PANIAGUA
v.
STATE
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Appellant Paniagua appealed an order denying his motion to suppress evidence in a DUI case where he entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere. The Ninth Judicial Circuit affirmed the suppression ruling, holding that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe a traffic crash occurred and that circumstantial evidence established probable cause that Paniagua was driving the vehicle.
The court affirmed that under section 316.645, Florida Statutes, it is sufficient if the investigating officer reasonably believed a traffic crash occurred rather than requiring an actual crash. The court held that circumstantial evidence, including the damaged vehicle, flat tire, appellant's sole presence at the scene, and his statement about drinking, was sufficient to establish probable cause that appellant was driving the vehicle.
[1] An officer has the authority to arrest a person for DUI when investigating a traffic crash and developing probable cause for the offense.
[2] For the purpose of DUI investigation, a 'traffic crash' is established if the investigating officer reasonably believes such a crash occurred, even if no actual collision…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under the statute, it is not necessary that a crash of a vehicle actually occurred; it is sufficient if the investigating officer reasonably believed that such crash occurred.”
Establishes the key holding that the officer's reasonable belief in a crash is sufficient under section 316.645, even without an actual crash occurring.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn investigating officer arrived at a scene where appellant's damaged car was on a shoulder with a flat tire and another tire lying three feet away. N…
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Before Rom W. Powell, Senior Judge, Stan Strickland and Tim Shea, J. J.
FINAL ORDER AFFIRMING LOWER COURT
Appellant Paniagua entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charge of DUI and appeals an order denying his pre-trial motion to suppress evidence. We dispense with oral argument pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.320. After careful consideration of the record on appeal, the transcript of the motion hearing, the briefs filed by counsel and the applicable law, we affirm.
Appellant correctly states in his brief that under section 316.645, Florida Statutes, an officer has the authority to arrest a person for DUI where he investigates a traffic crash and develops probable cause to charge the person with the offense of driving while intoxicated. Appellant’s two arguments are (1) that the state did not establish that a traffic crash occurred, and (2) that the investigating officer did not see appellant driving or in control of a motor vehicle, thus lacking probable cause for one of the essential elements of the offense of driving while intoxicated.
Under the statute, it is not necessary that a crash of a vehicle actually occurred; it is sufficient if the investigating officer reasonably believed that such crash occurred. See Runyon v. Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 10 Fla. Law Weekly Supp. 588a (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. June 13, 2003). After discussing the various meanings of the word “crash,” the court in Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Williams, 937 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), held that minimal damage to Williams’ car resulting from an impact with another object was sufficient to establish a “traffic crash” within the meaning of the statute.
Here, when the investigating officer arrived there was only appellant’s damaged car there on the shoulder with appellant sitting nearby. The officer testified he believed that appellant’s car had collided with a median strip. In our view, the officer’s belief was reasonable, and there was sufficient competent evidence to establish that a traffic crash within the meaning of the statute had occurred.
Further, two courts have held that although the investigating officer may not see it, he can rely upon circumstantial evidence to deduce that a defendant was driving a vehicle. See Boynton v. State, 556 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (car inoperable in ditch; defendant the sole occupant in driver’s seat). See also State v. Hemmerly, 723 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (two occupants in rear seat of damaged car; one occupant indicated the other was driving and the other, the defendant Hemmerly, made no response). In the instant case, the damaged car was on the shoulder with no other vehicles around, one tire was flat and another tire was lying on the ground three feet away. Appellant was the sole person at the scene. When asked, appellant told the officer he was coming from a bar and had had three drinks. We find that this was sufficient competent evidence to establish circumstantially that appellant was driving the damaged vehicle. [Appellant does not challenge the trial judge’s implied finding that there was probable cause that appellant was alcohol impaired.]
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the officer here was investigating a “traffic crash” within the purview of section 316.645, Florida Statutes, and that while doing so he developed probable cause that appellant had been driving while under the influence of alcohol so as to lawfully charge appellant and arrest him for the offense of DUI.
Consequently, the order appealed from is
AFFIRMED.
DONE and ORDERED at Orlando, Florida this 2nd day of August, 2010.
/S/
Rom W. Powell, Senior Judge
/S/ /S/
Stan Strickland, Circuit Judge
Tim Shea, Circuit Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy hereof has been furnished to Lamaya A. Henry, Esquire, attorney for appellant, 1999 W. Colonial Dr., Orlando FL 32804, and to Christiana J. Patterson, Assistant State Attorney, attorney for appellee, P.O. Box 1693, Orlando FL 32801, by mail, this 2nd day of August, 2010.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- State v. Williams, 937 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
- State v. Boynton, 556 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- State v. Hemmerly, 723 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)