HORACE WILLIAMS, APPELLANT/CROSS APPELLEE,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE/CROSS APPELLANT

Fla. 4th DCA | 1990-12-05
No. 88-2094
GLICKSTEIN, J., and RIVKIND, LEONARD, Associate Judge, concur.
573 So. 2d 875 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1990) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

In a murder case where the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, the defendant sought to waive jury trial for the penalty phase without the state's consent. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction but reversed the trial judge's ruling allowing such a waiver, holding that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.260 requires the state's consent for waiving jury trial in the penalty phase.


Holding

No. A defendant cannot waive jury trial for the penalty phase without the state's consent. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.260 unequivocally requires that any waiver of jury trial must be accompanied by the consent of the state, and this requirement applies equally to the penalty phase of a capital trial.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant's waiver of a jury trial for the penalty phase of a criminal trial requires the consent of the state.

[2] Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.260, which requires state consent for a jury trial waiver, applies to the penalty phase of a trial.

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Key Quotes

“Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.260 provides that a defendant can, in writing, waive a jury trial. However, the rule unequivocally declares that this waiver requires 'the consent of the State.'”

Establishes the legal requirement that jury trial waiver must have state consent

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Facts & Procedural History

The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in the first phase of a capital trial. The trial judge stated on the record that he would not impos…

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Opinion of the Court
LETTS, Judge.

LETTS, Judge.

The main appeal is per curiam affirmed without comment. However, the state has filed a cross appeal which merits discussion.

Involved is the second phase of a murder trial. The jury here found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, but the trial judge stated for the record that he would not impose the death penalty. Upon receipt of that news, the defendant opted to waive jury trial as to the penalty phase of the trial, a waiver not ill-advised considering the brutal, protracted, senseless, torture of the victim.

The question presented is: Can the defense waive trial jury consideration of the penalty phase without the consent of the state and simply have the trial judge conduct the penalty proceedings in their entirety? The trial judge below ruled that the defense could do so, but we disagree and reverse.

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.260 provides that a defendant can, in writing, waive a jury trial. However, the rule unequivocally declares that this waiver requires “the consent of the State.” As we will more fully discuss hereafter, such consent was not obtained sub judice and we know of no reason why rule 3.260 should not apply equally to the penalty phase. Indeed, the Second District agrees with us and so held in State v. Ferguson, 556 So. 2d 462 (Fla.2d DCA 1990).

The defense argues that the state did consent to the penalty phase being conducted without a jury, but while the trial transcript permits of some ambiguity, the bottom line is that no such consent was forthcoming. Excerpted from the record, for example, is the following statement made by the prosecutor:

Judge, I am sorry. I do, prior to proceeding, just want to put on the record and renew my objection to the procedure utilized whereby the defense waive(s) the jury trial on phase two.

There is no way we can conclude from this record that consent was obtained and we must reverse the trial judge’s ruling in this regard and remand for further proceedings on the penalty phase of this trial pursuant to section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1989).

The main appeal is affirmed in its entirety.

AFFIRMED IN PART; CROSS APPEAL REVERSED.

GLICKSTEIN, J., and RIVKIND, LEONARD, Associate Judge, concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Williams v. State, 595 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1992)
    …OVERTON, Justice. This is a petition to review Williams v. State, 573 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). The trial court found Williams guilty of first-degree murder. At the penalty phase of the trial, the trial judge stated that he would not impose the death penalty, allowed Williams to waive the jury for the sentencing phase, and…

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