ELIZABETH JOANN WOLFF, APPELLANT,
v.
HENRY EDWARD WOLFF, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the former wife challenged both the trial court's award of custody to the former husband and its award of rehabilitative alimony instead of permanent periodic alimony. The court affirmed the custody designation but reversed the alimony award, holding that the wife's inability to become self-supporting in the foreseeable future warranted permanent rather than rehabilitative alimony.
The court affirmed the custody designation, finding no abuse of discretion. However, it reversed the alimony award, holding that permanent periodic alimony was appropriate because the wife lacked capacity to become self-supporting in a measurable period of time, and rehabilitative alimony requires evidence of such capacity.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in designating a primary residential custodian when extensive evidence supports the decision.
[2] Rehabilitative alimony requires evidence that the receiving spouse has the capacity to become self-supporting within a measurable period.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A rehabilitative alimony award must be based upon evidence that the receiving spouse has the capacity to develop or acquire the ability to become self-supporting in a measurable period of time.”
Establishes the legal standard for rehabilitative alimony eligibility
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married for fifteen years. The wife had not worked outside the home except for a brief period during an earlier separation, doing so …
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PER CURIAM.
In this appeal from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the appellant/former wife raises two points on appeal. She argues, (1) that the trial court erred in designating the appellee/former husband as the primary residential custodian of the parties’ minor child; and (2) that she should have been awarded permanent periodic alimony rather than rehabilitative alimony. We affirm as to the first point, but reverse and remand as to the second.
Extensive evidence was presented before the trial court regarding which of these parties should be designated the primary residential custodian of the parties’ minor child. After a careful review of such evidence and the trial court’s order, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in so designating the appellee. See Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22 (Fla.1975).
We find, however, that the trial court erred in awarding appellant rehabilitative alimony for one year, rather than the permanent periodic alimony she requested in her petition. The parties were married for fifteen years. With the exception of a very brief period of time during an earlier episode of marital difficulties and separation, the appellant has not worked outside the home, at the appellee’s request. The appellant was working at the time of the final hearing, but her net salary was only $515 per month, and she had no reasonable prospects of earning substantially more in the future. On the other hand, the appellee has a long work history and is earning a salary of more than four times that earned by the appellant.
A rehabilitative alimony award must be based upon evidence that the receiving spouse has the capacity to develop or acquire the ability to become self-supporting in a measurable period of time. Burke v. Burke, 401 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). A person is not self-supporting, however, just because she has a job and an income, for the courts consider the receiving spouse’s ability to support herself in a life-style similar to that enjoyed during the marriage. Askegard v. Askegard, 524 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 536 So. 2d 243 (Fla.1988). In this case, there is no evidence to suggest that after the expiration of the one-year rehabilitative period, the appellant’s ability to support herself will be any different than it was on the date of the final hearing. Under these circumstances, the award of rehabilitative alimony was error. Askegard; Evans v. Evans, 507 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
The facts of this case indicate that permanent alimony should be awarded. Accordingly, we will remand to the trial court for an appropriate award of permanent periodic alimony. The trial court is authorized to take additional testimony as to a reasonable amount.
That portion of the final judgment of dissolution of marriage in which the wife was awarded rehabilitative alimony is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for the award of permanent periodic alimony. In all other respects, the final judgment is affirmed.
ERVIN, ALLEN and WOLF, JJ., concur.
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Akers v. Akers, 582 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…ital assets by the court was fair and equitable, which we find not to be the case, the evidence requires an award of permanent rather than rehabilitative alimony, as a cursory review of recent cases applying settled law demonstrates. Wolff v. Wolff, 576 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Holmes v. Holmes, 579 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Meachum v. Meachum, 580 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); and see, as to the award of permanent alimony even where there has been a substantial distribution of assets, Hamlet v.…
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Zeigler v. Zeigler, 635 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…for the children, the courts of this state have reversed awards of temporary support in lieu of permanent alimony. Anderson v. Anderson, 617 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Shudlick v. Shud-lick, 618 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Wolff v. Wolff, 576 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Cruz v. Cruz, 574 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1990). Raising children constitutes a significant contribution to the family and frees the other spouse to pursue the wage-earning functions. In Bender v. Bender, 363 So. 2d 844, 845 (…1 / 2
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Demont v. Demont, 67 So. 3d 1096 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…umstances remain in flux. On this basis, the court awarded the wife only $50.00 monthly in permanent alimony. The wife correctly notes that even when she secures full-time employment, she will not necessarily be self-supporting. See Wolff v. Wolff, 576 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The trial court’s rulings on alimony [*1103] do not suggest otherwise. The court was faced with a situation where the wife clearly needs permanent alimony and the husband is obligated to pay the lion’s share of the family’s size…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975)
- Askegard v. Askegard, 524 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Evans v. Evans, 507 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Burke v. Burke, 401 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)