JAMES W. CARR, APPELLANT,
v.
MARIAN J. CARR, A/K/A JEANNIE CARR, APPELLEE
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The court held that an equitable distribution of marital assets should be equal unless there is justification for a disparity, and absent such justification, the award must be reversed.
[1] Marital asset distribution should be equal unless there is justification for a disparity of treatment.
[2] Trial judges in the Fourth District must follow the precedent requiring equal distribution of marital assets absent justification for unequal treatment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe wife received at least 84% of the marital assets in a final judgment of dissolution. The husband calculated the award to the wife as over 90% of t…
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LETTS, Judge.
The motion for rehearing is granted. The opinion of April 25, 1990 is withdrawn and the following opinion is substituted.
This appeal emanates from a final judgment of dissolution in which the wife concedes that she received at least 84% of the marital assets as an equitable distribution. We reverse.
For better or for worse, for richer or for poorer, the Fourth District Court of Appeal has held on at least two occasions that: “[i]n this district ... asset distribution should be equal unless there is justification for a disparity of treatment.” Bobb v. Bobb, 552 So. 2d 334, 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Longo v. Longo, 533 So. 2d 791, 793 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Frankly, this particular author questions whether, in so holding, we have correctly followed the teachings of Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980), because what we have done here at the Fourth District, comes perilously close to an adoption of the community property concept.
However, this author’s concern is not the point. This court sitting en banc in Longo held that the distribution should be equal unless justification for unequal treatment is shown, such as was enunciated in Lester v. Lester, 547 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Accordingly, we must follow the law of our own cases until we are overruled or until we recede from them. Trial judges in this district must do likewise.
In the case at bar, there does not appear to be justification for such a lopsided award, and the trial judge has not articulated any. Indeed, according to the hus band s calculations, the award to the wife is actually over 90% of the marital assets.
Accordingly, we must reverse the equitable distribution award. As to the award of alimony and attorney’s fees, we do not agree with the husband’s position. However, those matters are interrelated with the equitable distribution question. Upon remand, the trial court may also reconsider all issues.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HERSEY, C.J., concurs in result only.
GUNTHER, J., concurs.
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Wood v. John Fraser, M.D., 677 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…r the Florida legislature clearly expresses its disapproval of Moore by a subsequent statutory enactment,5 trial courts in [*19] this district are firmly bound by its holding. E.g., State v. Sanchez, 642 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Carr v. Carr, 569 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Bunn v. Bunn, 311 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).6 In closing, we take this opportunity to remind trial courts again that they “do not create precedent.” State v. Bamber, 592 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), approved, 630…
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Blythe v. Blythe, 592 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…justification apparent from the record. It appears that this error may have been inadvertent.1 We reverse for correction of the asset distribution, which should have been equal in the absence of a justification for disparate treatment. Carr v. Carr, 569 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Bobb v. Bobb, 552 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Longo v. Longo, 533 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), rev. dismissed, 542 So. 2d 989 (1989). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision as to the date used to de…
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Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Bobb v. Bobb, 552 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Longo v. Longo, 533 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Shirlee R. Lester v. Lester, 547 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)