof; or any product which is made wholly or in part from any poultry carcass or part thereof.” Id. §§ 453(e)- (f). The USDA has repeatedly characterized lab-grown chicken as "poultry food products" and determined that existing regulatory requirements apply to lab-grown poultry. See FSIS Responsibilities in Establishments Producing Cell-Cultured Meat and Poultry Food Products, U.S. Dep't of Agric., at 1-2 (June 21, 2023), [https://perma.cc/7VUP-2KRN]; see also Human Food Made with Cultured Animal Cells, U.S. Dep't of Agric. (last visited Oct. 7, 2025), [https://perma.cc/7JVC-27E8].

Finally, the PPIA requires that "[a]ll proceedings for the enforcement or to restrain violations of [the PPIA] shall be by and in the name of the United States.” 21 U.S.C. § 467c.

B.

We draw the following facts from Upside's evidentiary submission in support of its motion for a preliminary injunction. Upside produces lab-grown chicken by banking embryonic chicken cells, placing them in a “cultivator,” supplying them with the same

24-13640 Opinion of the Court 5 nutrients they would receive in an animal's body, and forming the resulting product into a shape that looks like conventional meat— for example, a chicken breast. Upside's founder and CEO, Uma Valeti, testified that lab-grown meat can replicate the sensory, taste, and nutritional profile of conventional meat. According to Valeti, Upside's chicken product “looks, cooks, and tastes, like a conventional boneless, skinless chicken cutlet." Doc. 11-324. Valeti explained that Upside's goal is to produce a meat product that avoids ethical, environmental, and health concerns related to slaughtered or conventional meat.

Upside has completed a pre-market consultation with the Food and Drug Administration, and the FDA issued Upside a letter stating that the FDA had “no questions” as well as a scientific memorandum regarding the safety of Upside's lab-grown chicken. The USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service has also issued product labeling approval and a Grant of Inspection to Upside, allowing it to sell its lab-grown chicken in interstate commerce. Upside undergoes the same kind of routine federal inspection of its facility as do producers of conventional meat.

After Upside received these federal approvals, the company began distributing its product in California and has showcased its product in at least four other states (including Florida). In Florida, before SB 1084 went into effect, Upside held a tasting event in Miami and talked with a Florida chef who was interested in serving lab-grown chicken. Upside also alleges that it was planning to hold at least two other tasting events in Miami—one at the Art Basel

Although Upside claims that its product tastes, feels, and has a nutrition profile like that of conventional meat, Florida policymakers who promoted SB 1084 highlighted the experimental nature of the product. They also referenced the threat that lab-grown meat poses to Florida's commercial agriculture industry.

Reflecting this concern, Florida policymakers passed SB 1084 to ban the manufacture, sale, holding, or distribution of labgrown meat in the state. See Fla. Stat. § 500.452(1). SB 1084 imposes criminal and civil penalties on violators. Id. § 500.452(2)–(5). For example, it is a second-degree misdemeanor "for any person to manufacture for sale, sell, hold or offer for sale, or distribute cultivated meat in this state." Id. § 500.452. If restaurants violate this ban, Florida officials can revoke their permits and administratively fine them up to $5,000 per violation. Id. §§ 500.121(1)(b), 570.971(1)(b).

24-13640 Opinion of the Court 7

C.

Shortly after SB 1084 went into effect, Upside sued Florida's Commissioner of Agriculture, State Attorneys for four judicial districts in Florida, and the Florida Attorney General, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Upside's complaint argued that because the USDA has approved it to sell lab-grown chicken, Florida could not ban Upside's product because such a ban amounted to an additional or different ingredient or facilities requirement and was thus expressly preempted under the PPIA. And although not at issue in this appeal, Upside also brought a dormant Commerce Clause claim. Upside alleged that SB 1084 had injured the company "in the form of lost revenue, missed business and promotional opportunities, reputational damage, and loss of consumer goodwill." Doc. 1 at 20.

Upside moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court held a hearing and denied Upside's motion. The district court first held that Upside did not have standing to enjoin the Attorney General or the State Attorneys for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits of Florida because the Attorney General did not have power to enforce SB 1084 and Upside's complaint did not specify any injury traceable to the State Attorneys for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. The district court then held that Upside had standing to enjoin the remaining defendants—the Commissioner and the State Attorneys for the Second and Eleventh Circuits because those defendants had statutory authority to enforce SB 1084 and Upside alleged that

But the district court concluded that the PPIA did not preempt SB 1084 and denied the preliminary injunction. The district court first addressed whether Upside had a cause of action to enforce the PPIA. The court assumed that there was a cause of action to enforce the PPIA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but noted that there was some confusion on this point, as both sides agreed the PPIA does not create a private cause of action. The court suggested that Upside file an amended complaint to clarify whether it was bringing preemption claims in equity. The district court held that lab-grown chicken qualified as a "poultry product” because Upside produced its product by growing cells taken from a slaughtered chicken. The district court then held that the Ingredients Provision did not preempt SB 1084 because Upside had not identified any federal requirement mandating that states permit the sale of labgrown meat. The district court also held that the Facilities Provision did not preempt SB 1084 because banning the sale of a product does not "reach into [Upside]'s facilities to tell them how they should handle their cultivated chicken cells.” Doc. 40 at 20.

Taking the district court's advice, Upside filed an amended complaint to clarify that it was bringing its preemption claims in equity and under section 1983. The main changes to the amended complaint were to: omit the Florida Attorney General from the list of defendants, split each of the two preemption claims (premised on SB 1084's Facilities Provision and Ingredients Provision,

24-13640 Opinion of the Court 9 respectively) into a section 1983 claim and an Ex parte Young equitable claim, and add allegations related to Upside's business activities in other areas of Florida.

Upside filed its notice of appeal four days after it filed the amended complaint. The Commissioner and State Attorneys moved to dismiss the amended complaint. Before oral argument on this appeal, the district court dismissed Upside's preemption claims, maintaining only its dormant Commerce Clause claim. The district court concluded that Upside did not have a cause of action under section 1983 or in equity to bring its preemption action because 21 U.S.C. § 467c foreclosed private enforcement of the PPIA. The district court then concluded that even if there were a cause of action, neither the Ingredients Provision nor the Facilities Provision preempted SB 1084.

We ordered additional briefing on the question: “Did UPSIDE's appeal of the order denying its request for a preliminary injunction become moot after the district court entered an order dismissing all of UPSIDE's preemption claims?” The parties timely filed supplemental briefs, with Upside arguing that the appeal was not moot and with the Commissioner and State Attorneys arguing that it was.

II.

We review jurisdictional questions de novo, United States v. Amodeo, 916 F. 3d 967, 970 (11th Cir. 2019), and we also review de novo whether a cause of action exists, Fulton v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 148 F. 4th 1224, 1235 (11th Cir. 2025) (first quoting Davis

III.

Upside argues that the district court should have granted its motion for a preliminary injunction. To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) that the threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the potential harm to the defendant; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Keister v. Bell, 879 F. 3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Palmer v. Braun, 287 F. 3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002)). If a plaintiff does not demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, we need not address the remaining preliminary injunction requirements. See Bloedorn, 631 F. 3d at 1229.

This appeal turns on three issues: mootness, the existence of a private cause of action to enjoin the enforcement of a preempted state law, and the likelihood of success on the merits of Upside's preemption claims. As to mootness, we must decide whether this appeal has been mooted by the filing of an amended complaint or

24-13640 Opinion of the Court 11 the dismissal of Upside's preemption claims in that amended complaint. As to the cause of action, we must assess whether Upside may bring a preemption claim as a matter of equity. And as to likelihood of success on the merits, we must determine whether Florida's law is likely preempted by federal law.

We address each issue in turn. We conclude that this appeal is not moot. We conclude that Upside has a cause of action to challenge Florida's law as preempted. But we conclude that Upside's action is unlikely to succeed. For that reason, we affirm the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction.

A.

We turn first to mootness. Article III of the Constitution requires that parties in litigation have a "legally cognizable interest in the outcome" of a dispute throughout the proceeding. Keohane v. Fla. Dep't of Corrs. Secʼy, 952 F. 3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). So even if a controversy is live in the district court, we cannot rule on an appeal if an intervening event or change in status eliminates our ability to give "meaningful relief" to the appellant. Id. (quoting Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F. 3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001)). Appeals like this one, from orders denying or granting preliminary injunctions, often run into mootness problems. Such an appeal may be mooted if the requested injunction is about an event that happens while the appeal is pending, see Graham v. Attʼy Gen., 110 F. 4th 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2024), if the district court enters final judgment granting or denying injunctive relief while the appeal is pending, see Harper ex rel. Harper

When assessing whether we can grant “meaningful relief,” we shouldn't elevate form over substance. We ask whether a judicial decision would have "any practical effect.” Ohio v. U.S. Env't Prot. Agency, 969 F. 3d 306, 308 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 317 (1974)); see also ABN Amro Verzekeringen BV v. Geologistics Ams., Inc., 485 F. 3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2007) (considering whether there is an “issue of practical importance for the court to adjudicate"). The mootness question is whether a lawsuit would be "a waste of effort on questions now more pedantic than practical.” Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 681 F. 3d 1208, 1209 (10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J.).

The defendants argue that two procedural developments in the district court make it so that we cannot give Upside "meaningful relief." First, the defendants say that we cannot reverse the denial of Upside's motion for a preliminary injunction because Upside filed an amended complaint before filing its notice of appeal. Second, the defendants say that we cannot reverse the denial of Upside's motion for preliminary injunction because the district court dismissed Upside's preemption claims after Upside filed its notice of appeal. We disagree. Neither procedural development in the district court prevents us from potentially giving Upside meaningful relief.

24-13640 Opinion of the Court 13

1.

Let's start with the amended complaint. The defendants believe that the filing of Upside's amended complaint necessarily eliminates our ability to review the earlier denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants reason that, because a party can request an injunction based only on the relief that is requested in a complaint, any change to the complaint between the denial of a preliminary injunction and an appeal moots the appeal.

The defendants' argument betrays a misunderstanding of interlocutory appellate review and is squarely foreclosed by our precedent. We have at least twice-resolved appeals from preliminary injunction rulings even though the plaintiff filed an amended complaint between the district court's order and the notice of appeal. See Barber v. Governor of Ala., 73 F. 4th 1306, 1316 n.16 (11th Cir. 2023) (amended complaint filed between denial of preliminary injunction and appeal); Rosen v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 21 F. 3d 1520, 1524 n.5 (11th Cir. 1994) (amended complaint filed between grant of preliminary injunction and appeal). We simply look to the record at the time of the district court's ruling, which is what an appellate court always does when reviewing an interlocutory order. See id.; see also League of Women Voters of Mich. v. Johnson, 902 F. 3d 572,578– 79 (6th Cir. 2018) (on interlocutory appeal, an appellate court is "not called to decide whether" the district court erred "as the case currently stands” but whether the district court erred "as the case stood").

The mere fact of an amended complaint doesn't stop us from resolving whether the district court's preliminary injunction decision was correct. Instead, under our caselaw, so long as the plaintiff is still seeking relief in the district court on substantively the same claims that the plaintiff is pursuing in this Court, the filing of an amended complaint doesn't moot an interlocutory appeal.

Our decision in Johnson v. 3M Co., 55 F. 4th 1304 (11th Cir. 2022), is instructive. There, we concluded that an amended complaint did not moot a plaintiff's interlocutory appeal about a nuisance abatement claim because the plaintiff's amended complaint did not meaningfully change the nuisance abatement claim. Id. at 1309. "The key point,” we said, “is that [the] fourth amended complaint does not change the nuisance abatement allegations on which" the appeal was based. Id.

Applying Johnson's reasoning here, nothing about Upside's amended complaint—which dropped some defendants and reorganized its claims—changes the fundamental nature of its case against the remaining defendants. Upside's amended complaint did not moot its appeal.

2.

Moving to the defendants' second mootness argument, they say that the district court's separate interlocutory order dismissing Upside's preemption claims prevents us from granting meaningful relief. They say that, because the district court has rejected the claims that Upside seeks to vindicate on appeal, we cannot review

24-13640 Opinion of the Court 15 the district court's earlier denial of Upside's motion for a preliminary injunction on those claims. Again, we disagree.

It is axiomatic that a district court cannot defeat our appellate jurisdiction by entering additional orders. After a party files an interlocutory appeal, the district court has the authority to move forward only with aspects of the case that are not on appeal. Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 341 F. 3d 1292, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting May v. Sheahan, 226 F. 3d 876, 880 n.2 (7th Cir. 2000)). A district court lacks the jurisdiction to take any action that would "alter the status of the case on interlocutory appeal." Johnson, 55 F. 4th at 1309 (citation modified) (quoting Green Leaf Nursery, 341 F. 3d at 1309). A district court cannot take such action because a notice of appeal shifts jurisdiction over the appealed aspects of the case from the district court to the appellate court. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982).

For similar reasons, we believe the district court's partial dismissal order can't defeat our ability to grant the relief that Upside seeks. Despite the district court's order, Upside is still pressing its preemption claims. And if we were to order the district court to enter a preliminary injunction on those claims, it would have to "enter an order in strict compliance with the mandate,” notwithstanding its partial dismissal order. Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F. 2d 1112, 1119 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 255 (1895)). It may be true that, if we were to order the district court to grant the preliminary injunction, the district court would also want to (or, perhaps, need to) revise its dismissal order. But

There is one, final mootness issue: the defendants say that the district court's partial dismissal order moots this appeal just like the entry of final judgment moots an appeal from a preliminary injunction. But the defendants are wrong yet again. It is true that the entry of a final judgment moots an interlocutory appeal about a preliminary injunction. See Harper ex rel. Harper, 549 U.S. at 1262. But the reason a final judgment moots such an appeal is that a preliminary injunction lasts only until final judgment. After a final judgment is issued, any dispute related to a preliminary injunction is no longer live because the time period for a preliminary injunction has run. By contrast, the district court's partial dismissal order isn't final, and the time period for a preliminary injunction has not expired.

B.

Because this appeal is not moot, we now turn to whether Upside can bring this action at all. Upside is asking the federal courts to enjoin the defendants from prosecuting it under a Florida law because, Upside says, the law facially and as applied to it is

It is well established that a regulated entity like Upside has a cause of action in equity¹ to restrain the enforcement of a preempted state law if that entity could raise such a preemption defense to an enforcement action. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 326–27 (2015). That is, if a regulated entity would have a federal defense to a state prosecution, then the regulated entity can seek declaratory and equitable relief in federal court without waiting for the state prosecution. This equitable remedy "reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back to England.” Id. at 327 (citing Jaffe & Henderson, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Historical Origins, 72 L.Q. Rev. 345 (1956)). And the availability of pre-enforcement

The logic of this cause of action stems from the idea that, if a state enforces a law against a private entity, that entity can invoke the defense that federal law preempts the state law being enforced. See Ga. Latino All. for Hum. Rts. v. Governor of Ga., 691 F. 3d 1250, 1261 n.7 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. 606, 620 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (in turn citing Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 262 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring))). As the Supreme Court explained in Ex parte Young, requiring a private party to "suffer imprisonment and pay fines" before “obtaining a judicial decision” would “close up all approaches to the courts.” 209 U.S. 123, 148 (1908). For this reason, federal courts have the power to recognize "the pre-emptive assertion in equity of a defense that would otherwise have been available in the State's enforcement proceedings at law." Va. Off. for Prot. & Advocacy, 563 U.S. at 262; see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983).

A regulated entity's ability to sue to enjoin a state law as preempted is so ingrained in our jurisprudence that it "has gone largely unquestioned.” Ga. Latino All. for Hum. Rts., 691 F. 3d at 1261. The Supreme Court has regularly entertained such equitable preemption claims by private parties. We regularly entertain

2 See, e.g., Shaw, 463 U.S. at 92, 96 n.14 (arguing that ERISA preempted state laws); Nat'l Meat Assʼn v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452, 459 (2012) (challenging California slaughterhouse law as preempted by the FMIA); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430

24-13640 Opinion of the Court 19 equitable preemption claims by private parties.3 And other circuits do as well.⁴

U.S. 519, 523–24 (1977) (challenging California food labeling statute as preempted by FMIA and other federal laws); Whiting, 563 U.S. at 594 (challenging state alien employment law as preempted by federal immigration law); Hines, 312 U.S. at 74 (challenging state alien registration act they were enforcing was preempted by federal Alien Registration Act); Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Commʼn of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642 (2002) (challenging a state entity's order as preempted by federal law).

3 See, e.g., Ga. Latino All. for Hum. Rts., 691 F. 3d at 1260–62 (challenging Georgia immigration law as preempted by the Immigration and Nationality Act); Sims v. Fla. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 862 F. 2d 1449, 1454–55 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (challenging Florida motor vehicle safety standards as preempted by the Clean Air Act and the Safety Act); Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven, 858 F. 2d 1521, 1524–25 (11th Cir. 1988) (challenging municipal ordinance as preempted by federal and state law); Fla. State Conf. of N.A.A.C.P. v. Browning, 522 F. 3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 2008) (challenging Florida voter registration statute as preempted by federal law); America's Health Ins. Plans v. Hudgens, 742 F. 3d 1319, 1326 (11th Cir. 2014) (challenging state insurance law was preempted by ERISA); Galactic Towing, Inc. v. City of Mia. Beach, 341 F. 3d 1249, 1250 (11th Cir. 2003) (challenging local ordinance regulating towing on the grounds that it was preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act).

4 See, e.g., Local Union No. 12004, United Steelworkers of Am. v. Massachusetts, 377 F. 3d 64, 75 (1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that Supreme Court precedent makes clear that a private plaintiff may challenge state action as preempted by federal law); Nw. Selecta, Inc. v. Ramón González-Beiró, 145 F. 4th 9, 13–15 (1st Cir. 2025) (entertaining PPIA preemption suit by private plaintiff); Loyal Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc. v. Town of Woodbury, 445 F. 3d 136, 149 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a private plaintiff had an “undisputed” right to challenge a municipal regulation as preempted by federal law); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F. 3d 297, 301 (3d Cir. 2013); Planned Parenthood of Hou. & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F. 3d 324, 334 (5th Cir. 2005); Cavel Int'l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F. 3d 551 (7th Cir. 2007); Bio Gen LLC

Notwithstanding this well-established caselaw, the defendants say that Upside lacks a cause of action to bring preemption claims in equity for two reasons. We reject both arguments.

First, the defendants say that all this precedent has been overruled, sub silentio, by Armstrong. They are wrong. In Armstrong, medical providers sued state officials, claiming that they were being reimbursed at rates lower than what Section 30(A) of the Medicaid Act required. 575 U.S. at 323–24. They wanted the federal courts to order state officials to reimburse them at higher rates. The Supreme Court rejected that kind of lawsuit. It held that the Supremacy Clause did not confer a private right of action to enforce all federal law and that the Medicaid Act itself did not contemplate lawsuits to compel higher payments. Id. at 324–25.

Armstrong has no bearing on this case, except to emphasize that Upside can, in fact, bring its preemption claims. No one in Armstrong was attempting to prevent the enforcement of a state law. Rather, Armstrong was about whether a medical provider could compel a state official to follow the medical provider's view of federal law in the way the officer administered a joint state-federal program. See id. at 323-24. For good measure, the Court expressly distinguished its well-established preemption jurisprudence from v. Sanders, 142 F. 4th 591, 599–600 (8th Cir. 2025); Bud Antle, Inc. v. Barbosa, 45 F. 3d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14) (holding that a private plaintiff may seek declaratory and injunctive relief against a state law on the ground that federal law preempts it); Ass'n des Éleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Québec v. Bonta, 33 F. 4th 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2022); Chamber of Com. of United States v. Edmondson, 594 F. 3d 742, 755 (10th Cir. 2010).

24-13640 Opinion of the Court 21 what the plaintiffs were asking for in that case. The Court recognized the longstanding rule that “if an individual claims federal law immunizes him from state regulation, the court may issue an injunction upon finding the state regulatory actions preempted.” Id. at 326 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155–56). But the Court said that what the medical providers wanted in Armstrong was different in kind. Here, Upside is asking for the standard, well-established remedy of an injunction against a preempted state law, not the "follow-federal-law-and-pay-me-more-money” injunction the medical providers wanted in Armstrong.

Second, the defendants point to language in section 467c of the PPIA that reserves the exclusive right to enforce the PPIA's provisions to the United States. The statute says that “[a]ll proceedings for the enforcement or to restrain violations of this chapter shall be by and in the name of the United States.” 21 U.S.C. § 467c. Broadly construing this language, the defendants say that this reservation of rights to the United States precludes Upside's lawsuit. But we cannot construe section 467c “in a vacuum”; instead, we must read it in "context and with a view to [its] place in the overall statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). And, in context, nothing about section 467c precludes a plaintiff in equity from seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a preempted state law.

Section 467c says that only the United States may enforce or restrain violations of the PPIA. The PPIA regulates poultry

Although the defendants insist that Upside's lawsuit is about "enforcing” the PPIA's express preemption provision, this is a misunderstanding of the nature of preemption. Upside is advancing a constitutional defense to a putative prosecution under Florida law. "Preemption is the power of federal law to displace state law substantively" and provides "a substantive defense to a state law action on the basis of federal law.” Geddes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 321 F. 3d

24-13640 Opinion of the Court 23

1349, 1352 (11th Cir. 2003). Although an express preemption provision like the PPIA's may define the scope of a preemption defense in any given case, the force of preemption is constitutional in nature. See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 736 (2009) (holding that a state law contrary to federal law “violates the Supremacy Clause"); Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 281 (2003) (describing a state law that "violates the Supremacy Clause” as "a legal nullity"); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (“It is basic to this constitutional command that all conflicting state provisions be without effect."). That is, under the Supremacy Clause, preemption "is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). Because Upside could raise a preemption defense to the enforcement of Florida's statute in a state proceeding, it can bring this claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.

C.

Finally, we arrive at the merits of Upside's claim. Because we have decided that Upside has a cause of action to restrain the enforcement of state laws that are contrary to the PPIA, we must decide whether its action is likely to succeed on the facts of this case. Two main parts of the statute are implicated by Upside's claim. First, there is the Facilities Provision, which preempts state laws that impose different or additional requirements "with respect to premises, facilities and operations of any official establishment." 21 U.S.C. § 467e. Second, there is the Ingredients Provision, which