PITTS

v.

MISSISSIPPI

PRELIMINARY PRINT

Volume 607 U. S. Part 1 Pages 1–6

OFFICIAL REPORTS

OF

THE SUPREME COURT

November 24, 2025

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF

reporter of decisions NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, [email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.

CASES ADJUDGED

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

AT

OCTOBER TERM, 2025

certiorari to the supreme court of mississippi No. 24–1159. Decided November 24, 2025 The State of Mississippi charged Jeffrey Pitts with sexually abusing his daughter, A.

G. C. When A.

G. C. testifed at trial, the court granted the State's motion to place a screen between A.

G. C. and Pitts pursuant to a Mississippi statute which provides that child witnesses “shall have the . . . righ[t]” to “a properly constructed screen that would permit the judge and jury in the courtroom . . . to see the child but would obscure the child's view of the defendant.” Miss. Code Ann. §99–43–101(2)(g). A jury convicted Pitts.

On appeal, Pitts argued that the screen vio­ lated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser face to face. A divided Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Pitts's arguments and held that Mississippi's mandatory statute provided sufficient justifcation for the screening in this case. Held: Under Coy v. Iowa, 487 U. S. 1012, and Maryland v. Craig, 497 U. S. 836, the Sixth Amendment tolerates screening in child-abuse cases only if a court “hear[s] evidence” and issues a “case-specifc” finding of “[t]he requisite . . . necessity.” See id., at 855. Simply pointing to a statute that authorizes screening, even one premised on “generalized finding[s]” of necessity, will not suffce. Coy, 487 U. S., at 1021. The Mississippi Supreme Court's reliance on the State's mandatory right-to-screening statute, without case-specifc findings, falls well short of these require­ ments, and its judgment is therefore reversed. On remand the State remains free to argue, and the Mississippi Supreme Court remains free 1

2 Per Curiam to consider, whether the error in this case warrants a new trial under the harmless-error standard. Ibid. Certiorari granted; 405 So. 3d 1238, reversed and remanded. Per Curiam. Ordinarily, the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause “guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with wit­ nesses appearing before the trier of fact.” Coy v. Iowa, 487 U. S. 1012, 1016 (1988).

In child-abuse cases, however, that rule sometimes gives way. Consistent with the Sixth Amendment, a court may screen a child witness from the defendant when “necessary to protect [the child] from trauma that would be caused by testifying in the physical presence of the defendant, at least where such trauma would impair the child's ability to communicate.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U. S. 836, 857 (1990).

Still, before invoking this procedure, a court must proceed with care. It must “hear evidence” and make a “casespecifc” finding of “[t]he requisite . . . necessity.” Id., at 855. Simply pointing to a state statute that authorizes screening, even one premised on “generalized finding[s]” of necessity, will not suffce. Coy, 487 U. S., at 1021. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court departed from these princi­ ples, we reverse. I In May 2020, A.

G. C. spent a weekend visiting her father,

Jeffrey Pitts. After returning home, A.

G. C. told her mother that she had been sexually abused. Eventually, that report led to criminal charges against Pitts.

At trial, the State moved for permission to place a screen between A.

G. C. and Pitts when she took the witness stand.

In support of its motion, the State pointed to a Mississippi statute providing that child witnesses “shall have the . . . righ[t]” to “a properly constructed screen that would permit the judge and jury in the courtroom . . . to see the child but

Cite as: 607 U. S. 1 (2025) 3 Per Curiam would obscure the child's view of the defendant.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99–43–101(2)(g) (2020).

Pitts objected. He did not question the statute's manda­ tory terms. But, he said, those terms had to give way to the Sixth Amendment's demands. 405 So. 3d 20, 31 (Miss. App. 2023).

And, he submitted, the State had not attempted to meet, and could not meet, its Sixth Amendment burden of showing that screening was necessary in the particular circumstances of his case. 405 So. 3d 1238, 1243 (Miss. 2025).

The trial judge granted the State's motion. In doing so, the judge reasoned that the “statute . . . appears to be man­ datory,” and expressed “concerns about [his] ability to de­ clare the statute unconstitutional and fail to follow it.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a (App.).

After a jury convicted him, Pitts appealed. 405 So. 3d, at 31. Invoking Coy and Craig, he argued that the trial court had failed to make the case-specifc finding of necessity the Sixth Amendment requires and, as remedy, sought a new trial. 405 So. 3d, at 31–35. Ultimately, a divided Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Pitts's arguments. The court did not dispute that the trial court failed to make a case-specifc finding of necessity. See 405 So. 3d, at 1246. Instead, the court sought to distinguish Coy and Craig on various grounds. 405 So. 3d, at 1248–1252. With those distinctions in hand, the court then proceeded to hold that Mississippi's mandatory statute provided sufficient authority for the screening in this case. Id., at 1254–1255. Unpersuaded, the dissent argued that Coy and Craig con­ trolled this case and that the trial court failed to comply with their terms. 405 So. 3d, at 1255 (King, J., dissenting).

After the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled, Pitts sought certiorari. II Under Coy and Craig, a trial court may not deny a defend­ ant his Sixth Amendment right to meet his accusers face to face simply because a state statute permits screening. Nor

And, the court observed, the state legislature exercised this power when it adopted the manda­ tory screening law the trial court applied in this case. 405 So. 3d, at 1249. But, true as all that may be, it is also irrele­ vant. When state law conficts with the Federal Constitu­ tion, the latter controls. Art. VI, cl.

2. And under the

Sixth Amendment, neither state screening statutes, nor the “generalized finding[s]” on which they are premised, are enough to overcome a defendant's right to face-to-face con­ frontation. Coy, 487 U. S., at 1021.

Second, the court stressed that Mississippi's statute man­ dates screening in child-abuse cases while the Iowa statute in Coy only afforded trial courts discretion to screen. 405 So. 3d, at 1249–1250. But, if anything, the fact that Missis­ sippi's statute is mandatory—and thus never requires a casespecifc finding of necessity—renders it “more constitution­ ally problematic than the statute at issue in Coy, not less so.” Id., at 1258 (King, J., dissenting).

Third, the court emphasized that A.

G. C. was four years old at the time of trial. Id., at 1250 (majority opinion). But Craig involved a 6-year-old witness. 497 U. S., at 840. And though a witness's age is a relevant consideration, Craig

Cite as: 607 U. S. 1 (2025) 5 Per Curiam made plain that a court must “hear evidence” and make a “case-specifc” “finding of necessity” before denying a de­ fendant the right to face-to-face confrontation in a childabuse case. See id., at 855.

Fourth, the court observed that in Coy the government and the defendant disputed who committed the alleged as­ sault, while in this case the identity of the alleged perpetra­ tor was not in question. 405 So. 3d, at 1250. But the Sixth Amendment right to confront one's accusers face to face does not only apply in cases where identity is at issue. See Craig, 497 U. S., at 840 (involving a known perpetrator). Nor does Craig's exception for child-abuse cases automatically apply just because identity happens to be uncontested. See id., at 855–856.

Finally, the court noted that the child witness and lawyers in Craig were placed in a different room from the defendant, with cross-examination conducted over closed-circuit televi­ sion. 405 So. 3d, at 1251. In this case, by contrast, every­ one remained in the courtroom, the witness and defendant separated only by a screen. Id., at 1244, 1251. But both approaches deviate from the Sixth Amendment's usual rule that a defendant is entitled to meet his accusers “face to face.” See Coy, 487 U. S., at 1016; Craig, 497 U. S., at 844. And both thus require a case-specifc finding of necessity. Id., at 855.

Before this Court, the State does not so much defend the Mississippi Supreme Court's various efforts to distinguish Coy and Craig as press a different argument still. As the State sees it, the trial court did “hear evidence” and make a “case-specifc” “finding of necessity.” See Craig, 497 U. S., at 855.

We disagree.

At trial, to be sure, the prosecution repre­ sented that A.

G. C.'s guardian believed it would be diffcult for her to testify face to face with her father. App. 6a. But the prosecution expressly rejected the notion that it had “to put on any proof,” choosing to rely instead on Mississippi's

III

Having resolved that much, we pause to underscore what we leave unresolved. Just because a constitutional error took place at trial does not necessarily mean a new one must be held. Even constitutional errors are sometimes subject to a “harmless-error” rule and do not require a new trial if the prosecution can show “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict ob­ tained.” Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 23–24 (1967).

This Court has held that the denial of the right to face-to­ face confrontation is among those errors “subject to that harmless-error analysis.” Coy, 487 U. S., at 1021. Accord­ ingly, on remand the State remains free to argue, and the Mississippi Supreme Court remains free to consider, whether the error in this case warrants a new trial under the harmless-error standard. The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is re­ manded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Reporter’s Note The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the official United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap­ tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made: p. 3, line 9 from bottom: “a” is changed to “the”