THE COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY AND GENERAL ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, APPELLANTS,
v.
WILLIAM RAMBO, APPELLEE
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The Coca-Cola Bottling Company and its carrier appealed an order determining the claimant's average weekly wage and awarding temporary workers' compensation benefits. The appellate court affirmed, holding that severance pay received by the claimant was properly included in the wage calculation and did not constitute salary continuation that would preclude temporary benefits.
The court held that competent, substantial evidence supported including the vehicle allowance, vacation pay, awards, and bonuses in the AWW calculation. The court also held that the severance pay was not salary continuation but rather an independent contractual right unrelated to the workers' compensation claim, and therefore the claimant was entitled to temporary benefits during the specified period.
[1] The value of fringe benefits, such as the use of a company vehicle, vacation pay, and awards, must be included in the calculation of an employee's average weekly wage for…
[2] Severance pay, contractually owed to an employee upon termination and contingent only on the execution of a release of claims (excluding workers' compensation), is not co…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the money paid claimant was not "salary continuation in lieu of compensation," but instead, was severance pay. Claimant was contractually entitled to the severance pay, amounting to one month's salary for every year of service, upon termination of his employment.”
Establishes the critical distinction that severance pay is an independent contractual right, not salary continuation that would preclude benefits.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRambo was employed by Coca-Cola and received various forms of compensation including a company vehicle ($30/week), vacation pay ($19.66/week), awards …
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PER CURIAM.
The employer/carrier (E/C) appeal an order determining claimant’s average weekly wage (AWW) and awarding temporary benefits from May 1, 1989, until August 31, 1989.
We find that there is competent, substantial evidence supporting the order appealed, which included the following in the calculation of claimant’s AWW: $30.00 per week for the use of a company vehicle; $19.66 per week vacation pay; $8.00 per week for “starchips” received by claimant as part of an employer’s award program; and the value of any bonuses claimant received for the last quarter of 1988.
We reject the E/C’s contention that claimant was not entitled to temporary benefits for the period claimed because the employer continued to pay the claimant’s salary for that period. The JCC found, correctly, that the money paid claimant was not “salary continuation in lieu of compensation,” but instead, was severance pay. Claimant was contractually entitled to the severance pay, amounting to one month’s salary for every year of service, upon termination of his employment. The right to receive this payment was not related to or dependent in any way upon the existence or nonexistence of a workers’ compensation claim at the time of termination.1 The only requirement for receipt of the payment was claimant’s execution of a release of all claims (excepting workers’ compensation) against the company.
AFFIRMED.
BOOTH, SMITH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. . Brown v. S.S. Kresge Company, Inc., 305 So. 2d 191 (Fla.1975), cited by the E/C, is inapposite. More to the point is Marion Correctional Institution v. Kriegel, 522 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 531 So. 2d 1354 (Fla.1988) (payment of accrued sick and leave time is independent contractual right agreed to as a condition of employment, and employer has no right to diminish his contractual obligation by refusing reimbursement of leave time expended by claimant while awaiting determination of his workers’ compensation claim).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Medina v. Miami Dade Cnty. & Risk Mgmt. of Dade Cnty., 300 So. 3d 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)…ot satisfied when the employer pays wages through a right that the claimant has to receive it, which is not related to or dependent in any way upon the existence or non-existence of a workers’ compensation claim. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Rambo, 576 So. 2d 394, 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Here, the Employer was not paying wages in lieu of workers’ compensation because it was sourcing the funds from Claimant’s bank of personal leave. In Woods v. St. Anthony’s Hospital, 586 So. 2d 415, 418–19 (Fla. 1st DCA 19…
Authorities Cited
- Vesta Mae Brown v. S. S. Kresge Co., Inc., 305 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1974)
- Marion Corr. Inst. v. Kriegel, 522 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)