STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
JOSE RAMON ENRIQUEZ, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court reviewed a district court decision that reversed a first-degree murder conviction because the defendant was tried by a six-person jury without personal waiver of his right to a twelve-person jury. The Court held that a valid waiver by defense counsel and the prosecutor, stipulating to a six-person jury, satisfies constitutional requirements without requiring the defendant's personal waiver.
A valid waiver by defense counsel and the prosecutor, stipulating to a six-person jury, satisfies the requirement that a twelve-person jury be used in first-degree murder trials, absent a showing by the defendant that the stipulation was not valid. The defendant's personal waiver is not necessary when counsel and the prosecutor agree to the six-person jury.
[1] A twelve-person jury is required in first-degree murder trials regardless of whether the state seeks the death penalty, unless waived by the defense.
[2] A defendant's statutory right to trial by a twelve-person jury may be waived by defense counsel.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“regardless of whether the state seeks the death penalty, a twelve-person jury is required in first-degree murder trials unless waived by the defense”
Establishes the constitutional requirement for twelve-person juries in first-degree murder cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJose Ramon Enriquez was charged with first-degree murder. At a pretrial hearing on July 3, 1985, the state announced it would not seek the death penal…
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OVERTON, Justice.
The state of Florida petitions this Court to review Enriquez v. State, 561 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), in which the Third District Court of Appeal reversed Enri-quez’s first-degree murder conviction because he “was tried below by a six-person jury and did not personally waive his right to be tried by a twelve-person jury.” Id. at 1190. The district court certified the following question as one of great public importance:
Whether a twelve-person jury is required in a first-degree murder case in which the prosecution waives the death penalty.
Id. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. In State v. Griffith, 561 So. 2d 528 (Fla.1990), we answered that certified question in the affirmative and held that, regardless of whether the state seeks the death penalty, a twelve-person jury is required in first-degree murder trials unless waived by the defense. However, we refused to reverse Griffith’s conviction and found that his personal waiver of his statutory right to trial by a twelve-person jury was not necessary and that his counsel’s waiver was sufficient.
In this case, the following exchange took place at a pretrial hearing on July 3, 1985:
MR. HOULIHAN: Judge, Mr. DiGre-gory told me, just to let the record know, that his office waived the death penalty against my client.
THE COURT: All right. What you have indicated you would like the court to waive? The state can’t by itself waive it.
MR. DiGREGORY: We do not wish to proceed as a death penalty case against either defendant.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. DiGREGORY: And if the court would like a proffer—
THE COURT: The court is satisfied as to Mr. Enriquez that the death penalty would not be appropriate. The court will waive that as to Mr. Enriquez.
During jury selection on November 5, 1985, this exchange took place:-
THE COURT: Am I correct that there has been a stipulation that this would be a six member jury?
MR. HOULIHAN: Yes.
MR. DiGREGORY: That is correct.
It is clear that the state, at the pretrial hearing, decided not to seek the death penalty and that defense counsel and the prosecutor stipulated that the case would be tried before a six-person jury. This stipulation was announced at the trial. We find that, under the principles set forth in Griffith, this was a valid waiver of Enriquez’s right to trial before a twelve-person jury, absent a showing by Enriquez that the stipulation was not valid. Accordingly, we quash that portion of the district court’s decision reversing Enriquez’s first-degree murder conviction.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, C.J., and McDONALD, EHRLICH, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Blair v. State, 698 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1997)…the right to seek the death penalty and the parties stipulate to the smaller jury. See State v. Mustelier, 561 So. 2d 533 (Fla.1990); State v. Rodriguez-Acosta, 561 So. 2d 531 (Fla.1990); State v. Jones, 561 So. 2d 532 (Fla.1990); State v. Enriquez, 572 So. 2d 515 (Fla.1990). In those cases we held that the waiver was effective even if counsel, rather than the defendant personally, waived the twelve-person jury on behalf of his client after consulting with him and obtaining his consent to the waiver. WAIVER…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Griffith, 561 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1990)
- Enriquez v. State, 561 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)