HARRY FRANCIS KENNEDY, PETITIONER,
v.
ROBERT H. BONNANO, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, RESPONDENT
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Kennedy petitioned for a writ of prohibition challenging his prosecution on the ground that the state violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial by delaying prosecution for nearly nine years after arrest. The court denied the petition, finding that although the delay was presumptively prejudicial and caused by state negligence, Kennedy failed to demonstrate actual prejudice, which the court required as part of the balancing test.
The court held that although the length of delay was presumptively prejudicial and caused by state negligence, Kennedy failed to satisfy the fourth prong of the Barker v. Wingo test requiring a showing of actual prejudice. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied his motion to discharge, but the denial was without prejudice, allowing Kennedy to renew the motion upon showing actual prejudice.
[1] A defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial is assessed by balancing four factors: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion o…
[2] A delay in bringing a defendant to trial may be presumptively prejudicial.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial judge correctly found that the length of the delay in bringing petitioner to trial was presumptively prejudicial, and that the reason for the delay was negligence by the state.”
Establishes that the first two Barker factors weighed heavily in Kennedy's favor, showing substantial state delay and neglect
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKennedy was charged with felonies in Hillsborough County in 1981. He was arrested in Lee County on January 1, 1986, on the outstanding warrant. After …
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PER CURIAM.
Harry Francis Kennedy petitions for a writ of prohibition because of a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial provided by the United States Constitution’s sixth amendment speedy trial clause and the fourteenth amendment due process clause, and the Florida Constitution, article 1, section 16(a). We deny the petition.
In 1981, informations were filed charging the petitioner with numerous felony offenses in Hillsborough County. Warrants were issued for the petitioner’s arrest. On January 1, 1986, the petitioner was arrested and detained on the warrant in Lee County. Hillsborough County was notified. On May 8, 1986, an acting circuit judge released the Hillsborough County hold because Hillsborough County had failed to provide sufficient identification of the petitioner. The petitioner was sentenced in Lee County to state prison. On or about July 25, 1986, Hillsborough County was notified that the petitioner was released from Lee County to the state prison to serve a five year sentence. The petitioner was released from state custody and supervision in November 1987. On October 27, 1989, he was arrested in Massachusetts on the outstanding warrants from Hillsborough County. He waived extradition, was returned to Hillsborough County, and filed a motion for discharge.
A hearing was held on the motion to discharge. At the hearing, the trial judge considered and applied the four factors to be considered in determining whether there has been a violation of an accused’s speedy trial right. Those factors are (1) the length of the delay, and whether the delay is presumptively prejudicial; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the appellant has timely asserted his right; and (4) the existence of actual prejudice as a result of the delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); Howell v. State, 418 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The court is required to balance and weigh the factors against each other. State v. Roundtree, 438 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), review denied, 447 So. 2d 888 (Fla.1984); Howell, at 1174.
In this case, it is clear that even though notified by Lee County as to the petitioner’s whereabouts, Hillsborough County did nothing to bring the petitioner to trial from the time he was arrested in Lee County, through his prison sentence, until his arrest in Massachusetts. The trial judge correctly found that the length of the delay in bringing petitioner to trial was presumptively prejudicial, and that the reason for the delay was negligence by the state. The trial judge was also correct in determining that the petitioner had timely asserted his right and that there was no showing of actual prejudice. The trial judge denied the motion without prejudice to the petitioner again raising the motion should actual prejudice be established during the discovery process or at trial.
We find that the trial judge correctly assessed each factor. No single factor determines whether the petitioner’s speedy trial right was violated. While the first three factors are certainly weighed in favor of the petitioner, we cannot say that the trial judge erred in requiring a showing of actual prejudice. Roundtree, at 71; Howell, at 1174. Accordingly, we deny the petition without prejudice to the petitioner raising the issue upon a showing of actual prejudice.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and HALL and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Shaw v. State, 645 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…in determining whether an accused’s constitutional speedy trial rights are violated: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) timely assertion of the right; and (4) actual prejudice resulting from the delay. Kennedy v. Bonnano, 571 So. 2d 14, 15 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), which in turn cites the leading case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Here, the trial court made findings that the cause of the delay was the unexplained failure of Palm Beach to detain…1 / 2
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State v. Stuart, 115 So. 3d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…ively prejudicial; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the appellant has timely asserted his rights; and (4) whether actual prejudice has resulted from the delay.” State v. Union, 469 So. 2d 840, 841 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); see Kennedy v. Bonnano, 571 So. 2d 14, 15 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). The length of the delay is a “threshold triggering mechanism,” and the court need not consider the other factors unless the delay is so long as to be presumptively prejudicial. Howell, 418 So. 2d at 1171 (citing State v. Bona…
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Bryant v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr. (Polk County) (M.D. Fla. 2025)…in favor of the defendant: Because they did not weigh "heavily" in Howell's favor and Howell did not establish actual prejudice, there was no constitutional violation. Howell, 418 So. 2d at 1174-1175. Also, in Kennedy v. Bonnano, 571 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss under circumstances similar to the present case was affirmed. In Kennedy, there were findings of presumptive 6 ---PAGE 7--- Case 8:23-cv-00620-CEH-AAS Document 10 Filed 05/0…
Authorities Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972)
- Howell v. State, 418 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- State v. Roundtree, 438 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)