JOHNSON
v.
MILLS

Fla. | 1948-12-14
37 So. 2d 906 Florida Supreme Court (1948) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 37 So.2d 906
Cited by 32 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

This case concerns whether a truck owner is liable for damages caused by an employee who took the owner's truck without permission. The court found the owner not liable because the employee was acting outside the scope of his employment and without consent when the accident occurred.


Holding

No, the owner is not liable. The court held that the employee's unauthorized use of the truck, outside of his employment duties and without consent, broke the chain of agency and absolved the owner of liability.


Key Quotes

“The appeal in this case presents the question of liability, on the part of an owner of a motor vehicle, for damages done by an operator thereof.”

Introduces the central legal question of the case.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

An employee, McDaniel, took his employer's (Mills) large truck without permission on a Sunday to pull his personal small truck out of the sand. He had…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
ADAMS, Justice.

Action by Henry Allen Johnson and others, each and all minors, by their next friend, Ernest Johnson, against H.L. Mills, trading and doing business under the firm name of Mills Construction Company, for damages resulting from operation of defendant's truck. From an adverse judgment, plaintiffs appeal.

Judgment affirmed. The appeal in this case presents the question of liability, on the part of an owner of a motor vehicle, for damages done by an operator thereof.

An action was brought against appellee for damages sustained by the operation of appellee's truck while operated by his agent and servant. In a second count, it was charged that the truck was operated by the same person (McDaniel) with appellee's knowledge and consent.

Pleas were filed denying that McDaniel operated the truck as the agent and servant and also denied that the operation was with appellee's knowledge and consent. *Page 907

Appellants' evidence disclosed that McDaniel, the operator of the truck, had been working for appellee only about two weeks. He was employed as a truck driver to work five and one-half days per week — getting off at noon on Saturday until the following Monday morning. He was granted permission to use a small delivery truck when off duty. On the Sunday when this accident occurred he had been visiting a friend of his and was using the small delivery truck. While on the visit the truck became stuck in the sand. McDaniel decided to go to appellee's place, get the large truck (which he had been accustomed to drive during his work week) and use it to pull the small truck out of the sand. Thereupon he entered appellee's premises, without appellee's knowledge or consent, took the large truck and proceeded to the place where the small truck was stuck. While en route this injury occurred.

The trial court held there was insufficient evidence to take the case to the jury. We find no error in the judgment of the trial court. McDaniel had no key to the large truck. It was not locked as it had a compression diesel engine which required no switch key. McDaniel consulted with no one about taking the large truck. There was no reason to suppose or suspect that McDaniel would return to the premises on Sunday and use the truck. At that time and place he was no more than a stranger to appellee. This had never happened before and there was no reason to suppose that express permission would have been granted had appellee been consulted. We find no circumstance to imply consent of appellee and certainly at that time and place the relationship of agent and servant was entirely absent.

Appellant relies upon the case of Hastings v. Taylor, 130 Fla. 249, 177 So. 621, holding that proof of ownership of the vehicle is prima facie evidence that the driver is the agent and servant of the owner, or was using same with the owner's consent. This case does not rule the case at bar. This presumption is a rebuttable one. In the case at bar, we are not left to an inference or presumption. The uncontradicted evidence shows that McDaniel was operating the truck which caused the injury without the owner's consent and that he, in no way, was acting as an agent or servant of appellee when the injury occurred. When this evidence was presented the presumption vanished from the case. See Vol. 9 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Part 2, § 6064.

The judgment is affirmed.

THOMAS, C.J., and BARNS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (15 total)

  • Gulle v. Purley L. Boggs, 174 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1965)
    …tter goes to the jury in this posture it must be without the aid of the presumption, which has been reduced to the status of a permissible inference or deduction which the jury may or may not draw from the evidence before it. Johnson v. Mills, Fla., 37 So. 2d 906; Leonetti v. Boone, Fla., 74 So. 2d 551; Tyrrell v. Prudential Insurance Company, 109 Vt. 6, 192 A. 184, 115 A.L.R. 392. As was stated in Tyrrell: “Presumptions disappear when facts appear; and facts are deemed to appear when evidence is introduced…
  • Leonetti v. Boone, 74 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1954)
    …forward with the evidence. They do not, however, shift the burden of proof, but simply permit one to make a prima facie case in a way that he could not make it without the statute.” 20 Am.Jur. 136, Evidence, section 133. In Johnson v. Mills, Fla., 37 So. 2d 906, 907, this Court has held in respect to the specific statute involved in this litigation: “This presumption is a rebuttable one. In the case at bar, we are not left to an inference or presumption. The uncontra-dicted evidence shows that McDaniel was…
  • Locke v. Stuart, 113 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)
    …y be made to disappear in the face of rebuttal evidence but which, in the absence thereof, compels a decision in favor of the one who relies on it. Davis v. Loftin, Fla., 75 So. 2d 813; Leonetti v. Boone, Fla., 74 So. 2d 551; Johnson v. Mills, Fla., 37 So. 2d 906.1 The presumption under Sec. 194.24, F.S., F.S.A., operates in respect to each of the statutory requirements preliminary to the issuance of a valid tax deed. Where on motion of the holder of the tax title for summary judgment evidence is presented…

Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw