STEWART AGENCY
v.
STANDARD FIRE INC
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Stewart Agency, Inc. (Earl Stewart Toyota) appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to The Standard Fire Insurance Company in a breach of contract case arising from an insurance claim for vehicle repairs. The appellate court reversed, finding genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the insurer fully paid for the covered loss and whether the insurer properly cooperated in the claim settlement.
The court reversed summary judgment, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment because the insurer's pre-approval language was contained only in the estimate, not the policy, and thus did not constitute a contractual duty on Earl Stewart Toyota; factual questions remained regarding whether the insurer's estimate properly accounted for necessary parts; and the question of whether the insurer breached its cooperation obligation is a question of fact inappropriate for summary judgment.
[1] An insurer's supplemental estimate, not incorporated into the insurance policy, does not create a contractual duty for the insured or its repair provider.
[2] Summary judgment is inappropriate when genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the full payment for covered losses under an insurance policy.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We find that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of The Standard Fire Insurance Company, because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether The Standard Fire Insurance Company fully paid for the loss to the vehicle covered by its automobile insurance policy.”
States the core holding that summary judgment was improper due to factual disputes over full payment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVictoria Lyons took her insured vehicle to Earl Stewart Toyota for accident repairs on September 24, 2014. Earl Stewart Toyota submitted repair estima…
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470 Columbia Drive Bldg. C101 West Palm Beach, FL 33409 [email protected]
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Stewart Agency, Inc. ("Earl Stewart Toyota"), appeals the trial court's order granting Appellee's, The Standard Fire Insurance Company's, Motion for Summary Judgment. We find that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of The Standard Fire Insurance Company, because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether The Standard Fire Insurance Company fully paid for the loss to the vehicle covered by its automobile insurance policy.
On September 24, 2014, Victoria Lyons ("the insured") took her vehicle to Earl Stewart Toyota for repair of damage to her vehicle caused by a motor vehicle accident. At the time of the accident, the insured's vehicle was covered by an automobile insurance policy ("the policy") issued to the insured by The Standard Fire Insurance Company ("the insurer.") On September 26, 2014, Earl Stewart Toyota submitted an estimate to the insurer for $5, 890.48. On September 30, 2014, Earl Stewart Toyota submitted a supplemental estimate for repairs for $6,228.59. After Earl Stewart Toyota submitted both estimates, the insurer's appraiser prepared a written estimate, estimating that repairs would cost $4,180.56. The insurer's estimate contained a provision, which was not contained in the policy, that "all supplements must be preapproved" and that "supplement repair charges may be subject to rejection unless approved by Travelers prior to repairs.". On October 2, 2014, the insurer issued a check to Earl Stewart Toyota for $3,680.56. After receiving the insurer's check, Earl Stewart Toyota continued to perform repairs on the insured's vehicle, without notifying the insurer, and then billed the insurer for $5,884.26.
On October 15, 2015, Earl Stewart Toyota filed an Amended Complaint against the insurer for a breach of contract arising out of the insurer's failure to pay the full amount of Earl Stewart Toyota's estimate for repair work of the vehicle. On February 22, 2016, the insurer filed a Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion"), alleging that it was entitled to summary judgment because Earl Stewart continued to perform repairs on the insured's vehicle based on its supplemental estimate and in contravention of language contained in the insurer's estimate that "all supplements must be pre-approved" and "supplemental charges may be subject to rejection" and in violation of policy language requiring Earl Stewart Toyota's cooperation "in the investigation, settlement, or defense of any claim or suit."
This Court rejects the insurer's argument that the language contained in the supplemental estimate requiring pre-approval for repairs bound Earl Stewart Toyota because this language was contained only in the supplemental estimate, and not in the policy itself. Therefore, this language does not constitute a contractual duty on the part of Earl Stewart Toyota. Additionally, issues of material fact remain with respect to whether The Standard Fire Insurance Company's proposed estimate would have fully paid for the loss covered by the policy. Such issues of material fact include whether The Standard Fire Insurance Company's estimate properly called for the installation an aftermarket energy absorber, a used left quarter panel salvaged from a junkyard, and an aftermarket rear bumper cover. Moreover, Florida courts have held that whether an insurer breaches an obligation to cooperate is a question of fact inappropriate for summary judgment. Bontempo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 604 So. 2d 28, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Bankers Ins. Co. v. Macias, 475 So. 2d 1216, 1218 (Fla. 1985).
Accordingly, we REVERSE the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of The Standard Fire Insurance Company because issues of material fact remain. Earl Stewart Toyota's Motion for Appellate Attorneys' Fees is GRANTED conditioned upon its prevailing in the lower court. Additionally, The Standard Fire Insurance Company's Motion for Appellate Attorneys' Fees is GRANTED conditioned upon its prevailing in the lower court, and the lower court's determination that the proposal for settlement entitled The Standard Fire Insurance Company to fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes.
SASSER, HAFELE, AND OFTEDAL, JJ., concur. IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
STEWART AGENCY, INC. d/b/a EARL STEWART TOYOTA OF NORTH PALM BEACH, a/a/o Victoria Lyons Appellant, V.
THE STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
APPELLATE DIVISION (CIVIL): AY CASE NO: 502016AP900115CAXXMB L.T. NO: 502015SC000953XXXXNB
Opinion/Decision Filed: JUN 1 3 2017
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Bankers Ins. Co. v. MacIas, 475 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1985)
- Bontempo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 604 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)