ROMAN GENEUS

v.

GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY

PER CURIAM ORDER AFFIRMING FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff/Appellant, West Side Chiropractic, as assignee of Roman Geneus (“Appellant” or “West Side”) appeals a final order of the County Court granting the motion for summary judgment of Defendant/Appellee, GEICO Indemnity Company (“Appellee” or “GEICO”). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(3). We dispense with oral argument, Fla. R. App. P. 9.320, and affirm. II. FACTS

This is a PIP case.¹

Romann Geneus sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident. He sought treatment from West Side to which he assigned his PIP benefits. West Side sought payment of its bills for treatment of Geneus under the PIP coverage of a policy issued by GEICO to Natacha Bacoup.² She further testified that she read the affidavit and signed it even though it was false because she was “pissed” at Geneus because “he was trying to get money from [her].” (Bacoup dep. 32:12-13, Feb. 23, 2007.) While Bacoup swore in the second affidavit that Geneus lived with her (contrary to the first affidavit), she testified at her deposition that she “[didn’t] even know him from scratch.” (Bacoup dep. 32:12-13, Feb. 23, 2007.) Geneus’s (West Side’s???) attorney then contacted Bacoup and told her to come to her office and sign and affidavit which counsel had drafted. Bacoup did not read the second affidavit but signed it anyway. When asked directly which of the two affidavits was correct, Bacoup indicated the first one and when asked again she said that the second one was incorrect.

GEICO again moved for summary judgment and argued that Geneus was not a resident relative of Bacoup, the insured. This motion was filed in June of 2007. It was scheduled to be heard on November 16, 2007 but rescheduled for January 22, 2008. Appellant’s counsel did not file any opposition and did not show up for the hearing. On the hearing date, the trial court judge contacted Appellant’s attorney by phone. Counsel requested a continuance and her request was denied. The court below granted GEICO’s motion for summary judgment and found that¹) there were no material facts in dispute;²) there was no record evidence that Geneus was a resident relative of Bacoup; and³) Geneus maintained a separate residence from Natacha Bacoup at all times relevant in this matter. Thus, Geneus was not covered by the Bacoup policy with GEICO. II. PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

West Side contends, first, that the judge below should have granted its request for a continuance. Secondly, it argues that the second affidavit of Bacoup creates an issue of fact sufficient to defeat GEICO’s motion for summary judgment.

GEICO responds that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion for a continuance. As to the merits, GEICO claims that, even if Bacoup’s second affidavit is considered, its summary judgment motion was properly granted. III. DISCUSSION

West Side’s first argument is not without merit.

“Typically, it is more appropriate for the trial court to require the trial attorney to atone for his own sins rather than visit them upon the attorney's unfortunate client.” Anthony v. Schmitt, 557 So. 2d 656, 662 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (citing Beasley v. Girten, 61 So. 2d 179 (Fla.1952)).

Remanding this matter, however would be an ineffectual waste of time and resources. Appellant asks us to review Bacoup’s second affidavit and we have done so. “Our courts have consistently held ruled that a party who opposes summary judgment will not be permitted to alter the position of his or her previous pleadings, admissions, affidavits, depositions or testimony in order to defeat a summary judgment.” DeCosmo v. Fisher, 683 So. 2d 659, 600 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Simply contradicting oneself does not make for a genuine issue of material fact. Bacoup’s second affidavit was obviously drafted solely for the purpose of contradicting her first one. In addition, she performed poorly at her deposition. She admitted not reading her second affidavit or even paying attention to it when she went to her attorney’s office to sign it. Her second affidavit was conclusory in the extreme and offered no explanation for why she it diametrically contradicts her prior one. When pressed at deposition as to which was correct, she conceded that the original was.

While, in another case, it might have been better for the trial court judge to have granted a brief continuance, a remand here would be a waste of time and serve no purpose.³

WHEREFORE it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Final Order granting the motion for summary judgment of Appellee, GEICO Indemnity Company, be and hereby is AFFIRMED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at Orlando, Orange County, Florida on this the _____4___ day of ___________February___________________, 2010.

______/s/___________________

THEOTIS BRONSON

Circuit Court Judge

________/s/__________________

______/s/___________________ FREDERICK J. LAUTEN

DANIEL P. DAWSON Circuit Court Judge

Circuit Court Judge

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order has been

furnished via U.S. mail to: Elizabeth C. Wheeler, Esquire, P.O. Box 2266, Orlando, Florida

32802-2266; and Crystal L. Eiffert, Esquire, 122 East Colonial Drive, Suite 210, Orlando,

Florida 32801, on the __4____ day of________February________________, 2010.

_______/s/__________________

Judicial Assistant

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