ROBERT L. PHILLIPS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Robert Phillips was convicted of first degree murder, but the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed because the trial court erred by preventing cross-examination of a key state witness about his probationary status, which would have revealed potential bias and motive to testify falsely.
The court reversed the conviction, holding that the defendant has a constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses to discredit them by showing bias, interest, and possible ulterior motives, and that preventing such cross-examination regarding Durham's probationary status was reversible error that was not harmless.
[1] A defendant has the right to cross-examine a witness regarding their probationary status to show bias, interest, or an ulterior motive.
[2] The denial of cross-examination concerning a key state witness's probationary status, which prohibited them from possessing firearms, is not harmless error when the defen…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The defendant has a right to discredit a witness by showing bias, an interest, and a possible ulterior motive for his testimony.”
Establishes the fundamental constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses on matters affecting their credibility and potential bias.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePhillips was accused of shooting a victim who was sitting in a car. The defense theory was that the victim was reaching for a gun when shot, though no…
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STONE, Judge.
Phillips was convicted of first degree murder. We reverse as it was error not to allow cross-examination of a key state witness, Lonnie Durham, concerning his probationary status at the time of the shooting.
The defense theory was that the victim, sitting in a ear, was reaching for a gun when shot by the defendant. No gun was found. The victim had earlier threatened the defendant. There was evidence that Durham, who was sitting next to the victim, quickly left the car and ran into an adjacent field. Durham told the police that he had not removed a gun from the car following the shooting.
The defendant has a right to discredit a witness by showing bias, an interest, and a possible ulterior motive for his testimony. E.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Watts v. State, 450 So. 2d 265 (Fla.2d DCA 1984); Lavette v. State, 442 So. 2d 265 (Fla.1st DCA 1983), pet. for rev. denied, 449 So. 2d 265 (Fla.1984). A condition of Durham’s probation was that he not possess firearms. However, the trial court would not allow the defendant to cross-examine the witness about his probationary status. We cannot say that this error was harmless. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986). We find no harmful error or abuse of discretion with respect to the other evidentiary issues raised.
The remaining issue, concerning the court’s failure to excuse a prospective juror for cause, is now moot. The juror had expressed repeated uncertainty as to whether he could find the defendant not guilty, even if he had a reasonable doubt, if the defendant did not testify. However, we take this opportunity to repeat the following statement concerning juror competency from Longshore v. Fronrath Chevrolet, Inc., 527 So. 2d 922 (Fla.4th DCA 1988):
The question of the competency of a challenged juror is one of mixed law and fact to be determined by the trial court in its discretion and the decision will not be disturbed unless error is manifest. Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 22 (Fla.1959). The. test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court. Lusk v. State, 446 So. 2d 1038 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 373, 105 S.Ct. 229, 83 L.Ed.2d 158 (1984). If there is a basis for any reasonable doubt as to the juror’s possessing that state of mind which will enable him to render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence submitted and the law announced at trial, he should be excused. Singer, 109 So. 2d at 23-24. Close cases involving challenge to the impartiality of potential jurors should be resolved in favor of excusing the juror rather than leaving doubt as to his or her impartiality. Sydleman v. Benson, 463 So. 2d 533 (Fla.4th DCA 1985).
GLICKSTEIN and WARNER, JJ„ concur.
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Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Auchmuty v. State, 594 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…rounds, Edward v. State, 548 So. 2d 656 (Fla.1989). A defendant has a strong interest in discrediting a crucial state’s witness by showing bias, an interest in the outcome, or a possible ulterior motive for his in-court testimony. Phillips v. State, 572 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). As we did in Phillips, so we are unable to say here that the exclusion of this evidence to show bias was harmless. [*861] We therefore reverse defendant’s eonviction and remand for a new trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED. HERSEY an…
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Livingston v. State, 678 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…, 394 So. 2d 121, 123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Obviously, a defendant has a strong interest in discrediting a crucial state witness by showing bias, an interest in the outcome, or a possible ulterior motive for his in-court testimony. Phillips v. State, 572 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). A well recognized area of cross examination is how pending criminal charges may have influenced a witness’ cooperation with the state and the content of in-court statements. Blanco v. State, 353 So. 2d 602, 604 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977…
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Purcell v. State, 735 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…4th DCA 1997); Stanley v. State, 648 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Pomeranz v. State, 634 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Taylor v. State, 623 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Caton v. State, 597 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Phillips v. State, 572 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Cox v. State, 441 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Jones v. State, 385 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Bias may be proved by animus or prejudice against the defendant, an interest in the outcome of a case, and any matter tending…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. DiGUILIO, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)
- Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1974)
- Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959)
- Lusk v. State, 446 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1984)
- Sydleman v. Daniel W. Benson, M.D., 463 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- Longshore v. Fronrath Chevrolet, Inc., 527 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Lavette v. State, 442 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- O'Neil v. Travelers Ins. Co., 450 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Watts v. State, 450 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)