RAJEEV JAIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1991-04-12
No. 90-01687
SCHOONOVER, C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur.
577 So. 2d 1002 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1991) Caution
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Rajeev Jain was charged with cocaine possession with intent to sell after police discovered cocaine during a pat-down search. The court held that the detective lacked the requisite founded suspicion to justify the Terry stop because the information relied upon was stale, and therefore reversed and remanded with directions to grant the motion to suppress.


Holding

The court held that Detective Bowlin did not possess the founded suspicion necessary to stop the appellant because the information was stale—revealing only that the appellant had participated in a crime two or three months previously—and the detective could not remember how recently the informant had observed the cocaine sales. Therefore, the stop was illegal and the cocaine discovered during the search must be suppressed.


Headnotes

[1] A law enforcement officer may temporarily detain a person if the officer has a founded suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a cri…

[2] Information regarding past criminal activity, without more, is insufficient to establish a founded suspicion for a Terry stop if the information is stale.

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Key Quotes

“A law enforcement officer may temporarily detain a person if the officer has a founded suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.”

Establishes the legal standard for a valid Terry stop under Florida law

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Facts & Procedural History

Detective Bowlin had made two indirect cocaine purchases from Jain months prior through an intermediary and had information from a confidential inform…

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Opinion of the Court
HALL, Judge.

HALL, Judge.

The appellant, Rajeev Jain, was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. He challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, asserting that Detective Bowlin did not have a founded suspicion to stop and search him and, therefore, his motion to suppress should have been granted. We agree.

Several months prior to stopping the appellant, Detective Bowlin made two indirect purchases of cocaine from the appellant through a Donald Meeker. At the time of these transactions, Meeker identified the appellant as his supplier. Prior to these transactions, a confidential informant had advised Detective Bowlin that the appellant was regularly putting cocaine in his vehicle when he was not at his apartment and visiting various lounges within Hills-borough County with cocaine on his person for sale.

About one month prior to stopping and arresting the appellant, Detective Bowlin went on leave, returning to work on January 4, 1990. On that date, the confidential informant advised the detective that he had seen the appellant dealing in cocaine at some point in time prior to January 4 and that the appellant was continuing to follow his pattern and method of selling cocaine.

In response to this information, Detective Bowlin and his partner went to the appellant’s apartment complex. The appellant’s vehicle was not at the complex, but after waiting a short time, the detectives observed a woman approach the appellant’s residence, knock on the door, receive no response, and return to her vehicle and wait. Subsequently, the appellant drove up to his apartment, exited his vehicle, and walked over to a set of mailboxes at the southeast corner of the complex. At that time, the detectives approached the appellant, identified themselves, and told him they had information that he was transporting cocaine. The appellant stated that he did not have any cocaine. The detectives then asked to pat down the appellant and had him put his hands on the hood of the car. During the search, cocaine was discovered in the appellant’s right front pocket.

A law enforcement officer may temporarily detain a person if the officer has a founded suspicion that the person has com mitted, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. § 901.151, Fla.Stat. (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Simons, 549 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).

Detective Bowlin’s testimony at the suppression hearing reveals that he did not possess the founded suspicion necessary to stop the appellant. The information possessed by Detective Bowlin only revealed the appellant had participated in a crime two or three months previously. Even if we consider the information received by the detective the day he stopped the appellant, he could not remember how recently the confidential informant stated he had seen the appellant selling cocaine. Also, Detective Bowlin testified that the appellant was not committing any crime when he was stopped.

The use of stale information will not create the founded suspicion necessary to support a Terry stop. Since the stop of the appellant was illegal, the cocaine found during the ensuing search must be suppressed.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to grant the motion to suppress.

SCHOONOVER, C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • M.D. v. State, 65 So. 3d 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
    …the informant’s knowledge. Because the tip was both stale and given without corroboration, it did not constitute probable cause to search. Indeed, it is difficult to see how such information could even create reasonable suspicion. See Jain v. State, 577 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (finding stale information, standing alone, cannot create reasonable suspicion). [*573] The majority argues that the tip in itself constituted sufficient reason to conduct the search because it concerned a student carrying a…
  • Austin v. State, 640 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
    …at 803. Here the source claimed to have witnessed several criminal transactions by appellant. Although it is true that stale information may not be used to create the founded suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop, see Jain v. State, 577 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), the information, while three weeks old, was not stale. There was a series of communications about an ongoing pattern of criminal conduct consistent with the officer’s own knowledge of how drug transactions are conducted. In this…
  • Beckham v. State, 934 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
    …rmants knew of this activity was not included in the testimony provided to the trial court. This court has stated that “[t]he use of stale information will not create the founded suspicion necessary to support” an investigatory stop. Jain v. State, 577 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Here, the State presented evidence that “within a week or two” prior to the officers’ contact with Beckham they had been told that he had been selling drugs. While this evidence established a time frame for when the officer…

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