BOST

v.

ILLINOIS BOARD OF ELECTIONS

Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. Three political candidates challenged Illinois's procedure for counting mail-in ballots received after election day. We consider whether the candidates have standing to maintain their suit. I Illinois law requires election officials to count mail-in bal­ lots postmarked or certifed no later than election day and received within two weeks of election day. Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 10, §§ 5/18A–15(a), 5/19–8(c) (West 2022). In May 2022, Congressman Michael Bost and Presidential elector nomi­ nees Laura Pollastrini and Susan Sweeney (petitioners) sued the Illinois State Board of Elections and its executive direc­ chelman, and John W. Whitehead; for the NRCC et al. by Michael E. Toner, Jeremy J. Broggi, Brandis L. Zehr, Blake D. Murphy, and Ryan G. Dollar; for the Phyllis Schlafy Eagles et al. by Andrew L. Schlafy; for the Public Interest Legal Foundation by J. Christian Adams; for the Re­ publican National Committee by Thomas R. McCarthy and Gilbert C. Dickey; for Restoring Integrity and Trust in Elections et al. by Christo­ pher O. Murray, Julian R. Ellis, Jr., and Michael L. Francisco; and for Michael T. Morley et al. by Michael T. Morley, pro se. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were filed for the District of Columbia et al. by Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General of the District of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Chloe Q. Pan, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as fol­ lows: Kris Mayes of Arizona, Rob Bonta of California, Philip J. Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Anne E. Lopez of Hawaii, Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford of Nevada, Mat­ thew J. Platkin of New Jersey, Raúl Torrez of New Mexico, Letitia James of New York, Dan Rayfeld of Oregon, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Charity R. Clark of Vermont, and Nicholas W. Brown of Washington; for Bipartisan Former State Secretaries of State by Donald K. Sherman and John B. Hill; and for the Democratic Party of Illinois by David R. Fox and Richard A. Medina. Erick G. Kaardal filed a brief for PA Fair Elections et al. as amici curiae.

75 tor (respondents), claiming that counting ballots received after election day violates federal law. They principally contended that doing so conficts with 2 U. S. C. § 7 and 3 U. S. C. § 1, which set election day as the Tuesday following the first Monday in November. In their complaint and declarations, petitioners asserted several bases for standing as candidates.1 They first argued that they were “entitled to have their election[ ] results certi­ fed with votes received in compliance with the federal Elec­ tion Day statutes.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 87a. And they alleged that they “rely on provisions of federal and state law in conducting their campaigns including, in particular, re­ sources allocated to the post-election certifcation process.” Id., at 87a–88a. Congressman Bost further explained that the late counting of ballots would require him to “organize, fundraise, and run [his] campaign for fourteen additional days.” Id., at 66a. This, in turn, would “cost [his] cam­ paign time, money, volunteers and other resources” by, for example, requiring the campaign to send poll watchers to “monitor late arriving ballots.” Id., at 67a. He also alleged that he “risk[ed] injury if untimely and illegal ballots cause[d him] to lose [his] election,” and “because [his] margin of vic­ tory . . . may be reduced.” Id., at 68a. “A diminished mar­ gin of victory [would] lead to the public perception that [his] constituents have concerns about [his] job performance,” which would “infuence . . . future voters, Congressional lead­ ership, donors, and potential political opponents.” Id., at 68a–69a.2 1 At the time, Congressman Bost was a candidate in the 2022 election, and Pollastrini and Sweeney planned to seek reappointment as Presiden­ tial electors in the 2024 election. Congressman Bost has served as the United States Representative for Illinois's 12th Congressional District since he was first elected in 2014. And he was previously a member of the Illinois House of Representatives, to which he was first elected in 1994. 2 Petitioners also alleged that Illinois's ballot receipt deadline injured them as voters by “dilut[ing] the weight of [their] votes.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 88a. They have not advanced that argument before this Court.

76 The District Court held that petitioners lacked standing and dismissed the suit. 684 F. Supp. 3d 720 (ND Ill. 2023). Petitioners appealed, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 114 F. 4th 634 (2024). The court concluded that the costs to monitor vote counting after election day could not support standing, because those costs would have been voluntarily incurred “to avoid a hypothetical future harm—an election defeat.” Id., at 642. In doing so, the court noted that Con­ gressman Bost had won the last election with 75% of the vote. Ibid. It also rejected petitioners' asserted “ `compet­ itive injury,' ” reasoning that they “do not (and cannot) allege that the majority of the votes that will be received and counted after Election Day will break against them.” Id., at 643. Finally, it dismissed petitioners' asserted injury based on an inaccurate vote tally as unduly “speculative,” because “the election is months away and the voting process has not even started.” Id., at 644. Judge Scudder dis­ sented in part. In his view, Congressman Bost had standing based on the extra costs his campaign would incur to monitor the counting of late arriving ballots. We granted certiorari. 605 U. S. 968 (2025). II Under Article III of the Constitution, plaintiffs must have a “personal stake” in a case to have standing to sue. FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 379 (2024). They must, in other words, be able to answer a basic ques­ tion: “ `What's it to you?' ” A. Scalia, The Doctrine of Stand­ ing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 882 (1983). Congressman Bost has an obvious answer: He is a candidate for office. And a candi­ date has a personal stake in the rules that govern the count­ ing of votes in his election.3 3 Because only one plaintiff needs standing for a suit to proceed, we do not address whether Pollastrini and Sweeney have standing to sue as prospective Presidential electors. See Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 489 (2023).

PRELIMINARY PRINT Volume 607 U. S. Part 1 Pages 71–106 OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT January 14, 2026 REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions Page Proof Pending Publication NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, [email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.

OCTOBER TERM, 2025 71

Syllabus BOST et al. v. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit No. 24–568. Argued October 8, 2025—Decided January 14, 2026 Illinois law requires election officials to count mail-in ballots postmarked or certifed no later than election day and received within two weeks of election day. Congressman Michael Bost and two other political candi­ dates filed a lawsuit claiming that counting ballots received after elec­ tion day violates federal law. They principally contended that doing so conficts with 2 U. S. C. § 7 and 3 U. S. C. § 1, which set election day as the Tuesday following the first Monday in November. The district court dismissed the case, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that petitioners lacked standing. Held: As a candidate for office, Congressman Bost has standing to chal­ lenge the rules that govern the counting of votes in his election. Pp. 76–83. (a) Under Article III of the Constitution, plaintiffs must have a “per­ sonal stake” in a case to have standing to sue. FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 379. An unlawful election rule can injure a candidate in several ways: It might cause him to lose the election, require him to expend additional resources, or decrease his vote share and damage his reputation. But winning, and doing so as inexpensively and decisively as possible, are not a candidate's only inter­ ests in an election. Candidates also have an interest in a fair process. Candidates seek to represent the people, and their interest in that prize cannot be sev­ ered from their interest in the electoral process. Win or lose, candi­ dates suffer when the process departs from the law. The harm to candi­ dates from an unfair and inaccurate election is not common to all. While voters also have a general interest in an accurate vote tally, a candidate's interest differs in kind. Those who spend time and re­ sources seeking to claim the right to voice the will of the people have “an undeniably different—and more particularized—interest” in know­ ing what that will is. Hotze v. Hudspeth, 16 F. 4th 1121, 1126 (Oldham, J., dissenting). Rules that undermine the integrity of the electoral process also un­ dermine the winner's political legitimacy. The counting of unlawful votes—or discarding of lawful ones—erodes public confdence in election Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication 72 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS Syllabus results and the elected representative. “[R]eputational harms” are classic Article III injuries. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 425. And they are particularly concrete for those whose very jobs de­ pend on the support of the people. Pp. 76–79. (b) Candidates do not need to show a substantial risk that a rule will cause them to lose the election or prevent them from achieving a legally signifcant vote threshold in order to have standing. Requiring such a showing could channel many election disputes to shortly before election day or after. Only then will many candidates be able to predict with any certainty that a rule will be outcome determinative. Yet the Court has repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election. Such latebreaking, court-ordered rule changes can result in voter confusion and undermine confdence in the integrity of electoral processes. The dem­ ocratic consequences can be worse if courts intervene only after votes have been counted. Counting first and ruling upon legality afterwards is not a recipe for producing election results that have the public accept­ ance democratic stability requires. Premising standing on a candidate's risk of election loss or failure to achieve a certain vote threshold would also convert Article III judges into political prognosticators and “invite[ ] findings on matters as to which neither judges nor anyone else can have any confdence.” Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U. S. 684, 711 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]ccurately predicting electoral outcomes is not” a “simple” endeavor. Id., at 712. And the limits of federal courts' jurisdiction do not rest upon such “unstable ground outside judicial expertise.” Id., at 713. Nor would requiring candidates to plead a substantial risk of harm to their vote share leave courts on any surer footing. Such an approach would force judges to assess whether an election rule is likely to disad­ vantage a particular candidate—determinations judges are no better qualifed to make than assessing a candidate's likelihood of winning or losing. Candidates would also have to plead and prove that voters who take advantage of the challenged rule will favor their rivals, which may require divulging information about political vulnerabilities. Faced with that prospect, many candidates are sure to wait until after votes are counted to sue. Article III does not require this result. Candidates have a concrete and particularized interest in the rules that govern the counting of votes in their elections, regardless whether those rules harm their electoral prospects or increase the cost of their campaigns. Their interest ex­ tends to the integrity of the election—and the democratic process by which they earn or lose the support of the people they seek to represent. Pp. 79–82.

Cite as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026) 73 Syllabus 114 F. 4th 634, reversed and remanded. Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Barrett, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Kagan, J., joined, post, p. 83. Jackson, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor, J., joined, post, p. 87. Paul D. Clement argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were James Y. Xi, T. Russell Nobile, and Robert D. Popper. Michael E. Talent argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sauer, Assistant Attorney General Dhillon, Deputy Solicitor General Mooppan, Dep­ uty Assistant Attorney General Osete, and Andrew G. Braniff. Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General of Illinois, argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Kwame Raoul, Attorney General of Illinois, Alex Hemmer, Deputy Solicitor General, and Carson R. Griffs, R. Sam Horan, and Samantha Sherman, Assistant Attorneys General.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of West Virginia et al. by John B. McCuskey, Attorney General of West Virginia, and Michael R. Williams, Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Tim Griffn of Arkansas, James Uth­ meier of Florida, Chris Carr of Georgia, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Liz Murrill of Louisiana, Andrew Bailey of Missouri, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Gentner Drummond of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, and Marty Jackley of South Dakota; for the American Center for Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, Walter M. Weber, Benjamin P. Sisney, Jor­ dan A. Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, and Andrew J. Ekonomou; for America's Future et al. by William J. Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan, Michael Boos, and Patrick M. McSweeney; for the Center for Election Confdence by Bradley A. Benbrook and Stephen M. Duvernay; for the Election Integ­ rity Project California, Inc., by Michael J. O'Neill, Matthew C. Forys, and Richard P. Hutchison; for the Honest Elections Project by Jason B. Tor­ chinsky, Jonathan P. Lienhard, and Andrew D. Watkins; for the League of Women Voters et al. by Ari Savitzky, Sophia Lin Lakin, Davin Rosbor­ ough, Theresa Lee, Cecillia D. Wang, Evelyn Danforth-Scott, Scott Mi­ Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication 74 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS Opinion of the Court

Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Sotomayor joins, dissenting. Under our standing precedents, this is an easy case. Arti­ cle III requires plaintiffs to assert and establish an “injury in fact”—i. e., the “invasion of a legally protected interest” that is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or im­ minent.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congressman Bost has failed to allege that the election-related law he seeks to challenge has caused him to suffer any injury that satisfes those requirements. A majority of the Court nevertheless concludes that Bost has standing to sue based solely on his status as a candidate for office. The Court thereby subtly shifts from our long­ standing actual-injury rule to a presumption that certain kinds of plaintiffs are sufficiently aggrieved to satisfy Article III standing, regardless of whether they will experience any particularized harm. In my view, this dubious departure from settled law disregards both the equal treatment of liti­ gants and judicial restraint. Justice Barrett rightly rejects today's bespoke candidate-standing rule. See ante, at 86 (opinion concurring in judgment). Yet her pocketbook theory would allow polit­ Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026) 89 Jackson, J., dissenting concerned bystanders.” United States v. Students Chal­ lenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U. S. 669, 687 (1973). Such a result is incompatible with our con­ stitutional design, which recognizes that “ `abstract ques­ tions of wide public signifcance' ” are “most appropriately addressed in the representative branches.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 475 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975)). In other words, the particularity requirement ensures that the Judiciary stays in its proper lane, leaving to the people's representa­ tives the prerogative to decide questions of broad impor­ tance in the absence of a litigant with a “direct stake in the outcome.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740 (1972). As such, litigants without a direct stake—i. e., those who as­ sert no more than “generalized grievances about the conduct of government”—cannot satisfy the “case or controversy as­ pect of standing.” Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 479 (internal quotation marks omitted). Today's decision all but ignores the particularity require­ ment and the democracy-preserving function that it serves. This case, the Court says, involves “[a]n unlawful election rule,” which necessarily injures candidates' “interest in a fair process.” Ante, at 77. But, even assuming that Illinois's rule is unlawful (as we must for standing purposes), the Court makes no real attempt to explain how that injury is particular to candidates; to the contrary, it acknowledges that voters, too, have a stake in a fair electoral process. See ante, at 78. Yet the Court insists that a candidate's interest is “undeniably different” from that of a voter's, because it is the candidate—and not the voter—who “compete[s]” in an election. Ibid. That assessment gets the signifcance of the relative inter­ ests exactly backward. A public office is a public trust, and an election for that office is the ultimate expression of the will of the people, not a mere competition to be won or lost. Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026) 91 Jackson, J., dissenting tions. Ibid. But it is the Court's own analysis—i. e., its purported distinction between the interests of candidates and voters in fair election outcomes—that raises the compar­ ative question, not mine. In any event, I agree that we need not “theorize” about the signifcance of these interests, for one thing is indisput­ ably clear: Our democracy was founded on the “self-evident” truth that a government is legitimate only insofar as it de­ rives its “just powers from the consent of the governed.” Declaration of Independence ¶2. Candidates come and go, but the voters' collective interest in the “right to elect legis­ lators in a free and unimpaired fashion” is enduring and in­ dispensable. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 562 (1964). Against this backdrop, the Court's effort to isolate and ele­ vate a candidate's “distinct” interest in electoral integrity, ante, at 78, falls fat. For today's standing purposes, the key realization is that, in a democracy, the (existential) interest in fair and accurate elections is common to all members of the voting public. I acknowledge that “[t]hose who spend untold time and re­ sources seeking to claim the right to voice the will of the people,” ibid.—candidates—have a particularized interest in getting the job. That is precisely why candidates do have Article III standing if an unlawful election rule creates a substantial risk of harm to that interest (the risk of an elec­ tion loss). But when what is at stake is the overall fairness of the electoral process, it is the people's shared interest in democracy itself (and not just the candidate's job prospects) that hangs in the balance. B The Court's standing analysis elides all this by employing the commonsense intuition that, “[w]in or lose, candidates suffer when the process departs from the law.” Ante, at 77. But how is that a particularized injury? Anyone and everyone who is governed by law is similarly harmed by any departure from the law's requirements. Moreover, this Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026) 93 Jackson, J., dissenting Finding no support for a nonparticularized “fair process” harm in either our precedents or the practices of the lower courts, the Court pivots to an analogy. It suggests that, as a candidate running for office who has been told that votes will continue to be counted after election day, Bost is no dif­ ferent from a competitor in a 100-meter dash whose race is “unexpectedly extended to 105 meters.” Ante, at 79. Ac­ cording to the majority, each runner in the newly announced 105-meter race would obviously suffer, regardless of whether he “expects to fnish strong.” Ibid. But whether any given runner is harmed by this rule change depends on a number of factors particular to each competitor, none of which the majority deigns to identify. And, indeed, it is far from obvi­ ous that a runner with a track record like Bost's—who ex­ pects to win both races based on sound statistical analyses of his current and past performance—would have the injury that begets Article III standing to involve the Judiciary in this rule-change dispute. Despite the imprecision of its analysis, the Court is clear about one thing today: Pinpointing the actual harm to candi­ dates for elected office is no longer necessary for standing purposes. Its remarkable holding jettisons the injury-in­ fact requirement entirely. Forget injury; political candi­ dates need only have “a concrete and particularized interest in the rules that govern the counting of votes in their elec­ tions, regardless whether those rules harm their electoral prospects or increase the cost of their campaigns.” Ante, at 82 (emphasis added). As Justice Barrett explains, see ante, at 86 (opinion concurring in judgment), this harm-free Article III standing rule finds no support in our precedents.4 4 The Government, participating as an amicus in support of petitioners, also suggests that our typical Article III standing requirements do not apply here, though for a different reason than the Court. In its view, we can presume that Bost has identifed an injury in fact because he is the “direct object” of Illinois's ballot-receipt deadline. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 21. To be sure, when a plaintiff is the direct Page Proof Pending Publication

94 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS Jackson, J., dissenting C Perhaps sensing the weakness of its novel, harm-free standing analysis, the Court resorts to policy arguments to bolster it. It worries that requiring candidates to establish that they might lose the election will “channel” lawsuits “to shortly before election day—or worse, after.” Ante, at 80. “Only then,” the Court says, will a candidate really know whether an election regulation has impacted his race. Ibid. And, worse still, a candidate trying to make such a showing could find himself in the “awkward” position of having to “plead and prove that voters who take advan­ tage of the challenged rule will favor his rivals.” Ante, at 81–82. The relevance of these practical concerns is unclear. We have traditionally viewed Article III standing as an “irre­ ducible” constitutional minimum, “not merely a troublesome hurdle to be overcome.” Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 472, 476. As such, Article III's “essential and unchanging” constitu­ tional mandates do not ordinarily yield to our policy judg­ ment about when it would be most convenient for courts to hear particular kinds of suits. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 380 (internal quotation marks omitted). “object” of “government action or inaction,” there “is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 561–562 (1992). But Bost is not a direct object of the Illinois rule at issue. The rule regulates the conduct of voters and election officials, dictating how and when ballots are cast and counted. See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 10, § 5/19–8(c) (West 2022) (“Each vote by mail voter's ballot that is mailed to an election authority and postmarked no later than election day, but that is received . . . before the close of the period for counting provisional ballots cast at that election, . . . shall be counted”). And we have recently reaffrmed that, “when (as here) a plaintiff challenges the government's `unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else,' ” standing “ `is ordinarily substantially more diffcult to establish.' ” FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S. 367, 382 (2024) (quoting Lujan, 504 U. S., at 562). Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026) 95 Jackson, J., dissenting In any event, under our usual standing rules, a candidate (and our democracy) need not be put in the awkward position of waiting until the eve of an election or predicting an elec­ toral loss with 100% accuracy. Our cases recognize that a litigant who bases standing on “[a]n allegation of future in­ jury” need only assert a “substantial risk that the harm will occur.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 158 (2014) (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omit­ ted). The substantial-risk standard is not especially exact­ ing; it demands more than mere conjecture, but it does not require plaintiffs to prove that the alleged future harm is “literally certain” to occur. Clapper, 568 U. S., at 414, n. 5. Accordingly, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, a candidate need only plausibly allege that the challenged regulation cre­ ates a substantial risk of an election loss—he need not pre­ dict with certainty that the rule will cause him to lose. See, e. g., Texas Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F. 3d 582, 587 (CA⁵ 2006) (concluding that a candidate who alleged that governmental action “threaten[ed] his election prospects” had established standing). Alternatively, a candidate whose win is more secure could allege a substantial risk of some other concrete and particularized harm stemming from the challenged rule's application, such as an existing or imminent financial or reputational injury. Cf. Federal Election Comm'n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289, 296 (2022) (recognizing a winning candidate's $10,000 expenditure as a “pocketbook harm” that “constitute[d] an injury in fact”); Meese v. Keene, 481 U. S. 465, 473–474 (1987) (finding stand­ ing where a candidate had “alleged and demonstrated” that a challenged disclosure rule would, among other harms, “ad­ versely affect his reputation in the community”). Though it may be more diffcult for candidates to satisfy the “substantial risk” standard at later stages of litigation, it is nowhere near impossible. It does not require a candi­ date to prove that the challenged rule guarantees his loss; it simply requires him to marshal enough evidence from which Page Proof Pending Publication

96 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS Jackson, J., dissenting a court could conclude that the challenged rule presents a signifcant threat to his victory, his pocketbook, or his reputation. As we have recognized in other contexts, that sort of evi­ dence may include an evaluation of the facts on the ground and statistical analyses. See, e. g., Department of Com­ merce v. New York, 588 U. S. 752, 767–768 (2019) (concluding that States had standing to challenge the inclusion of a citi­ zenship question on the census, in light of statistical evidence “establish[ing] that noncitizen households have historically responded to the census at lower rates” and “that if nonciti­ zen households [were] undercounted by as little as 2%” those States would “lose out on federal funds”). In the electoral arena, preelection polling will often provide a relevant data set. Candidates could also rely on historical data about how a particular rule has affected those who have run similar campaigns in the past. And the relative advantages or dis­ advantages of various electoral processes can be scrutinized by the kinds of experts who are routinely hired to make these sorts of assessments. See, e. g., Meese, 481 U. S., at 473–474 (finding standing where a candidate submitted “de­ tailed affdavits, including one describing the results of an opinion poll and another containing the views of an experi­ enced political analyst” to show that a challenged disclosure requirement “would substantially harm his chances for re­ election” (footnote omitted)). The Court's suggestion that it is beyond a judge's compe­ tency to evaluate whether an election rule causes a substan­ tial risk of electoral loss, ante, at 80–82, is therefore both puzzling and unfounded. A “substantial risk” of future harm has been the Article III imminent-injury standard for decades. See Clapper, 568 U. S., at 414–415, n. 5 (collecting cases applying this standard). And federal courts, including this one, have routinely applied that standard in a variety of circumstances—essentially whenever a plaintiff maintains that state action is likely to harm him in the future. See, Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026) 97 Jackson, J., dissenting e. g., Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U. S. 43, 57–58 (2024) (First Amendment challenge related to social media content moder­ ation); Department of Commerce, 588 U. S., at 766–767 (Ad­ ministrative Procedure Act challenge to changes to the cen­ sus); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U. S. 139, 153–155 (2010) (environmental challenge to regulations of ge­ netically modifed crops). In short, our precedents establish that certainty of future harm is not the benchmark, as the majority suggests. Ante, at 80. Rather, all that is required is a plausible allegation (eventually followed by proof) of a substantial risk of fu­ ture injury. Bost fails to clear even that low bar. At most, he alleges that he “risk[s] injury if untimely and illegal ballots cause [him] to lose [his] election” or “reduc[e]” his “margin of vic­ tory” in a way that harms his reputation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a–69a (emphasis added). But his complaint and sup­ plemental declaration include no—zero—allegations to sup­ port an inference that such risk exists, or is at all substantial, in his own case; for example, he never alleges that untimely ballots are more likely to break against him and in favor of his opponent. Indeed, Bost appears to have disclaimed the need to include any such allegations before the Court of Ap­ peals, where he argued that his “stated injury is not based on a risk of losing the election” and that “[n]either a change to his electoral fortunes nor any other effect is necessary to afford him standing.” Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants in No. 23–2644 (CA⁷), p. 19. The Court today accepts that unprec­ edented contention, which fies in the face of both the partic­ ularity requirement and the substantial-risk standard. Alarmingly, today's ruling also has far-reaching implica­ tions beyond Bost's election, since dispensing with our usual standing requirements opens the foodgates to exactly the type of troubling election-related litigation the Court pur­ portedly wants to avoid. For example, under the Court's new harm-free candidate-standing rule, an electoral candi­ Page Proof Pending Publication

98 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS Jackson, J., dissenting date who loses in a landslide can apparently still file a disrup­ tive legal action in federal court after the election is over. All he must do is assert that an election rule somehow de­ prived him of a fair process—even if that rule played no role in the election's outcome or otherwise caused him harm. That possibility is especially concerning given the host of election-related regulations that States must promulgate when exercising their constitutional duty to set the “Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections.” Art. I, § 4, cl. 1. States regulate everything from a ballot's chain of custody to its format—all of which the majority would permit candi­ dates to challenge in court without offering any theory of how such rules harm them personally. See Brief for Dis­ trict of Columbia et al. as Amici Curiae 16–22 (describing the myriad state regulations at risk under Bost's broad the­ ory of standing).⁵ See, e. g., ante, at 80 (empha­ sizing that “ `federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election' ” (quoting Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee, 589 U. S. 423, 424 (2020) (per curiam))). Ironically, then, it is the Court's new and generous candidate-standing rule that invites late-breaking judicial intervention into the political process in a manner that is “as practically untenable as it is undemocratic.” Ante, at 79. 5 The Court's suggestion that these sorts of challenges are unlikely, ante, at 82, n. 7, is belied by recent experience. See, e. g., League of Women Voters of Fla. Inc. v. Florida Secretary of State, 66 F. 4th 905, 929 (CA11 2023) (considering a challenge to a “drop-box provision” that governed “the chain of custody of the ballot” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kim v. Hanlon, 99 F. 4th 140, 147, 153 (CA3 2024) (noting that “[c]ourts often decide ballot-design cases” in considering a challenge to “the form of election ballots” in the State of New Jersey). Without a harm-based standing rule for candidates, these kinds of challenges will undoubtedly become even more common. Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026) 99 Jackson, J., dissenting II While more tethered to our standing precedents, Justice Barrett’s pocketbook-injury theory is also insufficient to support Bost's standing. This is because it is well settled— in light of our decision in Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U. S. 398—that plaintiffs “cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.” Id., at 402. Bost's allegations establish only a hypothetical future harm, even when crediting them as true and drawing all reasonable in­ ferences in his favor. In Clapper, we held that a group of attorneys and humanrights organizations lacked standing to challenge a provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) “author­ izing the surveillance of individuals who are not `United States persons' and are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.” Id., at 401 (footnote omitted) (quoting 50 U. S. C. § 1881a). The attorneys and organiza­ tions premised their standing argument on the possibility that their clients would be surveilled under FISA. 568 U. S., at 406. That possibility, they said, required them to take “costly and burdensome measures” to protect their pri­ vacy, including avoiding “certain e-mail and phone conversa­ tions” and traveling to their clients “so that they [could] have in-person conversations.” Id., at 415. Yet the attorneys and organizations “ha[d] no actual knowledge” of the Govern­ ment's surveillance practices under FISA. Id., at 411. They “merely speculate[d] and ma[de] assumptions about whether their communications” would be targeted. Ibid. As a result, the measures they took to avoid surveillance could not satisfy Article III's requirements. Id., at 416. Or, put differently, they could not “manufacture standing merely by inficting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that [was] not certainly impend­ ing.” Ibid. Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication 100 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS Jackson, J., dissenting Bost's alleged pocketbook injury is no different. He fears that Illinois's ballot-receipt deadline will allow the State to count illegal votes, which in turn might injure him by costing him an election or at least resulting in a diminished margin of victory that somehow damages his reputation. Brief for Petitioners 18. He has therefore hired poll watchers to monitor the State's vote counting for an additional two weeks. But, in the absence of any allegation establishing that he actually faces a substantial risk of losing the election or having his margin of victory diminished in a meaningful way, Bost has taken those precautions based on the mere (and by all accounts remote) possibility that such harms will otherwise materialize. At bottom, then, Bost fears a “hypo­ thetical future harm that is not certainly impending.” 568 U. S., at 416. So any additional expenses Bost incurs to ward off that harm is not a proper basis for standing. Ibid. Bost nevertheless insists that his case is distinct from Clapper because he knows that the State will apply its 14­ day ballot-receipt deadline in his next election. That fact, he says, sets him apart from the attorneys and human-rights organizations in Clapper, who could not prove that the Fed­ eral Government would invoke FISA against them or their clients. Stated differently, Bost is certain that the State will apply the ballot-receipt deadline, whereas the Clapper plaintiffs could only speculate as to FISA's future application. This contention misunderstands Clapper's standing rule and how it applied in that case. In Clapper, the harm the plaintiffs feared (unlawful surveillance) would occur at the precise moment that FISA was invoked against them or their clients. And because the asserted injury stemmed di­ rectly from the application of the challenged regulation, the risk of future harm was tied directly to the risk of FISA's future application to the plaintiffs. It mattered, then, that the possibility of FISA's application was only speculative.

Cite as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026) 101 Jackson, J., dissenting Bost's feared injury—the one he seeks to spend his way out of—is different in this respect, but it is no less specula­ tive. The harm Bost fears does not stem from the mere (certain) application of the State's 14-day ballot-receipt dead­ line. Rather, what triggers Bost's spending is fear of a lost election or the diminution of his reputation—i. e., the possi­ ble downstream effects of the challenged election rule. Thus, even though the rule's application is certain, the feared harm is not; Bost has only speculated as to the possibility that this future, downstream harm will occur. This means that Bost's pocketbook injury is similar in all relevant respects to that presented by the plaintiffs in Clap­ per: He is spending money to ward off speculative future injury. His case differs from Clapper only insofar as the source of the harm he is seeking to alleviate is not the (uncer­ tain) application of the regulation itself, but the (uncertain) effects of that regulation. In other words, both Bost and the plaintiffs in Clapper spent money to mitigate a risk of injury that was only theoretical, not substantial. And nei­ ther can leverage unnecessary expenditures into Article III standing. Our decision in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U. S. 139, is not to the contrary. There, we held that farm­ ers who “established a reasonable probability” that geneti­ cally modifed alfalfa seeds would cross-contaminate their or­ ganic alfalfa had standing based on the costly measures they had taken to protect their crops. Id., at 153–155 (internal quotation marks omitted). The key phrase from our Monsanto opinion is “reasonable probability.” The farmers did not simply point to a hypo­ thetical possibility of cross-contamination. Instead, their al­ legations established that their fear of future harm was rea­ sonable. In particular, the farmers explained that modifed alfalfa seeds were actually “ `being planted in all the major alfalfa seed production areas with little regard to contamina­ Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication 102 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS Jackson, J., dissenting tion to non-GMO seed production felds.' ” Id., at 154, n. 3. The farmers also emphasized “ `the compact geographic area of the prime alfalfa seed producing areas and the fact that pollen is distributed by bees that have large natural range of activity.' ” Ibid. Accordingly, they reasonably predicted that “ `the genetic contamination of the [modifed] seed [would] rapidly spread through the seed growing regions.' ” Ibid. Bost's allegations, by comparison, fall well short of demon­ strating a reasonable probability of future harm absent costly mitigation efforts. He alleges only that he “risk[s] in­ jury if untimely and illegal ballots cause [him] to lose” or diminish his “margin of victory,” leading “to the public per­ ception that [his] constituents have concerns about [his] job performance.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a–69a. Examined closely, Bost's averment is that, if the vote counting contin­ ues, he could receive fewer votes, which could cause him to lose the election or could damage his reputation among vot­ ers and donors. No other allegations make this harmful out­ come likely or otherwise substantiate the risk that any of these potential problems might actually occur. Justice Barrett nevertheless suggests that the forgiv­ ing standard for motions to dismiss is enough to get Bost over the line. See ante, at 85, n. (opinion concurring in judg­ ment). But that standard cannot beneft a plaintiff like Bost, who is “armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678–679 (2009).6 See ante, at 85, n. (Barrett, J., concurring in judgment). But a proper Article III standing analysis requires us to answer a different question: whether it was reasonable for this particular plaintiff to voluntarily incur such costs under the circumstances presented in his case. At the motion-to­ dismiss stage, we are only obligated to credit the plausible assertions of fact the plaintiff makes to support that inference. We do not have to accept Bost's bald contention that he has to hire poll watchers in light of Illinois's rule (or make the inference that it is reasonable for him to do so

Cite as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026) 103 Jackson, J., dissenting plaint identifes only a “speculative chain of possibilities,” and, as such, his allegations are insufficient to establish a reasonable probability of future harm. Clapper, 568 U. S., at 414.7 It rightly acknowledges that a plaintiff who relies on costs to establish standing “must incur those costs to `mitigate or avoid' a `substantial risk' of some inde­ pendent harm.” Ante, at 82 (quoting Clapper, 568 U. S., at 414, n. 5). And it recognizes that the independent harm Bost asserts—“discrepancies in late-arriving ballots”— amounts to “conjecture,” with “little support in the plead­ ings.” Ante, at 82. But rather than follow that observation where it leads, the majority crafts a new candidate-only standing rule, ignoring the patently speculative nature of Bost's harm based on Bost's more generalized “interest in a fair process.” Ante, at 77. With respect to the majority's harm-free, fair-process standing theory, Justice Barrett has the better of that argument. She correctly observes that the majority's con­ clusion relieves Bost “of having to show any real harm” and fails to hold him to the same standards that we apply to all during the upcoming election); indeed, in my view, accepting that conclu­ sory contention abdicates our responsibility to actually evaluate the suff­ ciency of the plaintiff's allegations.⁷ Bost's concern that his reputation might be damaged even if he wins— due to a diminished margin of victory, see Brief for Petitioners 18—is especially diffcult to fathom, much less designate as plausible. I suppose it is possible that voters and donors will think less of Bost as an official if he wins by 74% of the vote instead of 75%, regardless of his performance while in office. See 114 F. 4th 634, 642 (CA⁷ 2024) (case below) (observing that Bost won the 2022 election with 75% of the vote). But that result is neither obvious nor intuitive. In fact, without more specifc allegations, one might just as easily speculate that a closer race would beneft Bost, as it could generate more donations and enthusiasm among his core supporters. Page Proof Pending Publication

104 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS Jackson, J., dissenting other litigants. Ante, at 86 (opinion concurring in judg­ ment). But, given the weaknesses of Bost's allegations, Justice Barrett’s standing theory would also unjustly beneft Bost, by permitting him to voluntarily spend his way into a federal forum absent any reasonable assertion that the challenged rule (as opposed to his own unsubstantiated fears and spending proclivities) has caused him to suffer an injury in fact.

III

Forty-some years ago, in Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95 (1983), this Court considered whether a plaintiff had standing to challenge the Los Angeles Police Department's repeated use of life-threatening chokeholds on civilians who posed no threat of violence. Id., at 105. The plaintiff in that case, Adolph Lyons, suffered such a chokehold at the hands of police, “rendering him unconscious and causing damage to his larynx.” Id., at 97–98. Fearing that he would again be subjected to a life-threatening chokehold, Lyons filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction that would bar the future use of that technique against civilians who posed no risk to officer safety. Id., at 98. We rejected Lyons's legal action on standing grounds, holding that he had failed to establish a “real and immediate threat” of future harm. Id., at 105. None of Lyons's ap­ peals to fairness or common sense suffced to persuade a ma­ jority of this Court that he had Article III standing. It did not matter, for instance, that Lyons had almost died from an illegal chokehold only fve months prior to filing his com­ plaint. See ibid. Nor did it matter that “no less than 16 persons ha[d] died following the use of a chokehold by an LAPD police officer” in the preceding decade. Id., at 115– 116 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Because those “odds” did not suggest a substantial risk of harm to Lyons in the future, we said, he was not entitled to sue for injunctive relief. Id., at 108 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). So, despite the grievous wrong and physical harm that Lyons Page Proof Pending Publication

Cite as: 607 U. S. 71 (2026) 105 Jackson, J., dissenting (and others like him) had suffered, we “decline[d] the invita­ tion to slight the preconditions” of Article III. Id., at 112.8 Rev. 1, 71–72 (1984). That prediction proved accurate. Today, courts routinely rely on Lyons to deny plaintiffs standing to seek injunctions against future police behavior. See, e. g., J. W. ex rel. Tammy Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F. 3d 1248, 1267 (CA11 2018) (per curiam); Shain v. Ellison, 356 F. 3d 211, 216 (CA2 2004); Whitfeld v. Ridgeland, 876 F. Supp. 2d 779, 787–788 (SD Miss. 2012); see also Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, 606 U. S. –––, ––– (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (concluding that, under Lyons, Latino plaintiffs who were “stopped for immigration questioning allegedly without reasonable suspi­ cion of unlawful presence” lacked standing to seek an injunction). Page Proof Pending Publication

106 BOST v. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS Jackson, J., dissenting showing of any real and immediate harm, is apparently cog­ nizable only if asserted by candidates for office. * * * I am all for simplifying our standing law. See ante, at 83. But I am against doing so selectively; either Article III standing requires an actual or imminent injury in fact that is particularized to the plaintiff, or it does not. Bost has plainly failed to allege facts that support an inference of standing under our established precedents. By carving out a bespoke rule for candidate-plaintiffs—granting them stand­ ing “to challenge the rules that govern the counting of votes,” simply and solely because they are “candidate[s]” for office, ibid.—the Court now complicates and destabilizes both our standing law and America's electoral processes. Page Proof Pending Publication

Page Proof Pending Publication Reporter’s Note The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the official United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap­ tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made: None