MICHAEL MEYER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Court remanded for determination of ability to pay where costs were imposed against an indigent defendant without notice or opportunity to be heard, and certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether imposing costs on an indigent defendant differs constitutionally from collecting those costs.
Imposition of costs against an adjudicated insolvent defendant without notice and opportunity to respond is improper, and the case must be remanded for a determination of ability to pay.
[1] Imposition of costs against an adjudicated insolvent defendant without notice and opportunity to be heard on ability to pay is improper and requires remand for determinat…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMeyer was adjudicated insolvent and subject to a community control order that imposed costs against him, but he was not given notice or an opportunity…
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PER CURIAM.
The order of community control reflects the imposition of costs against appellant. However, appellant was adjudicated insolvent, but was not given notice or an opportunity to respond and object. Such an imposition of costs is improper, and was held so in Beasley v. State, 565 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). We, therefore, remand for a determination of ability to pay pursuant to Mays v. State, 519 So. 2d 618 (Fla.1988), and Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984).
The state here is making the same assertion made in Beasley, namely, that the imposition of assessments on an indigent, per se, does not offend the constitution, and that constitutional principles are implicated only if the government seeks to force collection of the assessments when the defendant is unable to comply. We, therefore, again certify the Beasley questions to the Supreme Court of Florida:
WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF COSTS AGAINST AN INDIGENT DEFENDANT IS DIFFERENT THAN THE COLLECTION OF THOSE COSTS MAKING THE QUESTION OF ABILITY TO PAY PREMATURE UNTIL ATTEMPT IS MADE TO COLLECT SUCH COSTS?
In all other respects, the judgment and order of community control are affirmed.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN PART.
LETTS and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur. STONE, J., concurs specially with opinion.
STONE, J.,
concurring specially.
I do not concur in certifying the question but do agree that judgment be reversed as to costs.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984)
- Mays v. State, 519 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1988)
- Beasley v. State, 565 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)