JUDITH SILVERMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
HARVEY PITTERMAN, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Appellant Judith Silverman sued real estate broker Harvey Pitterman for breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud, claiming he failed to disclose his romantic relationship with her ex-spouse's divorce attorney. The trial court granted summary judgment for Pitterman, but the appellate court reversed, finding material factual issues precluded summary judgment.
The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case because materiality of the broker's non-disclosure is a factual question for the jury, not suitable for summary judgment determination. If the jury finds the relationship was material and the broker breached his duty to disclose, Mrs. Silverman may recover compensatory damages, punitive damages, and the broker may forfeit his commission.
[1] A real estate broker owes a fiduciary duty to their principal, requiring loyalty, good faith, and full disclosure of material facts.
[2] A real estate broker must disclose any circumstance that could reasonably influence the principal's decision to hire the broker or affect the broker's loyalty.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A broker is obligated to inform the principal of any circumstance which might reasonably be expected to influence the complete loyalty of the broker to the interests of his principal, or that might reasonably be expected to influence the principal in negotiations.”
Establishes the broker's duty to disclose conflicts of interest that could affect loyalty or the principal's negotiating decisions.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Silvermans' divorce decree required their marital home be sold with proceeds split equally. With Mr. Silverman's recommendation and Mrs. Silverman…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Materiality Of Facts cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Judith Silverman claims the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in real estate broker Harvey Pitter-man’s favor in her action seeking compensatory and punitive damages for Pitter-man’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty. We find that issues of fact existed which precluded the order granting summary judgment and we reverse on that basis.
Robert and Judith Silverman were parties to a heated and bitter dissolution of marriage proceeding. The Silvermans’ final judgment of dissolution of marriage ordered that the marital home be sold and the proceeds split equally between the spouses. Upon Mr. Silverman’s recommendation and with Mrs. Silverman’s approval, the couple entered into a listing agreement with Pitterman. Several weeks after the home was listed for sale, the broker informed Mrs. Silverman that an offer had been received. The offer was subsequently accepted and the sale concluded. Prior to entering the listing agreement, Mrs. Sil-verman knew the broker had acted as her ex-spouse’s expert witness at the couple’s dissolution proceeding.
However, unbeknownst to Mrs. Silverman, the broker was romantically involved with her ex-spouse’s divorce attorney. Mrs. Silverman claims that had she known of this romantic relationship, she never would have hired Pitter-man.
Thus, she argues, the broker’s failure to disclose this information constituted a breach of his fiduciary duty and constructive fraud. Further, she asserts that under the broker’s biased supervision, the home sold for less than its fair market value.
A broker’s duty to his principal is one of trust, confidence, good faith, and loyalty. Chisman v. Moylan, 105 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958).
A broker is obligated to inform the principal of any circumstance which might reasonably be expected to influence the complete loyalty of the broker to the interests of his principal, or that might reasonably be expected to influence the principal in negotiations. MacGregor v. Florida Real Estate Comm’n, 99 So. 2d 709 (Fla.1958).
The broker is obligated to inform his principal with “fairness, promptness, and completeness” concerning all facts within his knowledge which are material to his representation. Chisman, 105 So. 2d at 189. See Connelly v. Special Road & Bridge Dist. No. 5, 99 Fla. 456, 126 So. 794 (1930); Kline v. Pyms Suchman Real Estate Co., 303 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 314 So. 2d 588 (Fla.1975); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 381 (1958).
A material fact is generally defined as one to which a reasonable person would attach importance in determining a choice of action. See Black’s Law Dictionary 881 (5th ed. 1979); 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 57 (1980).
Under Florida law, materiality is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. See Atlantic Nat’l Bank of Florida v. Vest, 480 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (whether misrepresentation was one of material fact for purposes of determining negligent misrepresentation question of fact), review denied, 508 So. 2d 16 (Fla.1987); Jaffe v. State, 438 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 5th DCA) (whether modification of offering is material depends on substance of change and the subject matter in context and is a question of fact for the jury), review dismissed, 436 So. 2d 99 (Fla.1983). Thus, the materiality of Pitterman’s relationship with the divorce attorney is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact.
If the jury finds that Pitterman breached his duty to disclose to his principal material facts within his knowledge, then Mrs. Silverman may seek both compensatory damages, see Erzene v. Florida Real Estate Comm’n, 504 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), and punitive damages, see Comfort Makers, Inc. v. Estate of Kenton, 515 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), as well as forfeiture of commission. See Carter v. Owens, 58 Fla. 204, 50 So. 641 (1909) (concealment from the principal of material facts known to the agent may result in a forfeiture of the agent’s right to compensation for his services); Prall v. Corum, 403 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
Accordingly, the trial court’s order is reversed and the case remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Haiman v. Fed. Ins. Co., 798 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…e an examination of the record reveals that there are disputed issues of material fact as to both issues, we reverse. As to the first issue, materiality is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. See, e.g., Silverman v. Pitterman, 574 So. 2d 275, 276 (Fla. 3d [*812] DCA 1991); Beneby v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 402 So. 2d 1193, 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Appellant had two Rolex watches, only one of which was insured and was the subject of the loss. While appellant agrees that he initially…
-
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Duignan, 243 So. 3d 426 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)…ustafa v. Omega Ins. Co., 201 So. 3d 710, 715 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (holding that materiality, as used in statute regarding false representations in an insurance policy application, is to be determined under an objective test); Silverman v. Pitterman, 574 So. 2d 275, 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) ("A material fact is generally defined as one to which a reasonable person would attach importance in determining a choice of action."); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194 (1988)…
-
Humana, Inc. v. Castillo, 728 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…en the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiffs misapprehension, the plaintiff cannot recover. See Stroud v. Crosby, 712 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). To further support certification of this class, the trial court referenced Silverman v. Pitterman, 574 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), for the proposition that materiality of fact is objective and can be determined by a jury on a class-wide basis. The trial court’s reliance on Silverman for this proposition is also misplaced. Silverman was not a class action law…
Authorities Cited (12 total)
- Connelly v. The Special Rd. & Bridge Dist. No. 5, 99 Fla. 456 (Fla. 1930)
- Atl. Nat'l Bank OF Fla. v. Vest, 480 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Carter v. J. C. Owens & E. Z. Jones Doing Bus. as P'rs Under the Firm Name of Owens & Jones, 58 Fla. 204 (Fla. 1909)
- Chisman v. Moylan, 105 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- Kline v. Pyms Suchman Real Est. Co., 303 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Jaffe v. State, 438 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Duncan MacGREGOR v. Fla. Real Est. Comm'n & J. E. Hollenbeck, Sr., 99 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1958)
- Royal Castle Sys., Inc. v. Townley, 314 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1975)
- Arthur C. Johnson & the Home Indem. Ins. Co. v. Frank Trisciuzzi & the State of Fla. Indus. Relations Comm'n, 314 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1975)
- Prall v. Jerrold R. Corum, 403 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)