EDWARD WESTBROOK, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Edward Westbrook was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and sentenced to life imprisonment as a habitual offender. He appealed claiming the trial court erred in applying the habitual offender statute to enhance his sentence, arguing that statute does not permit enhancement of first-degree life felonies. The court affirmed, holding that the robbery statute permits sentencing under the habitual offender statute and the 1989 version of that statute expressly allows life sentences for qualifying recidivists.
The court held that the robbery statute permits sentencing under the habitual offender statute, and the 1989 version of the habitual offender statute expressly authorizes trial courts to impose life sentences upon finding a defendant is a habitual felony offender, regardless of whether the underlying offense is already a life felony.
[1] A life felony conviction does not preclude sentencing under the habitual offender statute.
[2] The habitual offender statute, as amended in 1989, allows for the imposition of a life sentence upon a defendant meeting the statutory definition of a habitual felony off…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the robbery statute on its face permits sentencing under the habitual offender statute”
Establishes that the court found statutory authorization for applying the habitual offender enhancement to robbery convictions
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWestbrook was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon under Florida Statute § 812.13(2)(a), a first-degree felony. His sentencing guidelines scoresh…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Life Felony Enhancement cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment as a habitual offender. He claims error in his sentence. We affirm based on the following analysis.
Defendant’s basic premise is that the robbery with a deadly weapon statute, § 812.13(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1989), which he violated is a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. Thus, he claims, the court erred in sentencing him under the habitual offender statute, § 775.084(4)(a), Fla.Stat. (1989), because that statute does not provide for the enhancement of life felonies. He cites Barber v. State, 564 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), to support this theory.
We find that neither the applicable statutes nor Barber supports his argument. First, the robbery statute on its face permits sentencing under the habitual offender statute. Even though conviction under section 812.13(2)(a) is a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment, the trial judge is required to enter a guidelines sentence. In defendant’s case, his guidelines scoresheet total provided for a recommended sentence of twelve to seventeen years, not life imprisonment. The defendant’s highest permitted sentence under the guidelines, without the necessity of written reasons for departure, would have been twenty-two years imprisonment with a one-cell upward departure. However, because the robbery statute permits sentencing under the habitual offender statute where applicable, the trial judge, upon finding the defendant recidivist, was permitted to impose the enhanced life sentence.
Secondly, the statement in Barber, 564 So. 2d at 1173, concerning the possible non-applicability of the habitual offender statute to those convicted of a first degree life felony is purely dicta. Moreover, Barber is not controlling here since the habitual offender statute addressed in that case was the 1987 version which was substantially rewritten by the Florida Legislature in 1989 to take penalties prescribed under the habitual offender statute outside the province of the sentencing guidelines and to allow the trial court to impose the penalty of life imprisonment on a defendant by simply making a determination that the defendant fit the statutory definition of a habitual felony offender. See Owens v. State, 560 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
-
Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1992)…a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment are subject to enhancement under the habitual offender statute.9 See Lock v. State, 582 So. 2d 819, 819 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Newton v. State, 581 So. 2d 212, 213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Westbrook v. State, 574 So. 2d 1187, 1188 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Paige v. State, 570 So. 2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). We also hold that sentencing under sections 775.084(4)(a)(l) and 775.084(4)(b)(l) is permissive, not mandatory. As a result, because the State argued that a life s…
-
Lamont v. State, 597 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…correctly sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment under the habitual offender statute in accordance with the Florida Supreme Court’s recent holding in Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267 (Fla.1992), and this Court’s holdings in Westbrook v. State, 574 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) and Henry v. State, 576 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Thus, as to that offense, we note an alternative basis for affirming our finding that the habitual offender statute was properly applied to Lamont. However, we reverse and vac…1 / 2
-
Hayes v. State, 598 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…CA 1991), approved, 595 So. 2d 37 (Fla.1992); Lock v. State, 582 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), approved, 595 So. 2d 50 (Fla.1992); Newton; Tucker v. State, 576 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), approved, 595 So. 2d 956 (Fla.1992); Westbrook v. State, 574 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), approved, 595 So. 2d 50 (Fla.1992); Paige v. State, 570 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) and Young v. State, 600 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). The application of the habitual offender statute to the armed robbery charge was prope…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Barber v. State, 564 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Owens v. State, 560 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)