WILLIAM POWIS, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY AND NANCY KRUG GERKEN, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that section 324.021(9) Florida Statutes (1983) does not create an exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine for long-term lessors.
Plaintiff appealed a final judgment entered after the lower court granted summary judgment for the defendant, Ford Motor Credit Company. The lower cou…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Statutory Exceptions cases and more on FLexlaw
[*736] PER CURIAM.
Powis appeals from a final judgment entered after the lower court granted Ford Motor Credit Company’s motion for summary judgment. The lower court found that section 324.021(9) Florida Statutes (1983), excepted a long-term lessor from liability under Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine.1
We reverse on the authority of Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363 (Fla.1990). In Kraemer the Florida Supreme Court rejected the contention that section 324.021(9)(a) created an exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Therefore, the lower court’s finding that section 324.021(9)(a) supported summary judgment in the instant case was in error.2
This cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
ANSTEAD, GLICKSTEIN and POLEN, JJ., concur. . This section was renumbered 324.021(9)(a) following the enactment of chapter 86-229, Laws of Florida.
. We note that the instant appeal does not address the issue of whether section 324.02 l(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1986), excepts a long-term lessor from liability under the Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine. See Folmar v. Young, 560 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), reh’g pending.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Trevisol v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 583 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…ty doctrine. We reverse on the authority of Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363 (Fla.1990). See also McCloud v. Wright, 579 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). This is the same result we reached in Powis v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 575 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), a separate case arising out of the same accident. We note that section 324.021(9)(b) does not relieve Ford of liability here. It applies only to leases requiring lessees to obtain, in addition to certain bodily injury insuranc…
Authorities Cited
- Kraemer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1990)
- Folmar v. Young, 560 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)