STEVEN J. CHORZELEWSKI AND GEORGEANNE CHORZELEWSKI, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
MANUCOR LEASING, ET AL., APPELLEES
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The Chorzelewskis sued Manucor Leasing under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine after Steven Chorzelewski was injured by a negligently operated leased vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment for Manucor based on a now-overruled precedent, but the Florida Supreme Court subsequently quashed that precedent in Kraemer, requiring reversal and remand to determine Manucor's actual liability exposure.
The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded because the trial court's decision was based on Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., a case subsequently quashed by the Florida Supreme Court. The lessor may be held liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine notwithstanding release of beneficial ownership, and the trial court must determine whether Manucor's policy limits satisfy its statutory obligations or if additional liability attaches.
[1] A lessor may be held liable under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine for the negligent operation of a leased vehicle.
[2] A prior judicial decision, subsequently quashed by the Florida Supreme Court, cannot serve as the controlling authority for a trial court's ruling.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court granted Manucor's motion for summary judgment on the authority of Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 556 So.2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), a decision which was subsequently quashed by the Florida Supreme Court in Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So.2d 1363 (Fla.1990), which appellee concedes is now controlling.”
Establishes that the entire basis for summary judgment was undermined by subsequent Florida Supreme Court precedent
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSteven Chorzelewski was injured as a result of the negligent operation of a vehicle that Manucor Leasing had leased to Pinnacle Pools, Inc., which was…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a final summary judgment entered in favor of appellee/lessor, Manucor Leasing. The trial court granted Manucor’s motion for summary judgment on the authority of Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 556 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), a decision which was subsequently quashed by the Florida Supreme Court in Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363 (Fla.1990), which appellee concedes is now controlling. See also Raynor v. De La Nuez, 574 So. 2d 1091 (Fla.1991). We reverse and remand.
The Chorzelewskis brought an action against Manucor, among others, alleging negligence against Manucor on the basis of Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine. The complaint alleged that Steven Chorzelewski was injured as a result of the negligent operation of a vehicle Manucor had leased to Pinnacle Pools, Inc., which was being operated by Richard Rodgers.
In its motion for summary judgment, Manucor asserted that it had released beneficial ownership of the vehicle to Steven Greene, the lessee. Manucor argued that because it was not the owner of the vehicle, it could not be held liable for the lessee’s negligence under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, or in the alternative, that it was immune under section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1986), from the type of liability Chorzelewski attempted to impose.
The trial court granted Manucor’s motion for summary judgment on the first issue only, and entered final summary judgment in its favor. Thereafter, the supreme court decided Kraemer and appellee then conceded here its effect upon the merits to the extent of appellee’s contingent policy limits of $100,000 given the lapse of Greene’s policy at the time of the accident.
The sole issue here is whether there is additional liability on Manucor’s part beyond the policy or whether the policy satisfies its statutory obligation.
We remand with direction to the trial court to make a determination upon that issue, it not having been previously considered by the trial court in light of the subsequent, controlling decision in Kraemer. HERSEY, C.J., and LETTS and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.
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State v. Thomas, 599 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…tory appeal, pursuant to section 924.07(l)(h), Florida Statutes (1991), as a petition for writ of certiorari and deny relief because the State failed to show that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law. See State v. Fazekas, 575 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). See also State v. Smith, 260 So. 2d 489 (Fla.1972). Thomas filed a cross-appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of his motions to dismiss Counts I and IV and Counts V and VI of the information. We likewise treat the cross-a…
Authorities Cited
- Kraemer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1990)
- Kraemer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 556 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Raynor v. DE LA Nuez, 574 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1991)