DHSMV
v.
WALSH
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The court reviewed the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles' (DHSMV) denial of a petitioner's request for early reinstatement of driving privileges on hardship grounds. The petitioner's license was revoked for three DUI convictions and was eight years into a 10-year revocation period, but was denied reinstatement after admitting to occasional alcohol consumption within the past year. The court affirmed the denial, holding that alcohol constitutes a "drug" under Florida law, requiring applicants to remain alcohol-free for at least five years before being eligible for a hardship license.
The court held that alcohol is a "drug" for purposes of determining whether an applicant for a hardship license has remained drug-free for at least five years prior to the hearing, even though the statute does not explicitly require alcohol abstinence. Therefore, the DHSMV properly denied the petitioner's reinstatement request based on her alcohol consumption.
[1] An administrative agency may reasonably interpret a statute to require an applicant to be alcohol-free as part of a requirement to be drug-free, even if the statute does…
[2] An applicant seeking reinstatement of driving privileges on hardship grounds must demonstrate compliance with all statutory requirements, including those related to being…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The law is well-established that alcohol is a "drug" for purposes of determining whether an applicant for a hardship license has remained drug-fee for at last five years before a hearing on the application even though statute does not specifically require an applicant to be alcohol-free.”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that alcohol constitutes a "drug" under the hardship license statute despite the statute's silence on alcohol specifically.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioner's driving privileges were revoked due to three convictions for driving under the influence of drugs. She was eight years into a 10-year rev…
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This case is before the court to review the administrative denial of Petitioner’s request for early reinstatement of her driving privileges on hardship grounds. Petitioner’s driving privileges were revoked because she sustained three convictions for driving under the influence—of drugs, specifically—not alcohol. She is eight years into a 10-year revocation. To her credit, Petitioner says she has been drug-free ever since losing her driving privilege. Her filings with the court suggest her efforts to do what is required to restore her privilege to operate a motor vehicle are sincere. In her hearing for reinstatement, however, she admitted to consuming alcohol on rare occasion within the past year, which resulted in the denial of reinstatement. She petitioned this court for relief, indicating that she did not know that she was to also refrain from using alcohol, or she would have done so.
This court admits the law is confusing to many except those schooled in the law, but it is nonetheless bound to apply it. The law is well-established that alcohol is a “drug” for purposes of determining whether an applicant for a hardship license has remained drug-fee for at last five years before a hearing on the application even though statute does not specifically require an applicant to be alcohol-free. § 322.271(4)(a) 3, Fla. Stat.; DHSMV v. Walsh, 204 So. 3d 169, 172 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)(alcohol is a “drug,” for purposes of determining whether an applicant for hardship license has remained drug-free for at least five years prior to hearing on application); Dept. of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Abbey, 745 So. 2d 1024, 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (Department acted reasonably in requiring applicant for hardship license to be alcohol-free for five years as part of being “drug-free,” even though statute does not specifically require an applicant to be alcoholfree.) See also Charkin v. Dept. of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 304 So. 3d 822, 829 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020).
Petitioner does not cite any legal error committed by the Department. Rather, her petition demonstrates her hardship, her misunderstanding of the law, and asks this court to intervene more as an act of clemency than anything else. Unfortunately, this court cannot legally grant the requested relief. Despite this, this court hopes that, with renewed understanding, Petitioner will continue to maintain a healthy, drug-free lifestyle, and reapply at her earliest opportunity.
It is ORDERED that the Petition is DENIED without need for a response on the date imprinted with the Judge’s signature.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- State v. Walsh, 204 So. 3d 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)
- State v. Abbey, 745 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Chakrin, 304 So. 3d 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)