JAMES FRANCIS DESMOND, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Desmond was convicted of kidnapping, armed robbery, aggravated battery, and aggravated assault. He challenged his convictions on appeal arguing the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction because his name was omitted from the body of the amended charging document. The court affirmed, finding he had implicitly submitted to the court's jurisdiction by entering pleas, waiving technical objections, proceeding to trial without complaint, and seeking affirmative relief.
The court held that Desmond submitted himself to the personal jurisdiction of the trial court through his actions and cannot challenge jurisdiction after conviction. The omission in the charging document was a technical deficiency that could have been remedied if raised timely, and Desmond's participation in the proceedings, including seeking and obtaining a judgment of acquittal on two counts, constituted an implicit submission to jurisdiction.
[1] A defendant waives the right to object to technical deficiencies in a charging document by entering a plea and proceeding to trial without objection.
[2] A defendant submits to the personal jurisdiction of the court by actively participating in the proceedings, including seeking affirmative relief, and cannot later challen…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A defendant should not be allowed to subject himself to a court's jurisdiction and defend his case in hope of an acquittal and then, if convicted, challenge the court's jurisdiction on the basis of a defect that could have been easily remedied if it had been brought to the court's attention earlier.”
Establishes the core principle preventing defendants from using selective participation to challenge jurisdiction after adverse rulings.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDesmond and Mathis were initially charged by information in April 1989. In June 1989, the state filed a first amended information naming only Mathis. …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Affirmative Relief cases and more on FLexlaw
PATTERSON, Judge.
Desmond challenges his convictions for kidnapping, armed robbery, aggravated battery, and aggravated assault. We affirm.
In a two-count information dated April 20, 1989, Desmond and Adam Lee Mathis were charged with kidnapping and armed robbery. On June 21, 1989, the state filed an amended information consisting of eight counts. Only Mathis was named in this amended information. On July 7, 1989, the state filed a second amended information which duplicated the first amended information except that Desmond’s name was added to the caption of the document. Only Mathis, and not Desmond, was named in the body of the information which set forth the charges. Not until after trial and conviction on six of the eight counts did Desmond move for discharge, contending that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he was not named in the body of the charging document. The trial court entered an order denying the motion, from which order this appeal is taken.
Desmond relies on Russell v. State, 349 So. 2d 1224 (Fla.2d DCA 1977), for support of his position that the trial court’s lack of personal jurisdiction over him now requires his discharge. In Russell, the names of the defendants were omitted from two counts of a multi-count indictment. The omission was discovered prior to trial and the trial court permitted the prosecutor to amend the indictment to add the omitted names. In reversing, this court held that an indictment may only be amended by the grand jury and the purported amendment by the prosecutor was a nullity. There fore, the trial court failed to acquire in personam jurisdiction over the defendants as to those charges. This case, although facially similar, is distinguishable. Here, Desmond entered pleas of not guilty as to each count of the second amended information and waived his right “to object to any technical deficiencies in the Information”; moved for discharge under the speedy trial rule; proceeded to trial without objection; and sought and obtained a judgment of acquittal as to two of the charges at the close of the state’s case. Only after conviction on the remaining charges did he assert a lack of in personam jurisdiction. We conclude that, under the totality of the facts here presented, Desmond submitted himself to the personal jurisdiction of the court and cannot now complain of a lack of jurisdiction over him. This is particularly true because he sought and received affirmative relief from the court in the form of the judgment of acquittal on two of the charges.
As our supreme court held in State v. King, 426 So. 2d 12, 15 (Fla.1982):
There is good reason for requiring defendants to register their objections with the trial court. A defendant should not be allowed to subject himself to a court’s jurisdiction and defend his case in hope of an acquittal and then, if convicted, challenge the court’s jurisdiction on the basis of a defect that could have been easily remedied if it had been brought to the court’s attention earlier. Neither the common law nor our statutes favor allowing a defendant to use the resources of the court and then wait until the last minute to unravel the whole proceeding. Sawyer v. State, 94 Fla. 60, 113 So. 736 (1927).
Desmond also asserted an error in sentencing which he now concedes. That point is therefore moot.
Affirmed.
SCHOONOVER, C.J., and PARKER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (71 total)
-
State v. Akers, 104 So. 3d 1259 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…fective); Hill v. State, 523 P. 2d 1114, 1116 (Okla.Crim.App.1974) (holding that an information that omitted the defendant’s name from the body but included it in the caption was facially sufficient). The trial court’s reliance on Desmond v. State, 576 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), and Russell v. State, 349 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), disapproved of on other grounds, Tingley v. State, 549 So. 2d 649 (Fla.l989),‘ is misplaced. It is true that this court determined that charging documents were facially de…
-
Griffin v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)…446 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (table decision); Griffin v. State, 104 So. 3d 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (table decision); Griffin v. State, 53 So. 3d 1035 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (table decision); Henry v. State, 933 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Desmond v. State, 576 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Edwards v. State, 128 So. 3d 134 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Golfe v. State, 125 So. 3d 876 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Wilson v. State, 109 So. 3d 240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Collins v. - 2 - State, 97 So. 3d 305 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Johnson v.…
-
Franciousha Rigell v. State, 782 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…clude that the trial court properly denied the motion. As to the remaining points, we also affirm. The failure to name the defendant in the information was not fundamental error and was waived by appellant’s failure to object. See Desmond v. State, 576 So. 2d 743, 744 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). With respect to the various identifications admitted by the trial court, we have reviewed the record and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them. On another issue, we have no trouble in…
Previewing 3 of 71 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. King, 426 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1982)
- Sawyer v. State, 94 Fla. 60 (Fla. 1927)
- Russell v. State, 349 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)