BENNETT
v.
WILLIAMS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
This case reviews a directed verdict concerning interest on two promissory notes. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that the notes' interest provisions, despite a minor omission, were not fatally ambiguous and were clarified by the parties' conduct.
The court held that the interest provision was not fatally ambiguous and that the judgment for 8% interest was proper. The parties' conduct in paying and accepting interest at 8% clarified any potential ambiguity.
“The use of the phrase, "eight per annum until paid" did not, as is contended, render that provision of the note fatally ambiguous.”
Establishes the court's primary finding regarding the ambiguity of the interest provision.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff in error executed two promissory notes for $500 each, with a provision for interest "at the rate of eight per annum until paid." Endorse…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Promissory Note Interpretation cases and more on FLexlaw
This is a writ of error to review a judgment entered upon a directed verdict in favor of defendants in error in the amount of principal and interest of two promissory notes.
The plaintiff in error executed two notes of $500 each on April 19, 1937. An identical provision for interest was made in each of these notes as follows, ". . . with interest after date at the rate of eight per annum until paid." There is an endorsement on the back of each note stating "Int. Pd to 4/19/38 W. E. V. $40.00." The pleas filed to the declaration admitted the execution of the notes but offered to prove certain set-offs. Verdict was directed for the defendants in error in the principal amount of the notes with interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum. Because of abandonment of errors assigned and stipulation, the sole question presented here is whether it was proper for the court below to enter the judgment in so far as it provides for the payment of interest on the notes.
It is the contention of plaintiff in error that the provisions in the notes for interest are ambiguous because of the evident omission of the words "per cent" immediately before the words "per annum", and that it is impossible to determine what interest was intended paid.
Sec. 6777, C.G.L., provides for the interpretation of ambiguities and omissions in negotiable instruments *Page 6 in certain instances, but there is no provision of the Negotiable Instruments Act of this State which directly controls the present situation. Sec. 6936, C.G.L. 1927, provides for the rate of interest where the instrument makes no provision for an interest rate. Under this section, if no attempt had here been made to state an interest rate, interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum would have been assessable. Myrick v. Battle, 5 Fla. 345; Patrick v. Kirkland,53 Fla. 768, 43 So. 969.
The use of the phrase, "eight per annum until paid" did not, as is contended, render that provision of the note fatally ambiguous. In construing a contract the object is to ascertain the intent of the parties by a reasonable construction. See Bloodworth v. A.H. F.H. Lippincott, 78 Fla. 261, 82 So. 827; Holmes v. Kilgore, 89 Fla. 194, 103 So. 825. A reasonable construction of the words here used can only lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff in error intended to pay interest after date at the rate of eight per cent per annum. This conclusion is supported by the fact that plaintiff in error did pay the only interest paid on the notes at the rate of eight per cent.
Even if it could be fairly said that the omission of the words "per cent" created an ambiguity, that ambiguity has been determined by the parties by the payment and acceptance of interest for one year at the rate of eight per cent per annum as evidenced by the endorsements on the notes. The construction of a contract by the parties thereto may be resorted to to clarify any ambiguous terms thereof. Gray v. Andrews, 141 Fla. 47, 192 So. 634.
Counsel for defendant in error has seen fit to attach photostatic copies of the notes to his brief. While *Page 7 these might have been more helpful to the court than the usual typewritten ones in the transcript they could not be considered because not properly before the court. Rule 11 of the rules of this court, as amended January 13, 1941, sets forth the requirements for the use and authentication of photostatic copies. Counsel failed to comply with the Rule.
The judgment appealed from should be and is hereby affirmed.
WHITFIELD, TERRELL, BUFORD and THOMAS, JJ., concur. CHAPMAN, J., not participating.
ADAMS, J., disqualified.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
ACE Elec. Supply Co. v. Terra Nova Elec., Inc., 288 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)…Fla. 429, 138 So. 21, 143 So. 758, 151 So. 327 (1931); Consolidated Development and Eng. Corp. v. Ortega Co., 117 Fla. 438, 158 So. 94, 97 (1933); Pembroke Park Lanes, Inc. v. High Ridge Water Co., 186 So. 2d 85 (Fla.App.1966); Bennett v. Williams, 149 Fla. 4, 5 So. 2d 51 (1941). In Holmes v. Kilgore, 89 Fla. 194, 103 So. 825, 827 (1925), the Court said: “All contracts must be given a reasonable interpretation according to the intention of the parties at the time of executing them, if that intention ca…
-
Fla. Power Corp. v. City OF Tallahassee, 154 Fla. 638 (Fla. 1944)…intention of the parties, objects to be accomplished, obligations created, time of performance, duration, consideration, mutuality, and other essential features. See Orlando Orange Grove Co. v. Hales, 119 Fla. 159, 161 So. 284; Bennett v. Williams, 149 Fla. 4, 5 So. (2nd) 51; Knabb v. Reconstruction Finance Co., 144 Fla. 110, 197 So. 707. If clauses in a contract appear to be repugnant to each other, they must be given such an interpretation and construction as will reconcile them if possible. If one in…
-
Emil Morton v. Ansin, 129 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)…A cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the intention of the parties. 7 Am.Jur., Bills and Notes, Sec. 49. The construction of a note by the parties thereto may be resorted to in the clarification of any ambiguous terms. Bennett v. Williams, 149 Fla. 4, 5 So. 2d 51; 4 Fla.Jur., Bills and Notes, § 63. Bearing in mind the foregoing principles, it is quite significant to observe that the holder of the note in his action at law against the maker of the note only claimed judgment against the maker of…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Holmes v. Barnard Kilgore, 89 Fla. 194 (Fla. 1925)
- State v. Brittain, 103 So. 825 (La. 1925)
- M. v. Patrick, 53 Fla. 768 (Fla. 1907)
- Bloodworth v. A. H. & F. H. Lippincott, 78 Fla. 261 (Fla. 1919)
- Myrick v. Battle, 5 Fla. 345 (Fla. 1853)
- Gray v. Andrews, 141 Fla. 47 (Fla. 1939)