CRAIG P. ECENRODE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court affirmed a sentence and rejected a vagueness challenge to sentencing guidelines' permitted range, but reversed the imposition of costs for lack of notice.
The permitted range in Florida's sentencing guidelines is not unconstitutionally vague and represents an appropriate preservation of judicial discretion.
[1] Costs cannot be imposed upon a defendant without prior notice.
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In exercising this little remaining discretion a sentencing judge can reward or punish, free or restrict, or set an example through the act of slightly enhancing or slightly reducing one defendant's sentence over another.”
The court explained the purpose and legitimacy of judicial discretion within sentencing guidelines.
Craig Ecenrode appealed his sentence, challenging the constitutionality of the permitted range in Florida's sentencing guidelines on vagueness grounds…
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DAUKSCH, Judge.
This is an appeal from a sentence. We are urged to declare unconstitutional the “permitted range” in the sentencing guidelines statutory scheme on account of its vagueness. We decline to do so. Historically, in Florida and most jurisdictions, the judiciary are given the discretion to tailor a sentence appropriate to each defendant appearing in court. Recently, in Florida and some jurisdictions, the discretion of judges to impose appropriate sentences has been curtailed by sentencing guidelines statutes and rules. The “permitted range" in Florida’s sentencing guidelines is an appropriate remnant of the preexisting judicial discretion and is best preserved for the benefit of all defendants and society. In exercising this little remaining discretion a sentencing judge can reward or punish, free or restrict, or set an example through the act of slightly enhancing or slightly reducing one defendant’s sentence over another. This is in line with the traditional reasons judges were given discretion in the first place, before prison overcrowding.
The defendant was not given notice before costs were imposed. See Harriel v. State, 520 So. 2d 271 (Fla.1988); Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984); Burgess v. State, 569 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Rowe v. State, 558 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).
Sentence affirmed; costs reversed, remanded for proper imposition of costs.
COBB and DIAMANTIS, JJ„ concur.
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Speed v. State, 732 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…a.1998); Jones v. State, 652 So. 2d 346 (Fla.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 202, 133 L.Ed.2d 136 (1995). AFFIRMED. GOSHORN and ANTOON, JJ., concur. . Now codified as section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (1998). . See Ecenrode v. State, 576 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). . See Kirk v. State, 663 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). . We do have one profound reservation in .regard to the Act, but it is not based on separation of powers but rather on substantive due process. Our concern is prompted…
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Hall v. State, 773 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…we note that before the implementation of sentencing guidelines, “[historically, in Florida and most jurisdictions, the judiciary are given the discretion to tailor a sentence appropriate to each defendant appearing in court.” See Ecenrode v. State, 576 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). Appellant also argues that the CPC is unreasonable because it permits the state to appeal a downward departure sentence, see § 924.07(l)(i), Fla. Stat. (1998), but does not allow a defendant to appeal an upward departure. See §…
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Kiawanna D. Payne v. State, 795 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…PER CURIAM.' Affirm. See Ecenrode v. State, 576 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984)
- Harriel v. State, 520 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1988)
- Rowe v. State, 558 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
- Burgess v. State, 569 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)