RENE E. LAMAR AND CELESTINO BORRON, APPELLANTS,
v.
E. SNOW MARTIN, TRUSTEE, APPELLEE
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Lamar and Borron appealed the denial of their motion for change of venue in a guaranty dispute, arguing the cause of action accrued in Dade County where they reside and where performance is due. The court reversed, holding that a guaranty agreement is akin to a contract for services and venue is therefore proper in the county where services are to be performed.
The court reversed and held that venue is proper in Dade County. A guaranty agreement is analogous to a contract for services rather than a traditional debtor-creditor relationship, so the cause of action accrues where the services are to be performed—the county where the guarantors reside and performance is due.
[1] A cause of action accrues in the county where the services are to be performed for venue purposes when a guaranty agreement is akin to a contract for services.
[2] A debtor-creditor relationship does not exist between a guarantor and the company to whom the debt is owed for venue purposes when the guaranty is merely a promise to aid…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In Knowles, we found that a debtor-creditor relationship did not exist between the guarantor of a debt and the company to whom the debt was owed. Since the guaranty in that case was merely a promise to aid in securing a debt, the guaranty agreement itself was more akin to a contract for services.”
Establishes the legal principle that guaranty agreements are treated as contracts for services rather than debtor-creditor relationships for venue purposes.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLamar and Borron guaranteed repayment of a payloader purchased from H.F. Mason Equipment Corp. in the event the purchaser defaulted. The equipment was…
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HALL, Judge.
This is an interlocutory appeal in which Lamar and Borron challenge the denial of their motion for a change of venue. They contend that the cause of action in this case accrued in Dade County, the county where Lamar and Borron reside and the county where services under the guaranty agreement at issue are to be performed. We agree.
The trial court found a debtor-creditor relationship existed between Lamar and Borron, as guarantors, and H. F. Mason Equipment Corp., the seller of a payloader for which Lamar and Borron guaranteed repayment in the event of the purchaser’s default. The H. F. Mason stockholders are represented here by trustee Martin. Since venue is generally proper in the county where the creditor resides, the trial court found this action was properly filed in Polk County, where trustee Martin resides.
The facts of this case are analogous to the facts set forth in Knowles v. Imperial Lumber Co., Inc., 238 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). In Knowles, we found that a debtor-creditor relationship did not exist between the guarantor of a debt and the company to whom the debt was owed. Since the guaranty in that case was merely a promise to aid in securing a debt, the guaranty agreement itself was more akin to a contract for services. Therefore, for venue purposes, the cause of action accrued where the services were to be performed — the home county of the guarantor. In the case at bar, it appears Lamar and Borron’s guaranty was, likewise, no more than a promise to aid in securing a debt. For that reason, it, too, was more akin to a contract for services.
The record shows the equipment was purchased from H. F. Mason in Dade County. Borron and Lamar also reside in Dade County, and that is where their guaranty agreement was executed. In addition, Dade County is where performance is due under the agreement. Based on the foregoing, it appears the cause of action in this case properly arose in Dade County. Therefore, the trial court’s ruling should be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to transfer the action to Dade County.
RYDER, A.C.J., and PARKER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Sundor Brands, Inc. v. Groves Co., Inc., 604 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…. v. Barrett, 155 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963). See also Whittington v. Laney, 566 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Defendants similarly contend that a cause of action for breach of a guarantee accrues where the guarantee was made. Lamar v. Martin, 576 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). According to defendants, because the closing took place in Dade County, the cause of action accrued there. Although we question the applicability of Sundor’s case authorities to many, if not all, of the claims contained in the a…
Authorities Cited
- James A. Knowles, Inc. v. Imperial Lumber Co., Inc., 238 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)