MCARTHUR MYRICK, APPELLANT,
v.
GILLARD GROVE SERVICE AND FEISCO, APPELLEES
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McArthur Myrick appealed a workers' compensation order dismissing his claim for a June 21, 1988 accident. The court reversed, holding that the employer/carrier's pretrial stipulation accepting the accident date and compensability was binding on the Judge of Compensation Claims and could not be rejected based on conflicting evidence alone.
Once an employer/carrier stipulates to the date of injury and existence of a compensable accident, the issue of compensability becomes moot and the stipulation is binding on the Judge of Compensation Claims. A stipulated fact may be rejected only if unsupported by any evidence or if the stipulation is void due to fraud, overreaching, misrepresentation, or similar circumstances. The existence of conflicting evidence does not constitute grounds for rejecting a stipulation.
[1] A stipulation by an employer/carrier accepting the date of injury and the compensability of an accident renders the issue of whether the claimant suffered an accident moo…
[2] By making a pretrial stipulation accepting the date of injury and the existence of a compensable accident, the employer/carrier waives the right to make compensability an…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Once the EC make a pretrial stipulation accepting the date of injury and the existence of a compensable accident, the issue of whether the claimant suffered an accident is moot by the time of the final hearing.”
Establishes the core principle that pretrial stipulations regarding compensable accidents become moot and binding
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMyrick was involved in two workplace accidents: one on March 1, 1988 (non-compensable, undisputed) and another on June 21, 1988. The employer/carrier …
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PER CURIAM.
McArthur Myrick, the claimant below, appeals a workers’ compensation order which dismisses his claim for benefits finding that he did not have a compensable accident. We reverse.
Claimant was involved in two accidents, one on March 1, 1988, and the other on June 21, 1988. The non-compensability of the March 1 accident is not in dispute. With regard to the June 21 accident, however, the employer/carrier (EC) stipulated as to both the accident date and its compensability. The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC), contrary to the EC’s stipulation, found that the June 21 accident was not compensable and denied benefits. In doing so, he erred.
Once the EC make a pretrial stipulation accepting the date of injury and the existence of a compensable accident, the issue of whether the claimant suffered an accident is moot by the time of the final hearing. Coq v. Fuchs Baking Co., 507 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). When the EC made the stipulation they waived the right to make compensability an issue. DOT v. King, 554 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). The fact that there was some conflicting evidence as to the accident date and compensability does not constitute grounds for the JCC to reject the stipulation. Christian v. Greater Miami Academy, 541 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). The JCC can reject a stipulated fact only if it is unsupported by any evidence. Id.; Fuller Lumber Co. v. Parler, 390 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1980). A stipulated fact supported by conflicting evidence may be set aside only upon a showing that the stipulation is void due to fraud, overreaching, misrepresentation or similar circumstances which render an agreement void. Maggard v. Montverde Academy, 505 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Espada Enterprises, Inc. v. Spiro, 481 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The JCC made no such finding here, nor would one be supported by the record. The EC never sought to have the stipulation set aside, and the JCC never declared it void. The joint stipulation of the parties is binding on the JCC, and a finding by the JCC at variance with the stipulation will be overturned. Wright v. Golf Drive Residence, Inc., 412 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
In light of our holding, we do not need to reach the remaining issues on appeal which include whether the JCC erred in failing to allow claimant to reopen his case once he became aware that the compensability of the June 21 accident was disputed by the JCC. Accordingly, we reverse the finding that the June 21 accident was not compensable, and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
NIMMONS, BARFIELD and ALLEN, JJ., concur.
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Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1996)…but, after acknowledging that Floyd would have to be recalled, accepted the stipulation. By stipulating to allowing Demon Floyd’s testimony to be used as substantive evidence, appellant waived any claim of error. See Myrick v. Gillard Grove Service, 577 So. 2d 655, 656 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Therefore, we find that the trial court did not commit any error. As his ninth claim, appellant contends that the trial court erred by disallowing appellant to comment, during closing argument, on the state’s failure to ca…
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Wren v. DMS, Inc., 821 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…uestion of compensability at the commencement of the hearing, and that the psychiatric claim was no longer at issue. The judge thus should not have addressed this issue on the merits in the appealed order. See Myrick v. Gillard [*459] Grove Service, 577 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The finding pertaining to the question of a psychiatric injury is therefore stricken from the order, and as amended the order is affirmed. ALLEN, C.J., ERVIN and KAHN, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Lucien COQ v. Fuchs Baking Co. & GAB Bus. Servs., 507 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Espada Enters., Inc. v. Spiro, 481 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Wright v. Golf Drive Residence, Inc., 412 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- D.O.T. v. King, 554 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Fuller Lumber Co. v. Parler, 390 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1980)
- Boyd Maggard v. Montverde Acad. & Mission Ins. Co., 505 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Christian v. Greater Miami Acad. & Crawford & Co., 541 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)