CHARLES HENRY WILLIAMS, PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE SIDNEY B. SHAPIRO, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Williams sought prohibition to prevent trial after the state filed informations charging him with attempted second-degree murder, arguing that a speedy trial rule's 15-day window had expired. The court denied prohibition, holding that the speedy trial rule only applies to persons charged by indictment or information, and Williams' earlier motion for discharge filed before any charging document existed was a nullity.
Williams is not entitled to relief under Rule 3.191. A motion for discharge filed before any indictment or information exists is a nullity because the rule applies only to persons charged by indictment or information, and the trial court lacks jurisdiction absent a charging document.
[1] A motion for discharge under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 is a nullity and has no effect when no charging document has been filed.
[2] The speedy trial rule applies only to persons charged with a crime by indictment or information.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it had no effect at all, and certainly not the one claimed here — that it set the fifteen-day window period running so as to require a discharge after it elapsed.”
Establishes that a motion for discharge filed before any charging document has no legal effect and does not trigger the speedy trial rule's 15-day window.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams was arrested on October 28, 1988, for attempted second-degree murder. The state announced "no action" on December 2, 1988, and Williams was r…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Speedy Trial Rule (Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191) cases and more on FLexlaw
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
Williams was taken into custody on October 28, 1988, for attempted second degree murder. No indictment or information, however, was then forthcoming, and pursuant to a “no action” announced by the state on December 2, 1988, he was thereupon released.
On December 29, 1989, at a time when a charging document had still not been filed, but which was far more than 180 days after the commencement, by the arrest, of the speedy trial time provided by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(1), he filed a motion for discharge under the rule. The fifteen-day “window of recovery” provided by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(i)(3) expired on January 13, 1990, without, of course, any action on the part of the court or the state.
On December 17, 1990, on the stated ground of the fifteen-day-plus lapse without trial, Williams moved for final discharge. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(i)(3). This action was in obvious anticipation of the fact that on December 18th and December 20th,1 the state indeed filed two separate informations formally charging him for the first time with the criminal acts which were the basis for the initial arrest. The motion for discharge was heard and denied on December 21, 1990, and the defendant has now sought prohibition to preclude the trial court from going forward. We deny the application.
Contrary to the sole contention of the defendant — who raises no constitutional claim arising out of an allegedly unreasonable pre-information delay or otherwise— we agree with the trial court that he is not entitled to relief under Rule 3.191. See State ex rel. Maines v. Baker, 254 So. 2d 207 (Fla.1971); Kanter v. State, 265 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).
The legal question before us is the effect on that issue of the motion for discharge filed on December 29, 1989, when there was no action pending in the circuit court. It is clear that it had no effect at all, and certainly not the one claimed here — that it set the fifteen-day window period running so as to require a discharge after it elapsed. This result is rendered no less than self-evident (a) by the express terms of the rule, which applies only to “person[s] charged with a crime by indictment or information,” Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1); (b) by the fact that the trial court, in the absence of a charging document, had no jurisdiction over the cause so that the motion for discharge must be deemed a nullity, see State v. Anderson, 537 So. 2d 1373 (Fla.1980); and (e) by the common sense of the situation: the state can hardly be required to bring a defendant to trial in a case which does not conceptually or actually even exist.
Prohibition denied.
. These dates were within the applicable statute of limitations as to the offenses which allegedly occurred on October 22, 1988.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Genden v. Fuller, 648 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1994)…plain language of the rule upon which to extend this rule of court procedure to instances in which a person has not [*1186] been charged by indictment or information. I find the reasoning of the Third District Court of Appeal in Williams v. Shapiro, 575 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 3d DCA1991), to be compelling in respect to a no-action situation, even though in that case, a motion to discharge was filed prior to the information being filed: The legal question before us is the effect on that issue of the motion for disc…
-
Fuller v. The Honorable Michael A. Genden, 630 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…. 92-3022, opinion filed, September 24, 1993) [18 FLW D2080] (majority opinion and Dauksch, J., specially concurring), vacated on rehearing, 627 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), directly so holds. Although our earlier decision of Williams v. Shapiro, 575 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) is to the contrary, we believe that it has been effectively overruled by Agee. Accordingly, on the authority of Agee, the petition for writ of prohibition is granted. We certify to the supreme court that this decision involves t…
-
Villavicencio v. State, 686 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…tate v. Agee, 622 So. 2d 473 (Fla.1993); Bloom v. McKnight, 502 So. 2d 422 (Fla.1987), overruled, State v. Agee, 622 So. 2d 473 (Fla.1993); State v. Dorian, 619 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), quashed, 642 So. 2d 1359 (Fla.1994); Williams v. Shapiro, 575 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Bottoson v. Singletary, 685 So. 2d 1302 (Fla.1997); Cox v. State, 407 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), review denied, 415 So. 2d 1359 (Fla…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Anderson, 537 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1989)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Lender Lee Maines & Charlie B. Brown v. The Honorable Paul Baker, 254 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1971)
- Kanter v. State, 265 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)