CAPITAL BANK, APPELLANT,
v.
HILLEL MEYERS, ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1991-01-08
No. 90-46
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUBBART and GODERICH, JJ.
573 So. 2d 120 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1991)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Capital Bank appealed a summary judgment against it in a third-party indemnity action seeking recovery from Meyers and Nitzberg for amounts paid in settlement after the bank was held liable for improperly disbursing $45,000 from a restricted account. The court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the third-party defendants should be liable for indemnity as the parties who actually received the wrongfully distributed funds.


Holding

The court reversed the summary judgment, holding that genuine issues of material fact remained as to the appellees' indemnity liability. Indemnity may be imposed by law even without a specific contractual relationship, and parties who wrongfully receive escrowed or restricted property may be directly liable to the rightful owner or to one who discharged a duty that should have been the wrongdoer's obligation.


Headnotes

[1] Indemnity may be imposed by law, even without a specific contractual relationship between the parties.

[2] A party who has discharged a duty that, as between itself and another, should have been discharged by the other may have a right to indemnity.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“Indemnity has been generally defined as a right that inures to a person who has discharged a duty that is owed by him but which, as between himself and another, should have been discharged by the other.”

Establishes the legal definition of indemnity that permits recovery from parties ultimately responsible for the loss

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Capital Bank held an account for Holiday Clubs with an agreement that $45,000 would not be disbursed without Holiday's consent. Meyers and Nitzberg, a…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

Capital Bank was sued by Holiday Clubs for mistakenly and unauthorizedly permitting the withdrawal of $45,000 from an account in the bank which, it had agreed, would not be disbursed without Holiday’s consent. After the trial court entered summary judgment on liability in Holiday’s favor, the bank settled the case for $40,000. In a third party action, the bank sought to recover the amount of the settlement from Meyers and Nitzberg, who, as principals in a brokerage corporation, were those who had finagled the bank to distribute to them the $45,000 in question.

On this appeal from a summary judgment entered below against the bank, we reverse on the ground that genuine issues of material fact remain as to the appellees’ liability for indemnity1 imposed as the result of the alleged facts2 that the bank has been held for improperly distributing money actually paid to Meyers and Nitzberg so that they, rather than Capital, should be deemed ultimately responsible. The discussion in Larjim Management Corp. v. Capital Bank, 554 So. 2d 587, 588 (Fla.3d DCA 1989) is directly applicable:

The obligation to indemnify need not derive from a specific relationship between the parties; it may be imposed by law. K-Mart Corp. v. Chairs, Inc., 506 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 513 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1987); Mims Crane Serv., Inc. v. Insley Mfg. Corp., 226 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 234 So. 2d 122 (Fla.1969). “Indemnity has been generally defined as a right that inures to a person who has discharged a duty that is owed by him but which, as between himself and another, should have been discharged by the other.” Atlantic Nat’l Bank of Fla. v. Vest, 480 So. 2d 1328, 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), review denied, 491 So. 2d 281 (Fla.1986); Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla.1979); Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla.1977).

Larjim Management Corp., 554 So. 2d at 588; Law v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 91 Cal.App. 621, 267 P. 565 (1928) (person to whom agent has wrongfully distributed escrowed property directly liable to rightful owner); Feisthamel v. Campbell, 55 Cal.App. 774, 205 P. 25 (1921) (same); see 30A C.J.S. Escrows § 16 (1965); 28 Am. Jur.2d Escrow § 39 (1966).

Reversed.3

. We find no merit in the bank's alternative theories of liability.

. Since the bank admits that it did not properly "vouch-in" or otherwise appropriately notify the alleged indemnitees, Meyers and Nitzberg, prior to effecting the settlement, the latter are not bound by the version of the incident which supports the settlement and the bank must prove those facts vel non in the case directly against them. Hull & Co., Inc. v. McGetrick, 414 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); compare Continental Casualty Co. v. Godur, 476 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).

. The appellees’ statute of limitations defense is without foundation. See Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 326 So. 2d 177 (Fla.1976).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Authorities Cited (11 total)

View all 11 cited authorities →

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw