TREND SETTER VILLAS OF DEER CREEK, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, CARL R. TRAUGER, ROSE KARIKA, JAMES KARIKA, ROSEANNE TRAUGER, PAMELA TRAUGER, CLOSEBURN CONTRACTING CORPORATION, AND TREND SETTER PATIO HOMES OF DEER CREEK, LTD., APPELLANTS/CROSS APPELLEES,
v.
VILLAS ON THE GREEN, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, JOSEPH E. POLICASTRO, AND DAVID A. HOINES, APPELLEES/CROSS APPELLANTS

Fla. 4th DCA | 1990-09-12
Nos. 87-1193, 87-2228, 87-3219 and 88-0494
DELL, POLEN, JJ., and FRANK, RICHARD H., Associate Judge, concur.
569 So. 2d 766 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1990) Caution
Cited by 18 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

After nine years of litigation, the appellate court affirmed most of the trial court's judgment against the appellants but reversed and remanded on damages due to a confusing interrogatory verdict form, reversed the imposition of both treble and punitive damages as a double recovery, and reversed the constructive trust imposed on Rose and James Karika's general assets.


Holding

The court reversed the damages award and remanded for a new trial due to the confusing interrogatory verdict form; reversed the award of both treble and punitive damages, requiring appellees to elect which remedy to pursue; affirmed that treble damages were appropriate based on evidence of civil theft and conversion; and reversed the constructive trust imposed on Rose and James Karika's general assets because no specific identifiable property or traceable assets were shown to be subject to inequitable transaction.


Headnotes

[1] A jury verdict form that is confusing as to the amount of damages awarded necessitates a new trial on the issue of damages.

[2] A trial court errs by entering a judgment that awards both treble and punitive damages, as such awards may constitute a double recovery and an excessive penalty.

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Key Quotes

“the interrogatory verdict form was at best confusing. Even after an in-depth examination, we still could not determine whether the jury intended to award $300,000 or $1.5 million dollars to appellees.”

Establishes the basis for reversal and remand on damages—the verdict form was so ambiguous that the appellate court could not determine the jury's intent.

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Facts & Procedural History

The case involved allegations of civil theft, conversion, and breach of contract arising from a sophisticated scheme of deceit involving escrow funds.…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal is the culmination of nine years of litigation. We have carefully reviewed the extensive record and briefs which involve some fourteen points on appeal and two points on cross appeal. Accordingly, we now affirm in part and reverse and remand for a new trial only as to the issue of damages.

First, the interrogatory verdict form was at best confusing. Even after an in-depth examination, we still could not determine whether the jury intended to award $300,000 or $1.5 million dollars to appellees. Consequently, we reverse that portion of the final judgment as it pertains to the award of damages against appellants and remand for a new trial solely on that issue. On remand, the trial court should first instruct the jury to determine the total amount of damages that appellees suffered. After that amount has been ascertained, the trial court’s instruction should direct the jury to apportion the total award into separate awards for the individual counts that it concludes the evidence supports. Phillips v. Ostrer, 481 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 492 So. 2d 1334 (Fla.1986).

Second, the trial court erred when it entered a judgment which awarded both treble and punitive damages. In this regard, we find that the awards amounted to a double recovery and an excessive penalty. Cutler v. Pelletier, 507 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 518 So. 2d 1277 (Fla.1987). Accordingly, we reverse that part of the trial court’s order with directions that appellees elect the remedy upon which they desire to seek recovery.

In the same vein, we reject appellants’ argument that an award of treble damages was inappropriate in this case. Appellants are correct when they argue that a contract claim standing by itself will never support an award of treble damages. Rosen v. Marlin, 486 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 3d DCA), pet. for review denied, 494 So. 2d 1151 (Fla.1986). Yet, the evidence clearly established an intricate sophisticated scheme of deceit and theft that amounted to much more than a simple breach of contract as appellants would lead this court to believe. Thus, we conclude that there was competent and substantial evidence that supported a finding of civil theft. We concur with the third district’s analysis in Masvidal v. Ochoa, 505 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), and find it dispositive of this issue:

Moreover, we are not persuaded by the argument that no civil theft or conversion occurred in this case because there was a contractual relationship between the parties. The evidence shows a classic embezzlement by the defendant of an escrow fund set up under a subscription agreement between the parties. That is, the defendant lawfully obtained possession of the plaintiff's funds to set up the escrow fund and thereafter converted the funds for his own use. This being so, the defendant, by his actions, committed an embezzlement, a civil theft and a conversion as well as a breach of con-tract_ We do not read Rosen ... to preclude this result....

Id. at 556.

Third, we find that the trial court erred by imposing a constructive trust as to appellants Rose and James Karika on their general assets. A constructive trust may only be imposed where the res is specific identifiable property or can be clearly traced in assets of the defendant which are claimed by the party seeking relief. Finkelstein v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 490 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). In the instant case, James Karika was never involved in any of Trauger’s activities nor was he employed by Trauger or any of the corporation or partnerships. There was no allegation of fraud, racketeering, conspiracy or civil theft. There was no evidence presented that any specific property owned by Rose and James Karika was the subject of an inequitable transaction. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the trial court’s judgment as it pertains to this appellant.

In all other respects we find appellants’ voluminous points raised on appeal to be without merit. In conclusion, we reverse and remand for a new trial as to the issue of damages and to the extent set forth in this opinion and reverse the imposition of a constructive trust as it applies to appellants Rose and James Karika. All other points are affirmed.

DELL, POLEN, JJ., and FRANK, RICHARD H., Associate Judge, concur.


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Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • Montage Grp., Ltd. v. Athle-Tech Computer Sys., Inc., 889 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
    …will refer to it as "the business damages” claim. . For an alternative approach to the preparation of verdict forms designed to eliminate duplicative and overlapping damage awards, see Trend Setter Villas of Deer Creek v. Villas en the Green, Inc., 569 So. 2d 766, 767 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), and Phillips v. Ostrer, 481 So. 2d 1241, 1245 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). . Athle-Tech also sought the recovery of the $8.9 million net value of the DES/Pinnacle transaction on its claim for unjust enrichment. Athle-Tech’s contrac…
  • Sol Gersh v. Cofman, 769 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
    …1988). Where the property at issue is also the subject of a contract between the parties, a civil theft claim requires additional proof of “an intricate sophisticated scheme of deceit and theft.” Trend Setter Villas of Deer Creek v. Villas on Green, 569 So. 2d 766, 767 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). With regard to Gersh’s claim for civil theft, the evidence showed that Gersh did not sign the five dividend checks received on the Jenkins stocks; someone had forged his signature. Gersh established that the dividend check…
  • Abele v. Sawyer, 750 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
    …ctual issues of its complaint, that would be the only relief available against the Dantos, because the property at issue is not, and never was, in the Dantos’ individual possession. See Trend Setter Villas of Deer Creek v. Villas on the Green, Inc., 569 So. 2d 766, 768 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). The Abele Group argues that the allegation in the complaint that the property was transferred to the Dantos must be taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. First, the complaint alleges that the property was tran…

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