DANNY LAVAN SMITH
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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The court held that the State is not required to prove an electric weapon or device was operable to convict a felon for possession of such a weapon.
[1] Possession of an electric weapon or device by a convicted felon does not require proof that the device was operable.
[2] An electric weapon or device is defined by its design or intended use for offensive or defensive purposes through electrical current, not its functional operability.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An ''[e]lectric weapon or device' means any device which, through the application or use of electrical current, is designed, redesigned, used, or intended to be used for offensive or defensive purposes, the destruction of life, or the infliction of injury.”
Establishes the statutory definition of electric weapon or device under Florida law, which does not require the device to be operable.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDanny Lavan Smith, a convicted felon, was found in possession of a taser. He appealed his conviction for possession of an electric weapon or device by…
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SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA
Case No. 6D2025-0194 Lower Tribunal No. 2023-CF-008892
DANNY LAVAN SMITH, Appellant,
v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County. Donald G. Jacobsen, Judge.
March 27, 2026
BROWNLEE, J.
Danny Lavan Smith appeals his conviction for possession of an electric weapon or device by a convicted felon. Smith argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to prove the taser found in his possession was operable. We review the denial of Smith's motion for judgment of acquittal de novo and affirm. See McCloud v. State, 224 So. 3d 842, 844 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ("We review de novo both the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal and an issue of statutory interpretation.").
Section 790.23(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2023), makes it unlawful for a convicted felon “to own or to have in his or her care, custody, possession, or control any . . . electric weapon or device . . . .” An ““[e]lectric weapon or device' means any device which, through the application or use of electrical current, is designed, redesigned, used, or intended to be used for offensive or defensive purposes, the destruction of life, or the infliction of injury." § 790.001(7), Fla. Stat. (2023). Contrary to Smith's contention, the statute contains no requirement that the device be "operable." Rather, according to the statutory definition, Smith's taser qualifies as an electric weapon or device if it is simply designed to be used for defensive purposes through the application or use of electrical current. It does not have to work.
The officer here testified that tasers use an electric current to incapacitate a person and that they are used for self-defense, which satisfies the statutory requirements. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Smith's motion for judgment of acquittal.
Because the State was not required to prove the taser was operable in order to convict Smith of possession of an electric weapon or device by a convicted felon, we affirm.¹
AFFIRMED.
SMITH and GANNAM, JJ., concur. David Maldonado, The Maldonado Law Firm, P.A., Lakeland, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Tayna Alexander, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED