STATE
v.
ROSADO, 15 AP 50
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The State appealed a trial court's suppression order in a DUI case, arguing the court applied the wrong legal standard when evaluating whether the initial detention was lawful. The appellate court agreed, finding the trial court used probable cause instead of the correct reasonable suspicion standard, and reversed and remanded for reconsideration.
The trial court applied the incorrect legal standard of probable cause rather than the proper standard of reasonable suspicion in evaluating the lawfulness of the detention. The case is reversed and remanded for the trial court to apply the proper reasonable suspicion standard and determine whether the trooper had reasonable suspicion to conduct the DUI investigation.
[1] A detention for a driving under the influence investigation is lawful if supported by reasonable suspicion, not probable cause.
[2] An appellate court may reverse a trial court's suppression order and remand for further proceedings when the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court used the incorrect legal standard, probable cause, rather than the correct legal standard, reasonable suspicion, in determining whether Appellee was illegally detained pursuant to a DUI investigation.”
Establishes the primary error on appeal—the trial court's application of the wrong legal standard for evaluating detention authority
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRonald Rosado was detained following a crash investigation for a DUI investigation. The trial court granted Rosado's Motion to Suppress all evidence d…
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Before MYERS, JR., O’KANE and UNDERWOOD, J.J.
PER CURIAM.
FINAL ORDER REVERSING TRIAL COURT ORDER AND REMANDING
Following a crash investigation, Ronald Rosado (“Appellee”) was detained for a driving under the influence (“DUI”) investigation. The trial court granted Appellee’s Motion to Suppress all evidence derived from Appellee’s detention. The State (“Appellant”) appeals. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(1). We reverse and remand. The trial court used the incorrect legal standard, probable cause, rather than the correct legal standard, reasonable suspicion, in determining whether Appellee was illegally detained pursuant to a DUI investigation. See State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1995). At the hearing, Appellant and Appellee interchangeably used probable cause and reasonable suspicion when arguing to the trial court about the legality of Appellant’s detention, and the trial court ruled that the trooper did not have probable cause to detain Appellee. Although the trial court made findings, the lack of specificity within the factual findings precludes this Court from conducting a de novo application of the law to the facts. Therefore, this case will be reversed and remanded for the trial court to apply the proper legal standard and determine whether the trooper had reasonable suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation under the totality of the circumstances.1 Bell, 873 So. 2d 476, 477-78 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Additionally, “[t]he trial court, in its discretion, may allow additional testimony or make the factual findings based solely on the existing record.” State v. Deferance, 807 So. 2d 806, 807-08 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the trial court’s order granting Appellee’s Motion to Suppress is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Orlando, Orange County, Florida, this 1st day of August, 2016.
/S/
DONALD A. MYERS, JR. Presiding Circuit Court Judge
O’KANE and UNDERWOOD, J.J., concur.1“Suppression issues are extraordinarily rich in diversity and run the gamut from (1) pure questions of fact, to (2) mixed questions of law and fact, to (3) pure questions of law. Reviewing courts must exercise care when examining such issues, for while the issues themselves may be posed in broad legal terms (e.g., whether a suspect was ‘in custody,’ whether conduct by police constituted ‘interrogation’), the actual ruling is often discrete and factual (e.g., whether police did in fact tell a suspect he was free to go, whether police did in fact ask a suspect if he committed the crime).” State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2001). CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing order was furnished to The Honorable Adam McGinnis, County Court Judge, 425 N. Orange Avenue, Suite 465, Orlando, Florida 32801; Brandon F. Dark, Assistant State Attorney, 415 N. Orange Avenue, Ste. 200, Orlando, Florida 32802; and to Stuart I. Hyman, P.A., 1520 East Amelia Street, Orlando, Florida 32803 this 2nd day of August, 2016.
/S/
Judicial Assistant
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Authorities Cited
- State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2001)
- State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1995)
- State v. Deferance, 807 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- State v. Bell, 873 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)