IN RE AMENDMENT TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 1.650(D)(2)

Fla. | 1990-10-25
No. 76500
SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDonald, ehrlich, barkett, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
568 So. 2d 1273 Florida Supreme Court (1990) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court approved an amendment to Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650(d)(2) to conform the medical malpractice presuit notice requirements with the statutory changes enacted by the legislature. The amendment unified the notice period for all defendants, including state agencies, to 90 days, eliminating the prior 180-day requirement for state agencies.


Holding

The Court approved the amendment to Rule 1.650(d)(2) to eliminate the 90-day/180-day dichotomy and establish a uniform 90-day notice period for all defendants in medical malpractice presuit screening, effective immediately.


Headnotes

[1] A rule of civil procedure governing medical malpractice presuit notice requirements must be amended to conform with statutory changes that alter the timeframes for respon…

[2] When a rule of civil procedure conflicts with a subsequently amended statute, the rule must be amended to align with the statutory requirements.

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Key Quotes

“In an effort to maintain consistency between the statute and the rule, the time requirements set forth in rule 1.650(d)(2) mirrored those in section 768.57(3)(a).”

Establishes that the rule was designed to reflect statutory requirements

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Facts & Procedural History

Rule 1.650 was adopted to implement medical malpractice presuit notice requirements under Florida Statutes. When originally promulgated, the rule requ…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We have before us a petition by the Civil Procedure Rules Committee of The Florida Bar to amend Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650(d)(2) to conform with section 766.-106(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1989). *

The existing rule 1.650 was adopted by this Court to provide uniform procedures for implementing the medical malpractice presuit notice requirements of section 768.-57, Florida Statutes (Supp.1986) (renumbered as section 766.106; Florida Statutes (Supp.1988)). In re Medical Malpractice Presuit Screening Rules—Civil Rules of Procedure, 536 So. 2d 193 (Fla.1988). At the time rule 1.650 was promulgated and adopted by this Court, the legislatively imposed time requirements for a prospective defendant to act on a notice of intent to initiate litigation in a medical malpractice case depended upon whether the claim was brought against a private party (in which case the period was 90 days), or against an agency of the state of Florida (in which case the period was 180 days). See § 768.57(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1987). In an effort to maintain consistency between the statute and the rule, the time requirements set forth in rule 1.650(d)(2) mirrored those in section 768.57(3)(a).

Subsequent to the adoption of rule 1.650(d)(2), the legislature amended section 768.57(3)(a) and reduced the notice requirement for bringing a medical malpractice action against a state agency from 180 days to 90 days. Ch. 88-173, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 766.106(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (Supp. 1988)).

Despite the change in the statutory requirements, rule 1.650(d)(2) still contains the 90-day/180-day dichotomy. Thus, the rule is in direct conflict with the statute.

Accordingly, we hereby adopt the proposed amendment, as follows:

RULE 1.650 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PRESUIT SCREENING RULE

(d) Time Requirements

(2) The action may not be filed against any defendant until 90 days after the Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation was mailed to that party. If the defendant is the State or-any subdiv-isi&n-subject to Section 768.29(6)(a), Florida Statutes,-the action may not be filed-against that defendant until 1-80 days after-the-Notice of — Intent—to—Initiate—Litigation—was mailed to that party-The action may be filed against any party at any time after the Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation has been mailed after the claimant has received a written rejection of the claim from that party.

This amendment shall become effective immediately.

It is so ordered.

SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDonald, ehrlich, barkett, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. *

We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Patry v. William L. Capps, M.D., 633 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1994)
    …le mode of service for presuit notice. We adopted the rule simply “to provide uniform procedures for implementing the medical malpractice pre-suit notice requirements of section 768.-57.” In re Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure—Rule 1.650(d)(2), 568 So. 2d 1273 (Fla.1990); see also Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d at 484 (Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650 was adopted to implement legislative intent; thus, rule must be amended when found to be inconsistent with intent of presuit notice and screening statute). Rule 1.…

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