PAUL E. ORR, APPELLANT,
v.
JUDITH M. ORR, APPELLEE
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Paul Orr appealed a trial court order holding him in contempt for nonpayment of alimony and issuing a writ of bodily attachment. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting Orr's argument that an IRS levy on his property satisfied the purge condition, finding the payment was made to the IRS rather than to his ex-spouse as required.
Payment to the IRS does not satisfy a state court order requiring direct payment to the obligee. The contempt order was properly issued and the writ of bodily attachment was properly maintained because the purge provision required payment to the ex-spouse, not to a third party, even when that third party is a federal agency with a valid levy.
[1] A writ of bodily attachment for non-payment of alimony may be purged by payment of the amount owed.
[2] Payment of alimony to the Internal Revenue Service on behalf of the payee, in response to a levy, may satisfy a purge provision for contempt.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This record is replete with references to appellant's numerous efforts to forestall payment of his marital obligation to appellee as determined by the trial court. This scenario is but the latest ploy.”
Court's characterization of Orr's pattern of behavior in attempting to avoid alimony payments and rejection of his IRS levy argument.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court ordered Orr to pay $7,975.98 in past due alimony by December 15, 1989, or face incarceration. On February 1, 1990, after Orr failed to…
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DOWNEY, Judge.
On November 15, 1989, the trial court ordered appellant to pay to appellee $7,975.98 in past due alimony by December 15, 1989, or suffer incarceration. On February 1, 1990, based upon the nonpayment affidavit of appellee, the court entered another order commanding the clerk of the circuit court to issue a writ of bodily attachment for appellant for delivery to the sheriff and directing the sheriff to bring the body of appellant before the court as expeditiously as possible. This order contained a provision for purging the contempt by payment of the amount owed.
On February 8, 1990, appellant was served with a notice of levy by the Internal Revenue Service purporting to levy on appellant’s property and specifically “alimony payable to Judith Orr, and any other funds due to the above individual.” On February 12, 1990, appellant gave the Internal Revenue Service a check for $7,975.98 with the legend thereon “Behalf of Judith M. Orr S.S. # [ XXX-XX-XXXX ]-59-1124603.” The clerk of the court issued the writ of bodily attachment on February 16, 1990.
Appellant then filed a second emergency motion to dissolve the writ of bodily attachment, alleging that he had complied with the purge provision of the order of February 1, 1990, in view of his payment to the Internal Revenue Service on behalf of appellee and because of the levy served upon him by the Internal Revenue Service. The motion was denied on March 7, 1990, and this appeal was filed April 5, 1990. Appellant also filed a complaint in interpleader in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on March 7, 1990, setting forth the order of the circuit court to pay appellee the $7,975.98 and the levy of the Internal Revenue Service for said sum and seeking to interplead said funds.
This record is replete with references to appellant’s numerous efforts to forestall payment of his marital obligation to appel-lee as determined by the trial court. This scenario is but the latest ploy. We are unimpressed and fail to find any reversible error in the trial court’s order appealed from. Accordingly, that order is affirmed.
HERSEY, C.J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur.