SAMUEL JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Samuel Johnson appeals his manslaughter conviction, arguing the trial court erred by not providing a complete and contemporaneous definition of justifiable and excusable homicide within the manslaughter jury instruction. The appellate court affirms, holding that Florida law permits defining these terms by reference to prior instructions.
The court held that no error occurred. Following Rojas v. State, a complete definition of manslaughter requires explaining that justifiable and excusable homicide are excluded from the crime, but Florida law does not require that complete definitions of these terms be repeated in the manslaughter instruction itself. Definition by reference to prior instructions is proper, as reflected in the standard jury instructions.
[1] A jury instruction defining manslaughter must explain that justifiable and excusable homicide are excluded from the crime.
[2] A trial court may define justifiable and excusable homicide by reference to prior instructions, rather than repeating the complete definitions.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“since manslaughter is in the nature of a residual offense, a complete definition of manslaughter requires an explanation that justifiable and excusable homicide are excluded from the crime”
Establishes the legal standard from Rojas v. State requiring that manslaughter instructions exclude justifiable and excusable homicide
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohnson was convicted of manslaughter. The trial court instructed the jury on excusable homicide during introductory charges and on justifiable homici…
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HARRIS, Judge.
Samuel Johnson appeals his conviction for manslaughter. He contends that the trial court erred in failing to give a complete and contemporaneous definition of justifiable and excusable homicide as part of the manslaughter charge.1 Under the facts of this case, we affirm.
Johnson does not contend in his argument that the instructions were incorrect statements of law or were incomplete instructions. He complains rather that the instructions on justifiable and excusable homicide, previously given by the judge, were not repeated in their entirety during the manslaughter charge. In Rojas v. State, 552 So. 2d 914 (Fla.1989), the supreme court held that since manslaughter is in the nature of a residual offense, a complete definition of manslaughter requires an explanation that justifiable and excusable homicide are excluded from the crime. The court did not require that a complete definition of excusable and justifiable homicide be given as a part of the manslaughter instruction. To the contrary, in footnote 2 of Rojas, the court specifically approved the standard jury instructions which, in the manslaughter charge, defines justifiable and excusable homicide by reference: “as I have previously explained those terms.” The instruction was so given in the present case.
The record reflects that the court did previously instruct on excusable homicide during the introductory charges and instructed the jury on justifiable homicide within its instruction on justifiable use of deadly force. This was done at the suggestion of defense counsel. Johnson does not contend that the justifiable use of deadly force charge is inadequate or that it cannot properly substitute for a separate charge on justifiable homicide. It appears that even if he took such a position, he would now be estopped. See Ray v. State, 403 So. 2d 956 (Fla.1981); Armstrong v. State, 566 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).
We find no error and AFFIRM.
DAUKSCH and COWART, JJ., concur. . He also contends that during closing argument the prosecutor improperly referred to Johnson’s two previous felony convictions in order to attack his character. We find this argument to be without merit.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- RAY v. State, 403 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1981)
- Rojas v. State, 552 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1989)
- Armstrong v. State, 566 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)