SAMUEL K. COBB, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that prior convictions entered on the same date cannot be used to classify a defendant as an habitual offender under section 775.084, Florida Statutes.
Appellant pled guilty to grand theft and was sentenced as an habitual offender based on prior convictions all rendered on the same date. The court res…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Fla. Stat. § 775.084 Construction cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The appellant, Samuel K. Cobb, challenges the enhanced habitual offender seven year sentence he received for the conviction of grand theft. We agree that the trial court erred by sentencing appellant as an habitual offender. We affirm the convictions but reverse and remand for resentencing.
The appellant pled guilty to grand theft reserving the right to appeal his sentence. The trial court found the appellant to be an habitual offender and imposed a seven year sentence. The prior convictions relied upon by the trial court to classify appellant as an habitual offender were all rendered on the same date.
In order to be sentenced as an habitual offender under section 775.084, Florida Statutes as amended in 1988, a defendant must have had successive felony convictions. Convictions that are entered on the same date are treated as a single offense. Walker v. State, 567 So. 2d 546 (Fla.2d DCA 1990).
Since all of appellant’s prior convictions were rendered on the same date, they should have been treated as a single offense, the trial court, therefore, erred in sentencing appellant as an habitual offender. Walker. Reversed and remanded for resentencing.
SCHOONOVER, C.J., and RYDER and THREADGILL, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Jones v. State, 638 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…iled to file a written order revoking Appellant’s probation. The trial court must enter a written order specifying the terms and conditions of probation that have been violated. Robinson v. State, 609 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Frazier v. State, 571 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). Accordingly, this case is remanded for the entry of a written order of revocation that specifies the particular probation conditions that were violated. The Appellant does not have to be present. See Frazier v. State, 571 So. 2…
-
Mack v. State, 694 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…la. 1st DCA 1997); Sanchez v. State, 675 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Vezina v. State, 667 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Jones v. State, 638 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Robinson v. State, 609 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Frazier v. State, 571 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Clark v. State, 510 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). The appellant need not be present for this clerical correction. Bontrager v. State, 678 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. PETERSON, C.…
-
Wilson v. State, 581 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…en revocation order. As the parties [*256] agree, a written order reciting the specific violations is required by Knight v. State, 566 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) and Clark v. State, 510 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). See also, Frazier v. State, 571 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). We decline to speculate as to the court’s resolution of the various factual issues presented, and because it is not clear whether the court would have revoked the appellant’s probation and imposed the same sentence upon proper fi…
Authorities Cited
- Romerio Latee Walker v. State, 567 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)