JAMES LYNCH
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES

15th Cir. Ct. App. Div. | 2011-06-09
1 FLCA 2045 Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Appellate Division (2011)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Lynch sought review of a hearing officer's order suspending his driver's license for refusing to submit to a breath test. The court granted the petition for writ of certiorari and remanded because the hearing officer failed to make an explicit finding regarding disqualification of Lynch's commercial driver's license.


Holding

The court granted the petition for writ of certiorari and remanded the matter to the hearing officer solely to make a finding regarding disqualification of Lynch's commercial driver's license. The court held that an overt written finding regarding the lawfulness of the stop is not mandated by Hernandez because the hearing officer's statement that all elements necessary to sustain the suspension were supported by a preponderance of the evidence subsumes the lawfulness issue.


Headnotes

[1] An administrative order must contain express findings on all material issues to be reviewed.

[2] An appellate court cannot reweigh evidence when reviewing an administrative decision.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“the Hearing Officer's order fails to make a ruling on the disqualification of Lynch's commercial driver license ("CDL"), the matter must be remanded to the Hearing Officer to clarify whether the permanent disqualification of Lynch's CDL was sustained”

Establishes the primary basis for remand—the hearing officer's failure to explicitly address CDL disqualification

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Lynch's driver's license was suspended following a hearing officer's determination that he refused to submit to a breath, blood, or urine test. The he…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court

PO Box 540609 Lake Worth, FL 33454

HAFELE, J.

James Lynch ("Lynch") seeks review of the Hearing Officer's order sustaining the suspension of his license.

We find that, because the Hearing Officer's order fails to make a ruling on the disqualification of Lynch's commercial driver license ("CDL"), the matter must be remanded to the Hearing Officer to clarify whether the permanent disqualification of Lynch's CDL was sustained.

However, our reading of Dep't Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Hernandez, 36 Fla.

L. Weekly S243a (Fla. June 9, 2011), does not mandate an overt written finding by the Hearing Officer that the refusal was incident to a lawful stop. In this case, the Hearing Officer's order states that "all elements necessary to sustain the suspension for refusal to submit to a breath, blood or urine test under section 322.2615 of the Florida Statutes are supported by a preponderance of the evidence." This statement subsumes the issue of whether the refusal was incident to a lawful stop.

Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is GRANTED. The order of suspension is QUASHED and the matter is REMANDED to the Hearing Officer solely to make a finding regarding the disqualification of Lynch's CDL.

COX, J., concur. CROW, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.

While I concur with the majority that the matter must be remanded for the Hearing Officer to make a determination as to the issue of Petitioner's commercial driver license, I would also remand because the Hearing Officer failed to make a finding that the refusal to submit to a breath test was incident to a lawful arrest as required by the Florida Supreme Court's recent decision in Dep't Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Hernandez, 36 Fla.

L. Weekly S243a (Fla. June 9, 2011). The majority assumes that the statement "all elements necessary to sustain the suspension for refusal to submit to a breath, blood or urine test under section 322.2615 of the Florida Statutes are supported by a preponderance of the evidence" subsumes a finding that the refusal was incident to a lawful stop. Such a conclusion assumes that the Hearing Officer read section 322.2615 in pari materia with the implied consent statute, despite the 2004 amendment to section 322.2615 that removed the lawfulness of the stop from the Hearing Officer's scope of review.

The record is void of any indication as to how the Hearing Officer analyzed this issue, which is precisely why it must be remanded for the Hearing Officer to make an express ruling. Since the order at issue did not make a finding that the stop was lawful, a conclusion that the issue was "subsumed" constitutes an impermissible reweighing of the evidence. The circuit court in its appellate capacity is not entitled to reweigh the evidence and must limit itself to determining whether the evidence supporting the decision was competent and substantial. Dep't of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Stenmark, 941 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Dep't of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Kurdziel, 908 So. 2d 607, 609 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

Therefore, I would remand to the Hearing Officer for a determination whether the request to submit to a breath test was incident to a lawful arrest. This would place us in line with existing Fifteenth Judicial Circuit precedent. See Maesel v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 18 Fla.

L. Weekly Supp. 1101a (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Sept. 26, 2011); Bennett v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 19 Fla.

L. Weekly Supp. 24b (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Oct. 17, 2011); Lebrun v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 19 Fla.

L. Weekly Supp. 24a (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Oct. 17, 2011); Christensen v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 19 Fla.

L. Weekly Supp. 24c (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Oct. 17, 2011); Rielly v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 19 Fla.

L. Weekly Supp. 24d (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Oct.17, 2011); Smith v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 19 Fla.

L. Weekly Supp. 11c (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. (Appellate) Oct. 14, 2011); Hollingsworth v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 19 Fla.

L. Weekly Supp. 11b (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Oct. 14, 2011); Maloney v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 19 Fla.

L. Weekly Supp. 11a (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Oct.14, 2011); Thomas v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, (Publication Forthcoming); Marsh v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, (Publication Forthcoming); Fraxedas v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, (Publication Forthcoming); Flanagan v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, (Publication Forthcoming); Ehilow v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, (Publication Forthcoming).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw