GLENDA NAHAR, ETC., ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
OROL MILDRED JAP-A-JOE NAHAR, ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1991-03-19
No. 90-801
Before JORGENSON, LEVY and GODERICH, JJ.
576 So. 2d 862 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1991) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Holding

A probate court cannot order that the costs of administration be paid out of assets, including a Totten trust account, which have not yet been determined to be subject to probate.


Headnotes

[1] A probate court cannot order that costs of administration be paid out of assets, including a Totten trust account, before determining those assets are subject to probate.

[2] Totten trust funds may be reached by creditors of the depositor during the depositor's lifetime, but this principle does not extend to paying estate administration costs…

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Facts & Procedural History

The probate court ordered that costs of administration be paid from a Totten trust account before determining if the account was subject to probate. T…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The issue raised on appeal is whether a probate court may order that the costs of administration be paid out of assets, including a Totten trust account, which the probate court has not yet determined are subject to probate. We find that it cannot.

The appellees rely on Kearney v. Unibay Co., Inc., 466 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), for the proposition that Totten trust funds may be used to pay the costs of administration, and that therefore, it is not necessary for the probate court to determine that the Totten trust account is subject to probate prior to authorizing that costs of administration be paid from the Totten trust account. The appellees’ reliance on Kearney is misplaced: Kearney does not deal with costs of administration, but deals with a living judgment debtor that was attempting to avoid the garnishment of a Totten trust fund. The Kearney court held that “[a] Totten trust can be reached by the creditors of the depositor.” 466 So. 2d at 272. The court went on to state that “[sjince the depositor has complete control over the deposit during his lifetime, however, he is treated as the owner insofar as his creditors are concerned. His creditors can reach the deposit while he is living, and can reach it as part of his estate on death.” Id. (citing Scott on Trusts § 330.12).

The appellees argue that they are “creditors” pursuant to section 733.707(2), Florida Statutes (1989),1 and that therefore, they may reach the Totten trust funds. On the other hand, as the appellants correctly argue, pursuant to section 733.707(2), disbursements to creditors may be made only from estate assets. As stated above, the probate court has not yet made a determination as to whether the Totten trust account is subject to probate and therefore, an estate asset.

Moreover, in Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So. 2d 726 (Fla.1956), the Supreme Court of Florida held that a Totten trust account passes directly to the beneficiary of the account unless the depositor, during his lifetime, revokes the trust. In Seymour, the administrator of the estate claimed the Totten trust account as part of the estate. In response, the beneficiary petitioned for a decree declaring that he was entitled to the funds in the Totten trust account. The trial court found in favor of the administrator, and the beneficiary appealed. The Supreme Court of Florida, in finding in favor of the beneficiary, stated that:

A deposit by one person of his own money in his own name as trustee for another, standing alone, does not establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or declaration, such as delivery of the passbook or notice to the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary without revocation, or some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand at the death of the depositor. Seymour, 85 So. 2d at 727 (quoting In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748, 752, 70 L.R.A. 711 (1904)).

Thus, pursuant to Seymour, Totten trust accounts pass directly to the beneficiary and not to the estate, unless there was a revocation of the trust prior to the depositor's death.

Since non-probate assets may not be used to pay probate expenses, see In re Barret’s Estate, 137 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962), administration costs and the administrator’s attorney’s fees may not be paid out of assets which the probate court has not yet determined are subject to probate.

In conclusion, we find that the funds from the Totten trust account may not be used to pay the estate’s costs of administration, unless the probate court first finds that the funds from the Totten trust account are subject to probate.2

Accordingly, we reverse the probate court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith.

. Section 773.707(2), Florida Statutes (1989) provides as follows: "After paying any preceding class, if the estate is insufficient to pay all of the next succeeding class, the creditors of the latter class shall be paid ratably in proportion to their respective claims.”

. The administrator's fees and costs were also to be paid from funds held by the Clerk of the Circuit Court. There has been no determination as to whether these funds are or are not subject to probate. Likewise, they should not be used to pay administration costs at this time.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Nahar v. Oral Mildred Jap-A-Joe Nahar, 656 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
    …the trial court to resolve any issues regarding the disposition of the Miami real estate in the first instance. We find no error in the trial court’s order charging the marshaled assets with the cost incurred in marshaling same. See Nahar v. Nahar, 576 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); In re Estate of Katz, 501 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Perez v. Lopez, 454 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). The trial court properly ordered the Administrator Ad Litem to pay these expenses from the assets of Roebi’s estate. We h…
  • Barnard v. Gunter, 625 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
    …ust “is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will until the depositor” or owner or grantor of the funds dies. Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla. 1956) (citing In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904)); see also Nahar v. Nahar, 576 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); First Nat’l Bank of Tampa v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Tampa, 196 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). As such, Mary was free to revoke the accounts at any time prior to her death. Vivian had no interest in the trust accounts upo…
  • Ullman v. Garcia, 645 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
    …is that the devisee of a revocable trust does not have any control over ownership of the trust property until the settlor’s death. See Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So. 2d 726 (Fla.1956); Barnard v. Gunter, 625 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Nahar v. Nahar, 576 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Since the settlor has the absolute right to end the trust at any time and to distribute the trust property in any manner, those named as beneficiaries are merely potential devisees. Accordingly, as noted in Paananen, 581 So. 2d…

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