HAPAG-LLOYD, A.G., APPELLANT,
v.
MARINE INDEMNITY INSURANCE CO. OF AMERICA, ET AL., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Hapag-Lloyd sold stevedoring equipment with defective wiring to Marine Indemnity Insurance, which discovered the defect but continued operating the equipment for four weeks without notifying the seller. After an explosion caused by the defective wiring, Marine Indemnity sued for breach of express warranty. The court reversed the judgment, holding that Marine Indemnity's failure to provide timely notice of the discovered breach barred recovery under Florida's UCC provisions.
The court held that as a matter of law, the buyer failed to provide notice within a reasonable time after discovering the breach and therefore is barred from any remedy for breach of warranty under Florida Statutes § 672.607(3)(a).
[1] A buyer who discovers a breach of warranty must provide the seller with notice within a reasonable time after discovery or be barred from any remedy.
[2] Failure to notify a seller of a discovered defect until after the loss caused by the breach has occurred may constitute an unreasonable delay in providing notice.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the buyer did not give the notice to the seller of the alleged breach "within a reasonable time after [it] discover[] or should have discovered any breach," as is required to permit a recovery for breach of warranty under section 672.607(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979).”
Establishes the legal standard for notice requirements under Florida's UCC and applies it to the facts
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHapag-Lloyd sold a 'toploader' stevedoring equipment to Marine Indemnity Insurance. A responsible official of the buyer discovered defective wiring in…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Notice Of Breach cases and more on FLexlaw
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
After a jury trial, the appellee-purchaser won a judgment for breach of an express warranty of soundness in the sale of a piece of stevedoring equipment by the appellant. We reverse with directions to enter judgment for the appellant.
The undisputed testimony1 established that a responsible official of the buyer was aware of the defective wiring in the engine of the “toploader” in question, which constituted the alleged breach of warranty sued upon, but nevertheless determined, without notifying the seller, to continue to use the equipment in its defective state until the defect could be repaired. In fact, the appellee did operate the toploader for at least four weeks, without repair or notice, until the wiring caused an explosion in the engine which severely damaged the equipment. The purchaser gave notice of the claim that the express warranty had been breached only after the accident and damages had occurred.
In these circumstances, we find as a matter of law that the buyer did not give the notice to the seller of the alleged breach “within a reasonable time after [it] discovered] or should have discovered any breach,” as is required to permit a recovery for breach of warranty under section 672.-607(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979).2 General Matters, Inc. v. Paramount Canning Co., 382 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). It is obvious that the failure to afford the seller reasonable notice of an already-discovered defect until after the loss caused by the breach of warranty had already occurred — when, as clearly appears, the seller could have remedied the defect and prevented the loss — requires a conclusion that, as the statute provides, the buyer is “barred from any remedy.” See Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F. 2d 1092 (11th Cir.1983); Running Springs Assocs. v. Masonite Corp., 680 F. 2d 469 (6th Cir.1982); K & M Joint Venture v. Smith Inti, Inc., 669 F. 2d 1106 (6th Cir.1982); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F. 2d 957 (5th Cir.1976).
Reversed.
. See Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Mynick, 91 Fla. 918, 109 So. 193 (1926) (negative statement of witness that condition not seen or heard insufficient to overcome positive testimony to the contrary).
. 672.607 Effect of acceptance; notice of breach; burden of establishing breach after acceptance; notice of claim or litigation to person answerable over.—
**
(3) Where a tender has been accepted:
(a) The buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Myrick, 91 Fla. 918 (Fla. 1926)
- Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983)
- E. AIR Lines, Inc. v. McDONNELL Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976)
- K & M Joint Venture v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 669 F.2d 1106 (6th Cir. 1982)
- Gen. Matters, Inc. v. Paramount Canning Co., 382 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Running Springs Assocs. v. Masonite Corp., 680 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1982)