SEE VITALE
v.
STATE

9th Cir. Ct. App. Div. | 2013-01-01
No. 2010-AP-47
1 FLCA 2681 Ninth Judicial Circuit Court, Appellate Division (2013)

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Synopsis

Ladd appealed the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained from a vehicle stop, arguing the stop was unreasonable and unlawful. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the stop and seizure were constitutionally reasonable under the emergency aid exception of the Community Care-Taking Doctrine.


Holding

The stop and seizure of Appellant were constitutionally reasonable and lawful based upon the emergency aid exception of the Community Care-Taking Doctrine, considering the totality of the circumstances.


Headnotes

[1] A law enforcement officer may lawfully seize an individual from a vehicle under the community care-taking doctrine when circumstances indicate an emergency aid situation.

[2] The totality of the circumstances must be considered when determining the constitutionality of a vehicle stop and seizure.

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Key Quotes

“based upon the emergency aid exception of the Community Care-Taking Doctrine”

The court's primary legal basis for upholding the stop and seizure as constitutional despite the lack of a warrant.

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Facts & Procedural History

At approximately 2:30 A.M., Deputy Michael Perrin was dispatched to a Walt Disney parking lot (closed since 6:30 P.M.) in response to a "man down" cal…

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Opinion of the Court

Before POWELL, O’KANE, and MIHOK, J.J.

PER CURIAM.

FINAL ORDER AFFIRMING TRIAL COURT

Appellant Ladd appeals the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress after entry of a conditional nolo contendre plea and a stipulation of dispositiveness. We dispense with oral argument pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.320, and affirm.

Appellant argues that the stop of his vehicle was unreasonable and unlawful. The record establishes the following facts which can be summarized as follows. Michael Perrin1, the only

We conclude that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the stop and seizure of Appellant (by removing him from the vehicle) was constitutionally reasonable and lawful based upon the emergency aid exception of the Community Care-Taking Doctrine. See Vitale v. State, 946 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.4th DCA 2007); Sweetman v. State, 13 Fla. Law Weekly Supp. 865a (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. May 31, 2006); Story v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 13 Fla. Law Weekly Supp. 1129a, (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. Sept. 14, 2006); Torcios v. State, 15 Fla. Law Weekly 323a (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Feb. 14, 2008); State v. Ponce, 17 Fla. Law Weekly Supp. 1227a, (Fla.2nd Cir. Ct. Aug. 6, 2010).

AFFIRMED.

DONE AND ORDERED at Orlando, Florida this 11th day of January, 2013.

/S/_________________________

ROM W. POWELL Senior Judge

/S/

/S/__________________________ JULIE H. O’KANE A. THOMAS MIHOK Circuit Judge Circuit Judge 3 of 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing order was furnished to Matthew A. Leibert, Esq., 112 E. Concord Street, Orlando, Florida 32801; Dugald McMillian, Assistant State Attorney, 415 N. Orange Avenue, Ste. 200, Orlando, Florida 32802-1673; and Honorable Faye Allen, 425 N. Orange Avenue, Orlando, Florida 32801, by mail, this 11th day of January, 2013.

/S/_________________________________

Judicial Assistant

Footnotes
1 We reject Appellant’s contention that Perrin was only an “employee” or “agent” of the Sheriff’s Office and not a law enforcement officer who had authority to take the action he did. Appellant referred to Perrin in his motion as a “deputy sheriff; 7 times in his Statement of Judicial Acts to be Reviewed as a “police officer”, and once in his cross-examination as “deputy”. The trial judge referred to Perrin in her findings on the record as “Deputy Perrin” and “the deputy”. 2 of 3 witness at the motion hearing, testified he was employed by the Orange County Sheriff’s Office and was on patrol at approximately 2:30 A.M. when he was radio-dispatched to “a man down” in a Walt Disney parking lot. The lot had closed at 6:30 A.M. Upon his arrival several Disney security men pointed out a parked car which was “running” its windows rolled up with its radio “blaring”. When Perrin approached he observed a man behind the wheel who appeared to be “asleep or dead’. He began “banging on the window”. The man remained unresponsive. Meanwhile a fire-rescue squad had arrived. Deputy Perrin opened the driver’s door, and “they removed Appellant from the vehicle”.

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