STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, ON BEHALF OF BRENDA C. KELLAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN KELLAMS, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services appealed the dismissal of a URESA petition seeking to increase child support and recover arrearages. The court reversed, holding that URESA proceedings are maintainable as separate remedial actions even when filed in the same court that retained jurisdiction over child support in the original divorce decree.
A URESA proceeding for enforcement of child support obligations is maintainable as a separate remedial action in the same court where the original divorce proceedings took place, even though that court retained jurisdiction over child support enforcement. The court may consolidate the actions if necessary and any orders should be compatible with the support provisions of the dissolution action.
[1] A Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) proceeding is maintainable as a separate remedial action even when the same court retains jurisdiction of child su…
[2] A URESA proceeding lodged in the same court of the responding state where antecedent divorce proceedings took place may not be dismissed solely because the court retains…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[W]hen a URESA proceeding for enforcement of a child support obligation is lodged in the same court of the responding state in which antecedent divorce proceedings took place, the URESA proceeding is maintainable as a separate remedial action and may not be dismissed simply because the same court retains jurisdiction of the subject of child support as part of the divorce proceeding.”
Establishes the core holding that URESA proceedings are separate remedial actions that cannot be dismissed merely because the court retained jurisdiction in the original divorce case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA 1981 divorce judgment in Sarasota County, Florida awarded Mrs. Kellams custody of three children and required Mr. Kellams to pay $25 per week per ch…
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SCHOONOVER, Chief Judge.
The appellant, the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), on behalf of Brenda C. Kellams, challenges the trial court’s final order dismissing a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) petition filed against the appellee, John Kellams. We reverse.
A final judgment dissolving the Kellams’ marriage was entered in the Circuit Court of Sarasota County, Florida, on December 9, 1981. The judgment awarded custody of the parties’ three children to Mrs. Kellams and required Mr. Kellams to pay child support in the amount of $25 per week per child. The judgment also contained a provision retaining jurisdiction for purposes of enforcement.
On March 14, 1989, the appellant filed a URESA petition in the state of Indiana. Her petition which was forwarded to Sarasota County, Florida, requested that the court enter an order increasing support for the two children that remained minors.
While that action was pending, the parties entered into an agreement modifying the original final judgment of dissolution of marriage by awarding custody of one of the children to the husband. The agreement provided that neither party would be responsible to the other for child support for that child. The trial court ratified the agreement.
The wife then filed an amended petition in the URESA action requesting child support for the minor child who was not the subject of the agreement and arrearages for both children. This petition was dismissed with prejudice on the grounds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter. This timely appeal followed.
We agree with the appellant that this jurisdictional issue was decided in Ray v. Pentlicki, 375 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). In Ray we stated:
[Wjhen a URESA proceeding for enforcement of a child support obligation is lodged in the same court of the responding state in which antecedent divorce proceedings took place, the URESA proceeding is maintainable as a separate remedial action and may not be dismissed simply because the same court retains jurisdiction of the subject of child support as part of the divorce proceeding. According to Ray, the URESA proceeding is maintainable as a separate remedial action even though the trial court had retained jurisdiction of child support enforcement as part of the divorce proceeding. Any order entered in the URESA action should be compatible with the support provisions of the dissolution action, see Stephens v. Stephens, 402 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and neither order, in itself, will render the other order a nullity. § 88.281, Fla. Stat. (1987). The court, furthermore, has the authority to consolidate the two actions if necessary. Ray. We, accordingly, reverse the order dismissing the action with prejudice.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
CAMPBELL and HALL, JJ., concur.
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Weaver v. State, 588 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…entence within sixty days of imposition. Since more than sixty days had passed between the sentencing hearing and the second restitution hearing, the trial court’s jurisdiction to modify the defendant’s sentence had elapsed. See McLaughlin v. State, 573 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); State v. Butz, 568 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order rendered August 16, 1990, increasing the amount of restitution.…
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Parks v. State, 595 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…order imposing the restitution requirement. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800(b); and see State v. Butz, 568 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). See also State v. Martin, 577 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 587 So. 2d 1329 (Fla.1991); McLaughlin v. State, 573 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). We also strike the requirement that appellant perform community service in lieu of paying court costs. The statute authorizing the imposition of community service in lieu of costs was amended effective October 1, 1986, eliminat…
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State v. Sanderson, 625 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1993)…ant one, have read rule 3.800(b) to mean that the trial court must determine the amount of restitution within sixty days of imposing sentence or it will lose jurisdiction. E.g., Weaver v. State, 588 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); McLaughlin v. State, 573 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); State v. Butz, 568 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). In other cases, however, the courts have affirmed amounts for restitution determined more than sixty days after imposition of sentence. E.g., Savory; Fairweather v. State, 596 So…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- RAY v. Pentlicki, 375 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Stephens v. Stephens, 402 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)