STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. EAST SIDE BANK, A CORPORATION, NORTH AMERICAN UNION LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY, A CORPORATION, AND RICHARD R. SMITH, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR,
v.
H. T. HOLLOWAY, AS MAYOR; FRANK NUTTING, AS VICE-MAYOR; J. P. BOWEN, AS TOWN CLERK, AS AND CONSTITUTING THE COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF BOYNTON, FLORIDA; J. P. BOWEN, AS TAX ASSESSOR OF THE TOWN OF BOYNTON, FLORIDA; AND GEORGE A. LONG, AS TREASURER AND TAX COLLECTOR OF THE TOWN OF BOYNTON, FLORIDA, DEFENDANTS IN ERROR
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of a mandamus petition seeking to compel the Town of Boynton to levy sufficient taxes to pay bondholders' claims. The court held that even though petitioners were entitled to relief under prior precedent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the peremptory writ given the town's completed tax levy for the year and practical administrative concerns.
Although the petitioners were entitled to mandamus relief under prior precedent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the peremptory writ because the town had already completed its annual tax levy and formally approved it before suit was filed, making additional levying impractical and expensive.
“While it appears from the record that the petitioners were entitled to the relief sought by the amended alternative writ, had the application been timely made, under authority of the opinion and judgment of this Court in the cases of State ex rel. Johnson, Attorney General, vs. Goodgame, et al., 91 Fla. 871, 108 Sou. 835, and Rountree et al. vs. State ex rel. Ga. Bond & Mortgage Co., 102 Fla. 246, 135 Sou. 888, and in State ex rel. Gillespie et al. vs. Baskin, 102 Fla. 329, 136 Sou. 262, and Klemm v. Davenport, Mayor, et al., 100 Fla. 627, 129 Sou. 904, yet we cannot say that there was an abuse of judicial discretion in denying the peremptory writ in view of the allegations of the last paragraph of the answer hereinabove quoted.”
Establishes that while plaintiffs had a substantive right to mandamus under precedent, the trial court's discretionary denial was proper given the practical administrative circumstances.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Town of Boynton issued bonds, and the plaintiffs held $170,880 in past due and accruing interest and principal on those bonds. In 1931, the Florid…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Mandamus cases and more on FLexlaw
Plaintiffs in error filed petition for writ of mandamus to issue against the defendants in error to compel the defendants in error tO' levy taxes sufficient to produce a fund to pay the past due interest and principal on a certain bond issue and to pay interest and principal which would accrue and become due during the years 1931 and 1932, the aggregate of which it was alleged was in the sum of $170,880.00.
Alternative writ issued and demurrer was filed thereto, as well as motion to quash.
The demurrer challenged the legal sufficiency of the allegations of the writ.
The Court, taking judicial cognizance of an Act of the Legislature of 1931, being:
“AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE CREATION OF A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION TO BE KNOWN AS THE TOWN OF BOYNTON BEACH, IN PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA, TO FIX AND DETERMINE THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS THEREOF, THE JURISDICTION AND POWERS OF SAID TOWN AND ITS OFFICERS: TO PROVIDE FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND GOVERNMENT *618THEREOF: TO DETERMINE AND FIX THE RESPECTIVE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF THE EXISTING TOWN OF BOYNTON AND THE TOWN OF BOYNTON BEACH, AS CREATED BY THIS ACT, IN RESPECT TO THE EXISTING INDEBTEDNESS OF THE PRESENT TOWN OF BOYNTON AND PUBLIC PROPERTY OWNED BY THE EXISTING TOWN OF BOYNTON: AND AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF BONDS OF THE TOWN OF BOYNTON BEACH'TO REFUND ITS PROPORTION OF THE BONDED INDEBTEDNESS OF THE EXISTING TOWN OF BOYNTON ASSUMED BY IT UNDER THIS ACT:”
and in which Act it was provided that,
“The Town of Boynton Beach shall assume and discharge 50% of all lawful indebtedness of the Town of Boynton whether evidenced by bonds or otherwise, for which the Town of Boynton was obligated on the 1st day of April A. D. 1930; provided, however, said total indebtedness shall be credited with the amount heretofore or hereafter collected by the Town of Boynton from the State or State Road Department, and existing Town of Boynton shall be liable for, and discharge, the remainder of said indebtedness;”
sustained the demurrer and allowed the petitioners to amend the alternative writ.
The demurrer to the alternative writ was properly sustained because the allegations of the writ entirely failed to' show that the obligation of the contract, to-wit: the bonds issued by the Town of Boynton had been abrogated by the provisions of the Act of the Legislature of 1931 above referred to, there being no allegation in the alternative writ that the method provided by the Legislature in that Act for the payment of the outstanding obligations was not adequate and enforceable.
If the provisions made by the Legislature for the payment of the obligations of the Town of Boynton when it eliminated a part of the territory of that municipality and created it into a new and different municipality meet the *619requirements of Section 8 of Article VIII of the State Constitution in providing for the protection of the creditors of the Town of Boynton, the obligations of the contracts in the hands of creditors were not abrogated and so it is that the demurrer to the alternative writ was properly sustained.
The amended alternative writ was so framed as to base the petitioners’ rights upon the provisions of the Act of the Legislature of Florida at the session of 1931 above referred to and required the respondents to show cause why they should not levy a sufficient tax to produce a fund necessary to pay 50% of the interest and principal past due and to become due as hereinabove referred to.
Demurrer was filed to the amended alternative writ and was properly overruled. The respondents then filed an answer, which answer contained the pertinent allegations as follows:
“ ‘Section 5. That the Town of Boynton may regulate by ordinance and equitably adjust the payment of delinquent taxes and special assessment liens held by the said Town and provide for the payment thereof.’ ”
“That the approximate amount of taxes heretofore levied for the retirement of bonds and interest due thereon, which is a charge1 against the lands within the said Town of Boynton is in excess of $275,000.00; that said special assessment liens which are due and owing said Town of Boynton amount to approximately $375,000.00, and such liens by ordinance are so collected for the payment of principal and interest for such outstanding improvement bonds.
These respondents further answering said paragraph would say that by the fixing of the levy and millage for the year 1931 based on anticipated tax collections under a plan for adjustments, would thereby raise sufficient money to meet the requirements for this year, and that such adjustments under provision of said Legislative enactment is a part of the general *620scheme for raising sufficient money to meet bond debt requirements, and for that purpose these Respondents being Commissioners of the said Town of Boynton, deem it equitable as well as practicable to levy only 16 mills, believing that such a levy will restore confidence and assist in tax adjustments, thereby raising sufficient money to meet these requirements, and for this reason these respondents protest the levying of an additional millage for the year 1931.
These Respondents further answering said paragraph would show unto the Court that the annual levy pursuant to charter provisions of said Town of Boynton has been perfected, such levy prior to the commencement of this suit having been formally approved by the Commission in regular session and that the whole machinery for the collection of such taxes has been completed, the lien for such taxes fixed and much additional expense and delay would be incurred in the collection of any taxes for the year 1931 should there be any change in the millage requirements.”
A motion for peremptory writ of mandamus, the answer notwithstanding, was filed and then, leave of court being had, an amended motion for peremptory writ, the answer notwithstanding, was filed. The matter then came on to be heard upon the amended motion for peremptory writ, the answer notwithstanding. Upon consideration of this motion, it was denied.by the Court, and, the petitioner indicating that it would not further amend, final judgment was entered in favor of the respondents.
While it appears from the record that the petitioners were entitled to the relief sought by the amended alternative writ, had the application been timely made, under authority of the opinion and judgment of this Court in the cases of State ex rel. Johnson, Attorney General, vs. Goodgame, et al., 91 Fla. 871, 108 Sou. 835, and Rountree et al. vs. State ex rel. Ga. Bond & Mortgage Co., 102 Fla. 246, 135 Sou. 888, and in State ex rel. Gillespie et al. vs. Baskin, 102 Fla. 329, 136 Sou. 262, and Klemm *621v. Davenport, Mayor, et al., 100 Fla. 627, 129 Sou. 904, yet we cannot say that there was an abuse of judicial discretion in denying the peremptory writ in view of the allegations of the last paragraph of the answer hereinabove quoted. Nothing stated in this opinion is intended to be construed as conflicting with the opinion and judgment in the case of State vs. Thursby, filed at this term of court and reported in 140 Sou. 775. Therefore, the judgment must be affirmed. It is so ordered.
Affirmed.
Ellis and Brown, J.J., concur.
Whitfield, P.J., and Terrell and Davis, J.J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State ex rel. T. v. Buckwalter, 112 Fla. 200 (Fla. 1933)…table Society, 226 U. S. 455, 57 L. Ed. 297, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 167; Note to case of Douglas v. Loftus, (Kan.) L. R. A. 1915-B, 797, 806, et seq.; State ex rel. Gillespie v. Thursby, 104 Fla. 103, 139 So. 372; State ex rel. East Side Bank v. Holloway, 105 Fla. 616, 142 So. 221 Morris, Mather & Co. v. Port of Astoria, 141 Ore. 215, 15 Pac. Rep. (2d) 385; Dillon on Munic. Corp. (5th ed.) Sec. 893; 10 R. C. L. 381; 38 C. J. 546-550; 21 C. J., subject, “Equity,” Sec. 207; Anniston Loan & Trust Co. v. Ward, 108 Al…
-
State v. Baskin, 111 Fla. 667 (Fla. 1933)…. Rep. 588; State v. Mitchell, 108 Fla. 233, 146 Sou. Rep. 207; Humphreys v. State, 108 Fla. 92, 145 Sou. Rep. 858. In the case of State v. Mitchell, supra, this Court distinguished the previous decisions in State ex rel. East Side Bank v. Holloway, 105 Fla. 616, 142 Sou. Rep. 221, and State ex rel. Gillespie v. Thursby, 104 Fla. 103, 140 Sou. Rep. 775, and pointed out why such holdings were not applicable to a case like that now before us, which is no different in principle from the status of things presen…1 / 2
-
State ex rel. Herbert L. Aldrich v. Mitchell, 108 Fla. 233 (Fla. 1933)…tion of its taxes already levied. The case is here on writ or error to the final judgment dismissing the mandamus proceeding on the grounds set up in the answer. Defendants in error rely upon the decision in State ex rel East Side Bank v. Holloway, 105 Fla. 616, 142 Sou. Rep. 221, to support the ruling of the Circuit Judge, while plaintiffs in error cite the decision in State ex rel. Gillespie v. Thursby 104 Fla. 103, 140 Sou. Rep. 775 to support their position to the contrary. In the latter cited case (S…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Klemm v. Davenport, 100 Fla. 627 (Fla. 1930)
- Rountree v. State, 102 Fla. 246 (Fla. 1931)
- State v. Baskin, 102 Fla. 329 (Fla. 1931)
- State v. Goodgame, 91 Fla. 871 (Fla. 1926)
- Buchanan v. Smith, 103 Fla. 1130 (Fla. 1932)