MELVYN M. GARCIA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1990-12-04
No. 90-938
Before JORGENSON, LEVY and GODERICH, JJ.
570 So. 2d 1082 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1990) Positive Treatment
Cited by 16 cases

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Synopsis

Garcia appeals his conviction for manslaughter with a firearm and unlawful firearm possession. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court erred by failing to excuse a juror for cause despite her manifest bias against firearms.


Holding

The trial court's refusal to excuse the juror for cause was erroneous. Although the juror's subsequent answers to leading questions stated she would follow the law, the reasonable doubt about her competency created by her initial statements about her hatred of guns and near-fatal experience was not dispelled by those affirmative responses.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court errs by refusing to excuse a juror for cause when the juror's statements during voir dire raise reasonable doubt about their competency, even if the juror l…

[2] A defendant is prejudiced when a trial court erroneously denies a challenge for cause, forcing the defendant to exhaust peremptory challenges and preventing the seating o…

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Key Quotes

“This reasonable doubt remained de spite the juror's answers to leading questions about her ability to follow the law.”

Establishes that affirmative responses to leading questions cannot cure reasonable doubt about juror competency created by earlier statements.

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Facts & Procedural History

During jury selection, a prospective juror (Ms. Trio) stated that she 'hate[s] guns' and 'almost got killed' due to her experience with firearms. When…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Melvyn M. Garcia, appeals from a final judgment of conviction and sentence entered against him for manslaughter with a firearm and for unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

During jury selection, the trial court erroneously declined to excuse a juror for cause, notwithstanding the fact that the statements made by the juror during voir dire raised reasonable doubt about her competency as a juror.1 See Blye v. State, 566 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Salazar v. State, 564 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). This reasonable doubt remained de spite the juror’s answers to leading questions about her ability to follow the law. See Club West, Inc. v. Tropigas of Fla., Inc., 514 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Leon v. State, 396 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 407 So. 2d 1106 (Fla.1981). The defendant was forced to exhaust his other peremptory challenges and was unable to obtain additional peremptory challenges. Therefore, reversal is required. See Hill v. State, 477 So. 2d 553, 556 (Fla.1985); Blye, 566 So. 2d at 877; Salazar, 564 So. 2d at 1245; Leon, 396 So. 2d at 203.

Since this point is dispositive, we do not need to address defendant’s remaining points on appeal.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

. The record reveals the following voir dire of that prospective juror:

[MR. ACOSTA: Prosecutor] Do you all agree that you can abide by the law in determining when a weapon is used justifiably in self-defense and when it is not; that you will listen to the law as the judge gives to you, that you will apply it fairly to the facts of the case? Anyone think they’ll have a problem with that? Anyone so anti or so pro gun control that the mere fact that somebody had a gun already biases you against that person? Is there anyone here who feels that way? Okay. Miss Trio. MS. TRIO: I hate guns, I hate the sight of them. I almost got killed, and I just don't like anything to do with guns. MR. ACOSTA: Okay. Let me see if I can just go over briefly with you again— Understanding you feelings, you understand that the law, like it or not, in the State pf Florida, allows people to possess handguns? MS. TRIO: I understand. MR. ACOSTA: Okay. And, that people who possess handguns are abiding by the law because the law allows them to possess them. You understand that? MS. TRIO: Yes. MR. ACOSTA: Okay Now, it's only when the gun is used in an unlawful manner that it becomes illegal. MS. TRIO: Right. MR. ACOSTA: And, do you agree that given the situation where we do allow people to have guns, that those laws which set out the parameters, if you will, or what situations — in which situations people can use those guns, that those laws need to be strictly abided by and adhered to? MS. TRIO: Yes. MR. ACOSTA: Okay Now, are you going to be able to give the defendant a fair trial in this case knowing that a gun was involved? MS. TRIO: I really don’t know. MR. ACOSTA: Can you follow the law? The judge tells you this is the law, and you’ve taken an oath to uphold the law. Will you be able to do that? MS. TRIO: I’ll follow the law, yeah. MR. ACOSTA: So, you will follow the instructions as the judge gives them to you? MS. TRIO: Right, right. MR. ACOSTA: Okay. Fair enough. Thank you.

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Citator

Cited By

  • Street v. State, 592 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
    …ound her answers were sufficiently equivocal to re [*372] quire reversal. The court also held it was error to refuse to excuse a juror who had already decided defendant was guilty but said she could “try” to be fair. Id. at 379. Cf. Garcia v. State, 570 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (despite her answers to leading questions, potential juror had shown strong bias). The present case is not as clear as Hamilton v. State, 547 So. 2d 630 (Fla.1989), and Leon v. State, 396 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 40…
  • King v. State, 622 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
    …who stole his car from him at gunpoint and that he was not sure whether he could put this experience out of his mind when judging the defendant. Moreover, the trial court’s attempt to rehabilitate juror Zapata was insufficient. See Garcia v. State, 570 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Since the defendant was forced to exhaust his peremptory challenges on prospective juror Zapata, a juror who should have been excused for cause, and the trial court refused his request for an additional peremptory challenge to st…
  • Eustache Henry v. State, 586 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
    …ied, 407 So. 2d 1106 (Fla.1981). The later responses to the court’s leading questions reflect a desire to please the court, but do not dissipate the reasonable doubt raised by previous equivocal statements. Singer, 109 So. 2d at 24; Garcia v. State, 570 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Price; Club West, Inc. v. Tropigas of Fla., Inc., 514 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), review denied, 523 So. 2d 579 (Fla.1988). When Simmons’ responses are considered in their totality, it is apparent that a reasonable doubt exist…

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