THELMA A. ROBINSON, F/K/A THELMA A. WILSON, APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF TAMPA, APPELLEE
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Mrs. Robinson appeals the trial court's denial of her motion for relief from a foreclosure judgment, arguing excusable neglect based on an inconvenient hearing time. The court affirms, holding that a litigant's failure to attend a properly noticed hearing due to scheduling inconvenience does not constitute excusable neglect warranting post-judgment relief.
The trial court properly denied Mrs. Robinson's motion for relief from judgment because she failed to establish excusable neglect or fraud. A litigant's failure to attend a properly noticed hearing merely due to inconvenience to their work schedule does not constitute excusable neglect warranting post-judgment relief.
[1] A party's inconvenience with a scheduled hearing time does not constitute excusable neglect or fraud sufficient to warrant relief from a judgment.
[2] A party appearing pro se is not excused from attending a properly noticed hearing simply because the scheduled time is inconvenient.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While we recognize that judicial proceedings may be inconvenient to a litigant appearing pro se, such inconvenience does not authorize a litigant simply to ignore a scheduled hearing.”
Establishes the core holding that inconvenience alone is not a valid reason to skip a hearing or grounds for post-judgment relief
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe City of Tampa foreclosed a lien imposed by its Code Enforcement Board against Mrs. Robinson's vacant house for housing code violations. The City p…
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ALTENBERND, Judge.
Mrs. Robinson appeals an order denying her motion for relief from a judgment of foreclosure pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b). We affirm.
The City of Tampa filed an action against Mrs. Robinson to foreclose a lien imposed by the City’s Code Enforcement Board for violations of certain provisions of the City’s minimum housing standards. The house in question is a vacant house which was left to Mrs. Robinson by her late husband.
After Mrs. Robinson had filed an answer pro se, the City moved for summary judgment and filed the necessary affidavits. It is undisputed that the City gave the appellant proper notice of the hearing, which was scheduled for 8:45 a.m. on February 6, 1990. The appellant is a school teacher in Pinellas County. She regarded the scheduled time to be inconvenient and simply did not attend the hearing. She did not attempt to contact the City’s attorney or the trial court prior to the hearing in an effort to reschedule the hearing. She filed no motions, affidavits, or other documents prior to the hearing.
The trial court entered a final summary judgment of foreclosure on February 6, 1990. Mrs. Robinson did not seek rehearing pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530 in the ten days allowed for such a rehearing. On March 2, 1990, she filed a motion for relief from judgment alleging excusable neglect or fraud. Her motion was based on the fact that the City’s attorney had unilaterally set the hearing for a time which was inconvenient for her work schedule.
The trial court was well within its discretion to deny this motion. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Pickard, 289 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). While we recognize that judicial proceedings may be inconvenient to a liti gant appearing pro se, such inconvenience does not authorize a litigant simply to ignore a scheduled hearing. The appellant failed to establish either excusable neglect or fraud. See Claffey v. Serafino, 338 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
The appellant also attempts to use the appeal of the order denying post-judgment relief as a vehicle to challenge the final summary judgment. Since the appellant did not appeal that judgment in the thirty days allotted for such an appeal, we have no jurisdiction to consider the remaining issues. Fla.R.App.P. 9.110(b); Shields v. Flinn, 528 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see also Odum v. Morningstar, 158 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963); Bodner v. Blackwelder, 181 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), cert. denied, 188 So. 2d 814 (Fla.1966).
Affirmed.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur.
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Lilian Breziner v. Point E. Three Condo. Corp., Inc., 57 So. 3d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)…s the continued presence of the pet violates the rules of the condominium association. However, the final summary judgment requiring the removal of the pet was not appealed. We have no jui'isdiction to consider this issue. Robinson v. City of Tampa, 573 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Affirmed.…
Authorities Cited
- Shields v. Flinn, 528 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Clyde Odum et ux. v. Morningstar, 158 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
- Claffey v. Serafino, 338 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Ashland OIL, Inc. v. Rod Pickard, 289 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Bodner v. Blackwelder, 181 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Brown v. Wainwright, 188 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1966)
- Beck v. State, 188 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1966)