WILLIAM PINEDA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that limiting voir dire examination to twenty minutes per side, and denying a request for additional time to follow up on juror responses, constituted an abuse of discretion.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by unreasonably limiting voir dire examination, thereby infringing upon the fundamental right to obtain a fair and impartial jury.
[2] A trial court's limitation of voir dire examination to less than thirty minutes for twenty-three potential jurors is unreasonable, particularly given the severity of the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliam Pineda was convicted of third-degree murder and possession of cocaine with intent to sell. During voir dire, the trial judge limited each side…
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PER CURIAM.
William Pineda appeals his convictions for third-degree murder and possession of cocaine with intent to sell. Pineda complains here, as he did at trial, that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting voir dire examination. We agree, and reverse.
After the trial judge had conducted a preliminary voir dire, the attorneys were advised that their examination of the twenty-three-member panel was limited to twen ty minutes per side. Thirty minutes into his examination, the trial judge ordered Pineda’s counsel to conclude. The court denied Pineda’s request for additional time to follow up on the responses of several panel members to the State’s question whether anyone had ever been a crime victim.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.300(b) provides for a reasonable voir dire examination of prospective jurors by counsel. Because the purpose of voir dire is to obtain a fair and impartial jury, time restrictions or limits on numbers of questions can result in the loss of this fundamental right. Williams v. State, 424 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
Although a trial judge has considerable discretion in determining the extent of counsel’s examination of the venire, we have held it is unreasonable and an abuse of discretion to limit counsel’s voir dire examinations of each potential juror to one-to-three minutes. Gosha v. State, 534 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). The limitation in this case ran afoul of the Gosha rule. It prevented Pineda’s counsel from adequately following up in an area of inquiry which proved important in light of the charges and the theory of defense. Further, the severity of the charged offenses made it more unreasonable to limit the defendant’s voir dire examination of twenty-three potential jurors to less than thirty minutes.
On a remaining issue — whether possession of cocaine with the intent to sell is a forcible felony — the trial court should be guided by our opinion in State v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), which was released after the trial of this case.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Willona Perry v. State, 675 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…ersed and remanded for a new trial. PARIENTE, J., and DEAN, AMY, Associate Judge, concur. . In O'Hara we reversed for a new trial because counsel were limited to forty minutes per side to examine twenty-four prospective jurors. In Pineda v. State, 571 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), the court reversed for a new trial because the court only gave counsel 30 minutes to examine 23 prospective jurors. In Pineda the court also observed that the severity of the charges made the time limitation more unreasonable.…
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O'Hara v. State, 642 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…n [*594] able time limitations or limitations on the number of questions results in the loss of this fundamental right. Compare Zitnick v. State, 576 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); James v. State, 575 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Pineda v. State, 571 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Gosha v. State, 534 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Williams v. State, 424 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) with Valdez v. State, 585 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Brunson v. State, 492 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Stano v. Stat…
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Andros Domonic Miller v. State, 785 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…etion when the imposition of unreasonable time limitations or limitations on the number of questions results in the loss of this fundamental right.”); Zitnick v. State, 576 So. 2d 1381-82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (on confession of error); Pineda v. State, 571 So. 2d 105, 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Gosha v. State, 534 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Similarly, the trial court may not deny defense counsel an opportunity to question jurors individually. See Francis v. State, 579 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). The trial co…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Williams v. State, 424 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Gosha v. State, 534 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Foye v. State, 558 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- State v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)