ROSA C. CRUZ, APPELLANT,
v.
MAXIMO L. CRUZ, APPELLEE
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Rosa Cruz appealed a final judgment dissolving her marriage to Maximo Cruz, challenging custody, disposition of the marital home, and alimony awards. The appellate court affirmed the custody award but reversed on the marital home and alimony issues, holding that the wife should retain the home until the youngest child reaches majority and that permanent periodic alimony was warranted given the significant disparity in earning potential between the parties.
The court affirmed the custody award. The court reversed the order to sell the marital home, holding the wife should remain in it until the youngest child reaches majority. The court reversed the alimony award, holding that permanent periodic alimony should have been awarded given the substantial disparity in earning power, the wife's age, the long-term marriage, and her homemaker status. The court vacated the lump sum alimony award and remanded for reconsideration in light of the permanent periodic alimony determination.
[1] A trial court should allow a custodial parent to remain in the marital home until the youngest child reaches the age of majority.
[2] In long-term marriages where one spouse was a homemaker and has significantly lower earning potential than the other spouse, permanent periodic alimony should be awarded.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We conclude that the trial court should have allowed the wife to remain in the marital home until the youngest child reaches the age of majority, rather than having the home sold at the present time.”
Establishes the court's holding that custodial parent should retain marital home for benefit of minor child.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThis was a seventeen-year marriage in which Rosa Cruz was a homemaker without outside employment. The couple had a youngest child, age fourteen, award…
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PER CURIAM.
Rosa Cruz appeals a final judgment in an action for dissolution of marriage. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
First, we have carefully considered the former wife’s arguments with respect to the issue of child custody, but conclude that no reversible error has been shown with respect to the custody award in this case. See Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla.1975); Richardson v. Richardson, 442 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
Second, the former wife’s argument with respect to the marital home has merit. The wife has custody of the youngest child, now age fourteen. We conclude that the trial court should have allowed the wife to remain in the marital home until the youngest child reaches the age of majority, rather than having the home sold at the present time. See Neustein v. Neustein, 503 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Cabrera v. Cabrera, 484 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
Third, this was a long-term marriage of seventeen years, during which the wife was a homemaker and did not have outside employment. She has expressed a desire for training in the profession of nursing and the final judgment makes an award intended for that purpose. However, the testimony is uncontroverted that the wife's earning potential subsequent to completion of training will be in the $18,000 per year range, while the husband presently earns $60,000 or more. The former wife will be entering the job market at the age of forty-six. There is no suggestion that the former wife’s earning potential will approach that of the former husband. In view of the disparity in the earning power of the parties and the other circumstances just outlined, an award of permanent periodic alimony should have been made. We reverse and remand for entry of an appropriate award. See Askegard v. Askegard, 524 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 536 So. 2d 243 (Fla.1988); Henning v. Henning, 507 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); see also Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1201-02 (Fla.1980).
Fourth, the final judgment contains an award of lump sum alimony payable in installments over the space of two years. This award was evidently intended to constitute a rehabilitative alimony award. We vacate the lump sum award and remand for further consideration of the award in light of the determination that there should be an award of permanent periodic alimony in this case.
Finally, the items as to which we have reversed may have effects on other portions of the alimony, child support, or equitable distribution awards. The trial court has the discretion to make such other adjustments as may be necessary to fashion a fair and equitable decree.
We reverse the decree insofar as was stated above, and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith. We affirm in all other respects, including the dissolution of the parties’ marriage and the award of child custody.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
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Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Kennedy v. Kennedy, 622 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…at the time of the trial. . See Atkins v. Atkins, 611 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (approving award of permanent alimony, but reversing because amount was insufficient, to 41-year-old wife of 17-year marriage producing no children); Cruz v. Cruz, 574 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (concluding that 17-year marriage was long-term where wife, who had custody of youngest child, would enter job market at age 46). . See White v. White, 617 So. 2d 732, 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (error not to award permanent alimony…
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Hill v. Hooten, 776 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), the court indicated it was "reluctant” to define a fifteen year marriage as long term. Marriages of seventeen years have specifically been determined by other districts to be long-term. For example, in Cruz v. Cruz, 574 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), a marriage of seventeen years was recognized as a long-term marriage, and in Moorehead v. Moorehead, 745 So. 2d 549, 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), the Fourth District characterized a seventeen year marriage "more on the side of a long…
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Zeigler v. Zeigler, 635 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…eversed awards of temporary support in lieu of permanent alimony. Anderson v. Anderson, 617 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Shudlick v. Shud-lick, 618 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Wolff v. Wolff, 576 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Cruz v. Cruz, 574 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1990). Raising children constitutes a significant contribution to the family and frees the other spouse to pursue the wage-earning functions. In Bender v. Bender, 363 So. 2d 844, 845 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), the court cited with approval t…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975)
- Askegard v. Askegard, 524 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Cabrera v. Cabrera, 484 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Henning v. Henning, 507 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Richardson v. Richardson, 442 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Dean v. Dean, 503 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Neustein v. Monroe Neustein, 503 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Cent. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Diaz, 442 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)